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It is appropriate that the University of Nebraska should publish, 
as a grateful memorial, the principal work which Professor Frye left 
behind him at his death in 1934. And it is especially appropriate because 
not only the work itself but the very spirit which animated it was 
engendered here on the spot, in the sparse leisure of his nearly forty 
years of teaching. For when he came, in the middle nineties, he had 
a bent toward science and mathematics; and it was here, paradoxically 
through friendship with a man of science, Louis Trenchard More, that 
he turned his face to the Greeks. Through this friendship he later 
came to know Mr. More's brother, Paul Elmer More, and Irving Babbitt, 
with whose names his own is associated by the tie of their common 
humanism. 
Meantime, in his early days here, he published a volume of verse, 
The Substance of His House, and then, like Cousin's young men 
of Paris, settled down in a garret to starve and read Plato. His pen 
was soon busy, however, giving expression, through literary criticism, 
to the double strain in him of poet and rationalist. It was this double 
strain, probably, that enabled him, drawing upon both, to give such 
depth and clarity and precision to the distinction between the classic 
and the romantic spirits in literature and life-a distinction which 
served him as his critical point d'appui. Most of his shorter criticisms 
appeared first in the Independent, the Bookman, and the Nation; the longer 
ones in UniverJity of Nebraska Studies and the University's Mid-West 
Quarterly, which latter he founded, and edited almost single-handed 
for over four years. Selections from among these publications, together 
with numerous fresh studies, he issued from time to 'time in book form: 
Literary Reviews and Criticisms in 1908, Romance and Tragedy in 
1922, and Visions and Chimeras in 1928. 
That a humanist should write about Plato needs scarcely more ex-
planation than that a man of science should write about natural phenomena. 
The text of the present volume, however, does need a prefatory remark. 
To say that the several essays, or chapters, which make it up were not 
composed for publication is too sweeping, for the one on "Plato's Political 
Ideas" appeared entire in the Mid-West Quarterly in 1914, and one section 
of "The Dialogues" appeared in 1928 in ia congratulatory volume to Charles 
Francis Johnson of Trinity. Both these passages, therefore, had the final 
care which the imminent prospect of print induces in any author. But 
these passages make up less than a third of the whole; the rest was left 
in still fluid manuscript. Not, indeed, that it was left unrevised. The 
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half-sheets, originally crossed with the crotchets of an almost microscopic 
handwriting, were recrossed, interlined, and supplemented on scraps pinned 
to the margin-sometimes in the interest of a finer clarity, a subtler nuance, 
or a denser coherence, sometimes of a juster cadence in the rhythm of the 
sentence. It is but just to Professor Frye's memory, however, to record 
that the larger part of the text never underwent his final and telling 
scrutiny. 
How telling that scrutiny could be, anyone with a mind exigent of 
precision and an ear attuned to the rhythms of prose may discover by 
turning to Romance and Tragedy and reading the "Racine," or the 
"Shakespeare and Sophocles," or to Visions and Chimeras and reading the 
"Pascal" or the "Montaigne." But much of the distinctive flavor of the 
man is here-the elegiac note that seems inseparable from the richer cadences 
of the English sentence, the sub-humor of a new turn given to an old 
idiom, and above all the intimate sense as of a mind thinking, and moving 
forward, phrase by phrase, in an ardent intensity of concern for the high 
significance of the theme. That these essays were a labor of love is made 
clear in the text and is apparent in the span of years covered by their 
composition. That the rendering of the text has been a labor of love rather 
than of erudition is the apology of the editors. 
vi 
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As a contribution to Platonic scholarship the following essays will 
turn out, I am afraid, to be thoroughly insignificant. If so I am sorry 
for it; I owe so much to Plato that I should like to make some sort of 
adequate acknowledgment. But unfortunately I am neither profound nor 
erudite; while the difficulty of my position is increased by the fact that 
I am by no means sure of being so good a Platonist as I could wish to be, 
particularly when I ponder the opinions of many who have no doubt of 
their own competence. By early reading I was confirmed a realist if not 
a materialist, a creature whom, for that matter, I continue to hold in greater 
esteem than an idealist, so stubborn are my youthful prejudices. I grew up 
with Spencer, Darwin, and Huxley, Bain, Maudsley, and Clifford in my 
hands-and what expositors they were !-and I still feel more at home in 
their lowly dwellings than on the dizzy pinnacles of the metaphysicians, 
whom I have frequented of later years. It was all so plain and solid and 
settled in those happy days when matter and energy were capable of any-
thing, when consciousness was only a nervous tremor, and thought a mode 
of motion. Has such a fare come to seem a little juiceless and innutritious? 
And yet in comparison with the spidery fabrics of the transcendentalists, 
how rich and varied the picture, how detailed and copious the panorama, 
in which all the myriad forms of nature took their places, as evolution 
unrolled its transformations one after another from "an indefinite, inco-
herent homogeneity" ( if I may borrow the terminology of the Spencerian 
u:n:Et(.)OV) to that triumph of differentiation and! integration, the body and 
brain of man! What a semblance of order and gradation with every 
variation catalogued and etiquetted ! 
And yet in a system which engaged to dispose of everything, and did 
in fact dispose of so much, there was one fatal omission. It took care of 
man and his appetites, but for his aspirations it made little or no provi-
sion-for to a sympathetic tie or bond of union with the powers and 
agencies about him it was quite indifferent. With his moral scruples it 
left him alien and estranged, a horrified spectator, in the midst of cre-
ation - so that even for Huxley his highest activities would seem to 
be exercised in defiance of the nature which conceived him. In this respect 
the advantage lies with spiritualism. But how insubstantial the founda-
tion, how flimsy the superstructure-a bare framework or shell of gener-
ality and abstraction! I acknowledge the "naivete", the credulousness 
required to accept the validity of the outer world on the evidence of the 
senses; but practically we do so accept it, and having once done so are 
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bound to recognize its multiformity and discreteness. For as a mere shadow 
of mind, a specter of reality, there is about it a disconcerting obduracy, 
a maddening refractoriness ( &.vd.yxri) which the architects of idealism 
have never yet succeeded in reckoning with. 
Now, I do not suppose that Plato himself has done anything like justice 
to generation; such was not his original purpose. And yet it is indubitable 
that he insists upon certain facts and distinctions that those other phil-
osophers have ignored or slighted. In particular, for all their differences, 
both idealist and materialist (I use the terms roughly for the two orders 
of rationalism) unite in packing all creation aboard one boat, like Pyrrho 
and his pig-man and beast, stock and stone, the sentient and the in-
sentient promiscuously under a single set of articles or bill of lading. 
In this confusion, incident to every system of monism, idealism is by all 
odds the worse offender, since materialism does concede, at least tacitly, 
a sort of practical efficiency to mind, whereas idealism tends but to attenu-
ate and impoverish actuality the more typical and absolute it becomes. 
For this reason, if Plato were living to-day, I am convinced that he would 
take the greater interest in science.1 Such an opinion is contrary, I know, 
to the general belief which persists in affiliating Platonism with the trans-
cendental metaphysics. But then I am neither an idealist nor a meta-
physician; and if one or both of these characters are indeed essential to 
the Platonist, then I can hardly claim the privilege of a disciple, and 
must seek some other justification for venturing upon this ground at all. 
It is nearly a hundred years now since Cousin complained that outside 
of six or seven poverty-stricken students starving in the garrets of Paris, 
Plato was virtually unknown to his generation; and while he spoke, of 
course, for his country solely, the case could not have been very much 
better, I imagine, elsewhere. That the situation has changed completely 
in the course of a century it would be idle to deny. Partly at Cousin's 
instance, but mainly for other causes, the concern for Plato has grown 
amazingly. The "literature" of the last decade or two alone would crowd 
a good-sized book-case, if not an entire library. So far so good. The 
difficulty is that the subject, in developing, has tended to become a kind 
of vested interest, the affair of "specialists," Fachmanner-so much so that 
for a layman to venture an opinion on the subject, or even for a critic to 
express himself in the premises otherwise than in certain set and appointed 
ways, is looked upon as something of an indiscretion if not an impert-
inence. In this respect Plato's plight is not unlike Shakespeare's. As there 
1 For that matter he would be more likely to sympathize with the realists than 
with the idealists-almost anybody but the idealists-for he did at least believe in "the 
d1Scovery of a world independent of the perceiver," however he might differ with some 
of them regarding the character of that world. 
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is an exclusive and official Shakespearean scholarship, so there has come 
to be an equally jealous Platonic faculty, of which no one is free who 
has not undergone his novitiate and initiation at the hands of a regularly 
ordained pontiff. And in the meantime Plato, like Shakespeare, is in 
danger of ceasing to be a liberal study and is turning into a profession-
if the mischief is not done already-though it is not merely with the 
erudite that he must count but with the serious-minded at large, if he 
is to count as an influence at all. To them, like his master Socrates, he 
was not ashamed to address himself directly; it was for them in the main 
that he wrote, and it was they whom he must have hoped to awaken and 
inspire. In spirit Platonism is not properly a technology; it is a humanity. 
But· unfortunately the present is an age with more regard for learning. 
Hence its struggles, when it busies itself with the subject at all, to find, 
like Aristotle, in Platonism, by hook or crook, a body of knowledge, a 
science of some sort,-a logic or metaphysic, an epistemology, even a 
scheme of natural "law"; or at least an esoteric art and "mystery." But 
just as the observations of any thoughtful man when inspired by Shake-
peare are likely to prove suggestive and haply instructive, it is a great 
pity that there should not be more general converse with Plato too. There 
will be few enough at best who seek to him-how many intimates has 
he now for all his commentators and expositors? "Who has time now-
adays to read Plato?" asks Gissing. "Perhaps fifty people in the United 
Kingdoms-if so many." And they should rather be welcomed and 
encouraged than rebuffed or even tolerated on sufferance2• 
It would be hard to find even in our literature-certainly, it cannot 
be found among the Elizabethans, including Shakespeare himself-a clearer 
mirror of the times than that which Plato holds up before our civilization. 
The people among whom he lived and with whom he colonized his 
writings are not so very dissimilar from our own. Like us the Athenians 
were thoroughly democratic; they were great talkers, tremendous boasters, 
unconscionable politicians; quite devoid of scruples, corruptible, venal, dis-
honest; luxurious and extravagant, with an insatiable thirst for novelty 
and distraction, self-indulgent, materially minded, capable of paying them-
selves with words to any extent, skeptical, arrogant, self-conceited, and super-
stitious. As for their worst vices, if the failure of Greek civilization was 
due, as some moralists like to believe, to their contempt of the feminine 
ideal, what shall be said of our efforts to obliterate the distinction in 
favor of a civilization essentially epicene? And though I may be mistaken 
in thinking for my own part that the Nemesis of the Athenians was 
2 As an offset to this sort of deformation it is a relief to read a book like E. J. 
Urwick's The Message of Plato for its very extremity in the opposite sense. 
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politics, as it is like to prove our own, yet there can be little doubt of 
the danger in both cases from the jealousy of public life, a danger so much 
the greater in our society for the fact that even the women are no longer 
exempt from its seductions. Nor do such parallel sins, suggestive as they 
may be, do much more than scratch the surface of the subject. There 
is hardly a "modern" doctrine of any importance, a leading philosophical 
idea-no, nor a principal heresy-which is not aired and exposed in 
Plato's pages. Consider the draughts of controversy blowing through the 
dialogues, the whirl of contradictory opinion with all its fantastic diver-
sity-the voices of Callicles and Thrasymachus and all those other young 
men who talk as though they had been reading Nietzsche overnight; of 
Protagoras, the pragmatic "humanist," and Prodicus, the "neo-realist," 
the whole chorus of Sophists, the professional "educators" of the time3, 
with their preparation for "citizenship" and "leadership," and on all sides 
the silly idolatry of rhetoric, self-expression, and "art." 
In short, it is all, or very nearly all in Plato already, with the inestim-
able advantage that the reflection has acquired perspective by virtue both 
of distance and the brilliancy of the speculum. For whatever else he was, 
the Athenian was intelligent by nature-Galton pronounces him as superior 
to us in that respect as we are to the African negro; and in no one is 
this clarity of mind, when untroubled by its vices, displayed to better 
advantage than in Plato. There may well be many matters of which 
Plato himself was ignorant, but at least his ignorance is clearly delimited. 
In this sense he is as certain of what he does not know as of what he does 
know. Such knowledge, he agrees with Socrates, is the beginning of 
wisdom. He abandons the study of nature for that of man; he is no lover 
of the country or of landscape-it is too vague and romantic-but of 
humanity and cities. He feels no fascination in obscurity; darkness is in 
his eyes the deprivation of light. A hole-and-corner mystification, the 
profundity of the cavernous, he finds distasteful. Imagine Plato whimper-
ing over his lost illusions in our semi-hysterical, feministic vein, as though 
to be rid of error were an intolerable deprivation. Even death he has 
succeeded in divesting of its chimerical horrors: "Be of good cheer," he 
says, "no evil can befall a good man alive or dead."4 The sun is his 
symbol; and for the most part it floods his discussions with an equable 
diffusion of transparent day. 
Nevertheless there is something in Plato's spirit, it must be added, 
peculiarly "unsympathetic" to the "modern" mind. His distinction, his 
3 oo.oL ot itmanrta( .e ,mt ooqiu:1.aC- Republic, 492d. 
4 Apology, 4lc-d. 
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aristocratic temper, his intellectualism;• his moral bias, his detestation of 
cant, his uncompromising hostility to "was uns a/le hiindigt, das Gemeine" 
make him repellent to that great pattern of democratic virtues, "the man in 
the street" or, in Matthew Arnold's more descriptive phrase, "the average 
sensual man." Nor do all the stronger minded appear tc take to him 
readily either. How many excerpts from Plato have found their way 
into Matthew Arnold's note-book, "the critic's breviary" as it has not 
inaptly been called? In Goethe's Gespriiche mit Eckermann I find but 
two references to him, and one of them has to do with Goethe's own 
Farbenlehre at that.6 In view of the latter's addiction to symbolism and 
the former's critical dogmatism, it may be Plato's naturalism, his habitual 
respect for actuality, as much as anything, which has done him a dis, 
service in these instances. 
Of course it is possible to quote enough tributes-like John Stuart 
Mill's-to offset, and more, such slights as these; it may even be granted 
that "the philosophy of Plato has been, in the last forty years, one of 
the chief inspirations of a school of English political thought," and that 
"you may come across English working men to-day, if you talk with 
students from the tutorial classes . . . who have read and learned to love 
the Republic."1 That is not my point; and in view of the facts that I 
have instanced the question still depends whether it is possible, after all-
I will not say to "popularize" or give a kind of currency to Plato in 
some special sense, but to extend his humane moral influence-if I dared to 
express my whole thought, I should say his religious influence, for that 
i~ the essential Platonism-beyond certain very narrow limits. All I am 
sure of is my indebtedness-an indebtedness which I have not the vanity 
to think I can in any manner repay, but to which I can at least own. 
I can testify that it is he, most of all, who has propped in these bad days 
my mind. And I can protest after a fashion against the romantic deforma-
tion which has made his name into a byword of airy and vacuous en-
thusiasm. For the Plato of the pedants is no more a falsification, no 
more suspect to good sense, than the Plato of the sentimentalists-the 
metaphysician of predication and abstraction than the mystic of aesthetic 
reverie and bemusement. 
Needless to say, under the circumstances, I have no idea of proposing 
Platonism in satisfaction of the religious needs, wants, or desires, real or 
imaginary, of the time. Christianity has absorbed all the Platonism it 
5 "The beast intellectualism," W. James: Letters, II, 290. The "bugbear called 
intellectualism" is Bosanquet's expression. 
6 "Plato, cavillator urbanus, tumidus poeta, theologus mente captus"---such is Bacon's 
rather curious epigraph. 
7 E. Barker: Greek Political Theory: Plato and His Predecessors, p. 392. 
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will hold so that it is pretty well saturated already; and Christianity is not 
faring any better at our hands on that account-rather worse, if anything. 
It is not likely then that an unmixed Platonism will have very much 
appeal for a race that, however it may superficially resemble the Greeks 
of the fourth century politically and temperamentally, and not least, I 
may add, in their indifference to this very Platonism, is not particularly 
remarkable for intellect in itself or respectful of it in others. And yet in 
spite of such cautionings of common sense I cannot quite rid myself of 
the conviction that Platonism is capable of serving as a kind of refuge 
from some of the perplexities and confusions of the day. Plato himself 
is at least free from the superstition that would make of matter the sub-
stratum of reality, and of the animal the father of the man. Whatever may 
be thought of the Timceus and its evolution au rebours, it is at all events 
untainted by the particularly noxious implication which our recent psy-
chology has fixed upon that sufficiently ambiguous commonplace, "the 
descent of man." Nor in spite of his aberrations-for so I must consider 
them-and the frailties of his declining years, is its author any less certain 
that justice and the other virtues-f\ aAArJ &.QE't~, in his own words-are 
genuine natures-much more truly so, let me say, than mass, inertia, and 
the other fabricative characters which have been foisted upon geometry 
in the attempt to explain the behavior of reality so called and which are 
gradually sloughing off again with the loss of what physical and material 
assurance we did for a while seem to possess. But above all, his insistence 
after the example of Socrates that our happiness does not consist with 
these matters or even with economics but with our own higher nature, 
in the health and sanity of the soul, and in its participation by knowledge 
in the divinity of that permanent and eternal pattern, the good-it is 
this belief that makes them both, and particularly him who has given 
their faith its scriptural expression, the greatest if not the first of the 
humanists. 
And if my more modest attempt at the mere acknowledgment of a 
debt should still seem to smack a little of self-conceit, I can excuse myself 
only by recalling that if it had not been for some such witnesses as those 
poor students of Cousin's a century ago in the garrets of Paris this tradition 
would have snapped long since. There may not be enough readers of 
Plato in the original to pay for more than one edition of the dialogues 
in the course of a life-time-if that. B.ut how important it is then that 
one and another, here and there, sheltering under the wall against the in-
clemency of the times, should tend that fire to the best of his ability 




Incapable of systematic exposition myself, I am naturally susp1c1ous 
of all attempts to systematize whatever is not a system on the face of it 
and obtrusively. In particular it is, in my opinion, only by a kind of 
violence or legerdemain that Plato can be made to submit to such treat-
ment-I mean the Plato of the dialogues. The other Plato-if there ever 
was another, the esoteric Plato or the Plato of the school-we know little 
or nothing about, save darkly through the polemic of Aristotle, and that 
little is not reassuring. It may be that this other' Plato prescribed to the 
Academy a rigidly concatenated curriculum; it is not impossible. And 
yet I imagine that we are prone to overrate its consistency, if not its 
comprehensiveness. Even the remarks on education in the Republic seem 
couched in the language of hope rather than attainment; while it is open 
to us, I suppose, to make what we please of the defection of a mind like 
Aristotle. At all events, that the Plato with whom posterity has most to 
do was no great methodist is obvious from the succession of his dialogues-
or should I say, from the labor that has been spent in the attempt to 
recover their chronological order? In view of such evidence it requires 
more imagination than I for one am possessed of to think of Plato, like 
a German metaphysician, a Hegel or a Kant, setting out with a ready-
made apparatus of axioms and postulates to realize a preconceived phil-
osophy of "coherent, interdependent, subordinate, and derivative principles." 
Rather, he appears to have begun improvidently with the discussion of 
such topics as happened to strike his fancy-moot questions of the fifth 
century, some of them, inherited from Socrates and the Sophists-and to 
have treated them just as they came, one after the other, of his own nature 
freely, without much regard to transition and consequence-often, in fact, 
quite inconclusively. That he should come gradually to recognize the 
principles underlying his spontaneous activity, the musculature of · his own 
speculation, is only what might be expected-and that they should grow 
more and more precise as he continued. But only toward the close of his 
life will he be found dissecting them out and treating them formally after 
the manner of an anatomical preparation. 
On the whole, then, it seems not only more congenial with my dispo-
sition but also more consonant with the facts to look upon Plato as a 
kind of essayist. Certainly what he has to say does not take its importance 
and confirmation from a punctilious agreement among the several parts. 
It is significant and convincing, on the, contrary, as it descries an aspect 
7 
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of truth from some point of vantage at which he happens or has contrived 
to find himself at the moment. Displace the point of view and the 
vision fades, as the village spire disappears among the trees the instant 
you move to right or left; his aperru seems no longer plausible--0r perhaps 
wholly intelligible. There is, to be sure, a general similarity of attitude 
from time to time; but his position is constantly shifting-as from the 
Cratylus to the Symposium, from the Symposium to the Pha:do or from 
the Pha:drus to the Thea:tetus.1 Though his progress is, for a great while, 
fairly forthright in its approach to that one goal for which he cared, 
tov vo11tov t6:rtov, "the region," in Leibniz' words, "of the eternal truths," 
yet he troubles himself little for the regularity of his 'advance; nor do 
occasional retardations or even retrocessions disturb him very much. It is 
not the path by which he travels or the spot on which he rests; it is the 
prospect, the revelation for which he is concerned. In this sense every 
dialogue is a coup d'a:il. It is a single sally, an essay in itself-a form of 
philosophic composition unspeakably shocking to discursive minds like 
De Quincey's and curiously enough to Montaigne's. And yet as Plato 
handles it, it has obvious advantages. It is compact and instant. It needs 
no preparation or supplementation, no scaffolding or shoring to sustain it. 
Above all, it is the record of a free play of the intelligence; it represents 
the moral nature, as a whole, one and undivided, in immediate contact 
with some single topic. Hence, in spite of Plato's preference at times for 
refuting opinions that he does not hold rather than substantiating those 
that he does, it is perfectly competent as far as it goes and satisfactory in 
itself. 
Not that Plato never reverts. To some subjects he comes again and 
again, so that pis dialogues are meshed with an intricate network of cross-
reference, and the whole or portions of some one may find a varied context 
in several others. To trace the gossamers of this web is one of the most 
fascinating of Platonic recreations: it excuses the persistency of scholarship 
in its efforts to methodize his thought. Only, as one or another thread is 
taken for a clue, there emerges a distinct pattern of opinion. In this way 
Plato has been made to appear, among other avatars, as a monist,2 a dualist,3 
a Wordsworthian pantheist,4 an expectant disciple of Kant,5 an ancient 
logician and grammarian,6 a kind of Attic Jansenist,7 an auto-hypnotic 
1 If Lutoslawski's arrangement is to be trusted; and it has at least the merit in my 
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a:sthete,8 a pre-Christian apostate,n an Athenian Brahman,18 a statesman 
manque,U and even the arch-rationalist himself.12 No doubt, like the genius 
of philosophy itself, he was something of a logician, metaphysician, cos-
mologist, lawgiver, and poet by turns, if not simultaneously. Neverthe-
less, if the probable chronology is to be followed, the truth is that he 
approaches a problem anew only after an interval~ften quite unex-
pectedly and from another quarter. The dialogues are inconsecutive in 
theme. And his later views are not so much in correction or revision-
not always in extension-but rather·in illustration of the earlier. It is not a 
development, it is a new vista that he offers. The gain is not by way of 
rational expansion but of insensible commutation. He outgrows his un-
certainties as often as he resolves them. The topical advance appears as a 
saltus; and though he may take off quite obviously from some former 
position, the original essay still retains its character of singular and sufficient 
authenticity. 
To a mind so vivacious as Plato's the dialogue offered a particular 
attraction over the set expository style to which curiously enough De 
Quincey seems totally blind. It gave him a chance to criticize doctrine 
not merely in the pure idea but 'in the character of its proponents, toward 
many of whom he was personally affected in one way or another, either 
through their association with Socrates or through his own acquaintance 
with them. From this source his reasoning borrows a peculiar cogency, 
like an argume11tum ad hominem; it is not merely sophistry, it is Callicles 
or Thrasymachus or Hippias that he is confuting. And why not? A 
philosophy, after all, is no better than its adherents. And as these repre-
sentatives of the views under discussion are human beings, themselves, the 
argument, as a result, takes on a moral complexion quite distinct from 
that of the theme involved and reinforcing it. To this motive may be 
referred in great part the Platonic irony and that strain of comedy in 
the dialogues, which appears not uncalculated, when directed again,t the 
genuine offenders of virtue and sanity, to offset Aristophanes' satire of 
Socrates. That 1,uch a practice is likely to prejudice the impartiality of 
debate, is true; quite patently Plato is now and again engaged in settling 
old scores, nor is he always averse in a pinch to 'helping himself out with 
the Sophists' own petard. But it can not be gainsaid that the treatment, 








liveliness and pertinency to a kind of writing not always remarkable for 
wit or point. 
In short, Plato is not content with recommending philosophy as a way 
of life; he illustrates it. Every dialogue is a drama, for whose -persona! 
philosophy is an occupation-protagonists who exemplify their principles 
in their behavior in addition to defending it in their speech. As truly and 
in somewhat the same manner as Corneille is reputed the dramatist of 
statescraft, Plato is the dramatist, as well as the expositor, of philosophy. 
Especially has he dramatized morality. It was the concern of his prime, 
the theme of his most energetic exercises, the frame of reference for his 
characterization and disquisition, as his Socrates amply proves. In this 
sense, even though he was no playwright, it is he who was the successor 
of the great tragedians, JEschylus and Sophocles-he and not Euripides. 
That his philosophy was explicit while theirs was implicit was incidental to 
the period, and being of necessity, was, as he would say, accidental and 
irrelevant--of the serious moral tradition of Athens he was, as far as the 
times allowed, the heir and perpetuator. 
But no product of human invention is ever quite unique. That there 
was a great stock of Socratic conversations in circulation before as well as 
after Socrates' death-memories and reminiscences and recollections of his 
interviews with divers persons and personages-is matter of common con-
jecture. And it is not improbable that some of them were reduced to 
writing in the shape of notes and memoranda of one kind or another. 
How much literary coloring such records had taken on in the process, 
aside from the imaginative heightening they had previously by word of 
mouth, it is impossible to say. There is no evidence, however, of any 
genuine Socratic dialogues precedent to Plato's, difficult as it is in the 
light of analogy to believe that the form sprang of a sudden: from Plato's 
brain full-armed. As an alternative to this sort of creation ab nihilo-
he may have taken a hint from such report and gossip as wa~ quickening 
Athens at the time; or what is more likely, he may have modeled his 
essays on the talk of his master itself. As the story goes, he had actually 
composed the Lysis before the execution of Socrates, provoking the mock-
serious protest, "O Hercules! What lies this young fellow tells of me!" 
Gratifying though it would be to think of Xenophon's Memorabilia as an 
earlier development of the genre-it seems relatively so inchoate and ele-
mentary both in excution and thought; yet as a matter of fact the greater 
part of it is much later, and of secondary, sometimes of Platonic, inspira-
tion. Nevertheless it challenges comparison with Plato's Socratic dialogues 
so called, as a kind of measurement for Plato's own achievement. Herc 
is an example of what another, himself a familiar of Socrates, and even 
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more favorably situated as a later comer, was able to do with the same .or 
similar material. 
Nor should we think of the Memorabilia either, as we might be inclined 
to do on the strength of Xenophon's representations, as solely matter of 
fact. It is a work, not to say of compilation, of imaginatio1' too. Xeno-
phon's avowed intention of vindicating the character of Socrates would 
lift it upon another plane than that of actuality, while Xenophon himself 
was by no means a contemptible man of letters. On the other hand, it is 
under bonds to a certain sort of truth; it is bound to be recognizable. And 
since Xenophon knew Socrates personally and admired him, it is only 
natural that even when he borrowed his material-from Antisthenes or 
another-he should pick and choose, as well as patch and pare, to suit 
his preconceptions, as his selection of interlocutors compared with Plato's 
seems to indicate that he did. As a result,. the collection, though ostensibly 
biography, is in fact partly imagination,· partly imitation, and partly por-
traiture, achieving hardly more than what Goethe would call the illusion 
of a common reality, even tripping occasionally on the edge of caricature, 18 
without other pretension than to reproduce by hook or crook the first-
hand impression of a homely intimacy. 
By contrast it is easy to appreciate the genius required first to conceive 
the possibility and then to realize it, of using this sort of matter, instinct 
with memory as it was, for the construction of a philosophical genre which 
should take advantage of the Socratic sentiment and celebrity even to the 
extent of recalling actual interpellations and interpellators and yet should 
throw off the clogs of actuality itself for the sake of introducing the author's 
own interpretations of thought and character and of insinuating, if not at 
once asserting, his own convictions and opinions, not only of the theses dis-
cussed but also of the disputants themselves. Nor save as an affair of 
scholarship does it make much odds-for where the 'literary records and 
remains are so fragmentary it is just as well to be wary-whether Plato 
was first in the field or 'not; his is the accomplishment and the perfection 
of the type to such an extent as to have extinguished rivalry. 
The contents of the Memorabilia are very diverse in character and very 
uneven in tenor. The first few chapters of the first book are pretty certainly 
original and include the gist 'of Xenophon's contribution to the character-
ization of Socrates. On this account, while in themselves the most im-
portant and interesting of the collection, they are hardly pertinent to 
comparison. On the contrary the eighth and ninth14 chapters of the third 
18 Sec Ill, XI, for instance. 
14 "In jenem als sokratisch treu ganz besonders ausgezeichncten Capitel," says Joel 
. of the ninth chapter: Der echte und der Xenopliontische Sok.rates, I, s. 93. 
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book, summarizing a few of the familiar Socratic teachings or what passed 
for such, recall the Platonic dialogues, though very much as a crude copy 
or rough draft might recall a finished painting. But not to compare incom-
mensurables, one of the most elevated disquisitions of the Memorabilia, 
or what at least is intended as a · pattern of its kind, occupies the third 
chapter of the fourth book, which purports to relate a conversation with 
Euthydemus, whereof Xenophon feigns to have been an auditor, con-
cerning the goodness of God, something in the vein of Fenelon. "Tell me, 
Euthydemus, has it never occurred to you to think how carefully the gods 
have made provision for men's needs?" It is deistic theological moral com-
monplace, but commonplace of such an order, whatever 'its provenance, as 
a great French ecclesiastic at the beginning 0£ the eighteenth century was 
not ashamed to father. And yet its superficiality is glaring in contrast with 
the penetration of almost any Platonic dialogue-the Protagoras, for ex-
ample, not to say the Gorgias, or more fairly, perhaps, the Charmides, 
since its subject is avowedly sophrosyne and the opportunity to compare the 
conceptions of that virtue is too good to be missed. Nor would it be un-
profitable either, in the interests of Plato's genius, to turn from the fourth 
chapter of the same book to the first book and a half of the Republic. The 
respondent of the Memorabilia. on this occasion is Hippias, the theme is 
justice, and in the course of the argument the Socrates of the Memorabilia 
reflects, however mistily, the great Platonic ( or is it indeed the Socratic?) 
conception of a universal moral order in distinction from the dingy 
"modern" heresy of an exclusively social ethics. "But whosoever trans-
gresses the divine laws 'pays the penalty which none may in any wise 
escape, as do many transgressing human laws, some by stealth and some 
by violence." That it falls far short of the achievement of the Republic in 
exalting righteousness above Olympus and establishing it with happiness 
in the constitution of reality, is what might be looked for. Equally remark-
able in these two instances is the apportionment of roles; it was not to 
such characters as Euthydemus and his brother Dionysodorus, that precious 
pair of verbal contortionists, or to Hippias, the sciolist and jack of all 
trades, that Plato was in the habit of intrusting the conduct of his 
great moral debates.15 
In one respect, it is true, Xenophont may be thought to have the ad-
vantage of the comparison. He touches in two instances at least a nerve 
15 That these latter chapters have been under suspicion is no matter for my purpose, 
which is simply to get some sort of measure for Plato's excellence. Nevertheless whether 
this third chapter, together with the two following, actually belongs or not, there is no 
particular difficulty in thinki:ng of it as an adaptation. The conception of sophrosyne 
is not Platonic. Is it authentically Socratic? or Antisthenic? At all events, if the two 
chapters I have cited are not evidence, they are perfectly good illustrations. 
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of sentiment to which Plato, it would seem, was nearly insensible. In the 
second chapter of the second book he represents Socrates admonishing the 
son of Xanthippe to a respect for his mother with a conventional delicacy 
which contrasts rather roughly with her husband's chilly dismissal of her 
in the Pha:do. And again, in the succeeding chapter the reconciliation 
which Socrates effects between Cha:rephon and Cha:recrates strikes a note 
which is lacking to the Platonic scale, though the consideration with 
which Plato always treats his own brothers may very well be put into 
competition with this display of sentimentality on the part of the Xeno-
phontic Socrates. But these are exceptions; I mention them in fairness 
for what they may be worth-for even in delimiting Plato's range they 
leave 'his superiority in the common field untouched. 
That a man of affairs with literary tastes should be excelled by a 
philosopher in profundity and acuteness of thought, seems no great matter 
for admiration. And yet in Plato's hands the Socratic dialogue is not 
solely a vehicle for the conveyance of ideas. It becomes as well the medium 
for the representation of a certain kind of experience. To be sure, there 
is some such dramatic notion inherent in the very conception of the dia-
logue as a genre. But the drama of Plato is more than an art; it is a faith, 
inspired by the Socratic contention that philosophy itself is nothing more 
or less than a way of life. And still, to such a pass of perfection as a 
literary form alone has Plato brought this drama of the contemplative or 
theoretic life that it is yet an insistent question to what extent and in how 
far the dialogues are to be taken in just this sense, as literature pure and 
simple. 
It is fairly obvious, for example, that closing references to the renewal 
of a discussion are usually nothing more than devices of verisimilitude, 
as at the end of the Protagoras. To argue otherwise-to the existence of a 
dialogue since lost, or to carry over the invitation-say, to the Gorgias, is 
surely a little naive at best. And yet the T/zea:tetus, Sophist, and Statesman, 
not to say the unborn Philosopher, have been coerced into a trilogy on 
little better grounds, to say nothing of the Republic and the Tima:us. To 
the same effect it must be admitted that many opinions in their shading 
and manner of expression are determined by the imaginative requirements 
of the situation, occasion, surroundings, and characters; they are partly 
"atmosphere" and "local color," as is self-evidently the case in the Sym-
posium. Less convincingly the so-called aporetic or inconclusive dialogues 
may be accounted for by other than exclusively philosophical considerations 
-such dubitative endings are 'not entirely unknown to the ingenuity of 
modern authorship-indeed, with some degree of plausibility where the 
reader has been given a clue to the solution of the problem, formally inde-
cisive though the close may appear. Or on the other hand, may some of 
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this reluctance to trancher la question be due to Plato's impatience to com-
memorate Socrates' familiar theses and modes of thought before he had as 
yet made up his own mind in regard to them? Or again may he be merely 
maintaining the ironic pretense of Socrates' ignorance? 
Further, it may be questioned whether the silence of Socrates in the 
Parmenides, the Sophist, and the Statesman has only a kind of poetic 
propriety, or whether it is significant of Plato's abandonment of the Socratic 
fiction or merely indicates his detachment from the discussion-a kind of 
modesty in the face of his own opinions. But then what is Plato's relation 
to the protagonist of his drama in general? How far, if at all, are the two 
to be identified, the latter as the mouthpiece of the former? With the 
ordinary playwright the inclination of the reader is, at times almost ir-
resistibly, to attribute the sentiments of the characters to the author him-
self. But the interpretation of Plato would appear to have suffered in 
addition from the contrary disposition-to credit his characters with what 
are actually his own opinions-in particular his leading man. As between 
these two stools, is it Socrates or Plato who brings the indictment against 
written teaching in the Pha:drus? And in the Pha:do is it Plato or Socrates 
who impugns physical science? To be sure, this is one of the convictions 
with which Socrates is endowed by Xenophon,16 but hardly that for which 
he is satirized by Aristophanes in The Clouds. Again, in the Pha:do, what 
is the symbolism of Plato's absence, so firmly underscored, I will not say 
from the death of Socrates-I will concede that point to "art"; but what 
is the sense of his absence from the debate on immortality with its heavy 
charge on the doctrine of ideas? Did he wish to bring that doctrine under 
Socrates' protection? Or is it possible that he is indicating as a matter of 
fact its Socratic origin? And finally, if Plato's Socrates is authentic and 
Plato but concurs with him, so to speak, why did not Xenophon, who 
had him under observation too, do better by him? 
The answer is obvious. Eminent as Plato is in other respects, the 
triumph of his genius is the character of Socrates. It is Plato who is 
responsible for the great Socratic tradition. Not that he was without 
materials to work with; he had what Xenophon had, even more than 
Xenophon had - perhaps more than Antisthenes. He not only had 
the man; he understood him better-or so we like to believe. But whatever 
he owes to Socrates, Socrates owes more to him. And if his indebtedness 
to Socrates is exaggerated, he has no one to blame but himself; for it is 
by placing his own person directly in line with his master's and in the 
latter's shadow that he has ended by an effect of perspective in running 
the two figures together so that dramatically they are almost indistiguish-
16 Memorabilia, I, i, 11 et seq. 
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able. Philosophically, Plato preserves his own integrity more or less; but 
sentimentally, Socrates becomes possessed of all Plato's virtues in addition 
to his own-notably a serenity of spirit to which Plato never quite attained. 
In this manner Socrates has gained in mental stature, in poetic power, in 
urbanity-in short, the friend of Cha:rephon, the Socrates of the greasy 
cloak and tousled aspect, with his insolent ostentation of poverty, sim-
plicity, and ignorance, with his bare feet and his boorish address, has been 
saved by the devotion of his pupil from the tradition of cynicism for that 
of culture and humanism. 
Under the circumstances to attempt to discriminate between Plato and 
Socrates would be, as a rule, an impossible task. And not only so; it is an 
illegitimate one, based on a misconception of the literary meJium chosen 
and perfected by Plato for the conveyance of his ideas; for the delight of 
the dialogues is that they are literature as well as philosophy, and that 
their appreciation calls for taste as well as intelligence. If Plato made 
Socrates in interpreting him, then for all representative purposes Socrates 
is Plato. As far as the dialogues go, Plato is known through his characters 
as Shakespeare is known through his, for it is sheer sophistry to deny the 
possibility of surprising the dramatist in his drama. With proper precau-
tions, of course, since there are moments when the critical sense may not 
decline to recognize a kind of distinction in Plato's intentions. While in 
the dramatic dialogues generally he has no hesitation in merging his per-
sonality with Socrates' at the same time that he turns the familiar Socratic 
dialectic with all its reminiscent authority to his own uses; still in excep-
tional cases he appears concerned, on the contrary, to segregate the two 
characters and to hold his master apart and at arm's length. Such a pur-
pose may account for his mention of himself and of his absence from 
Socrates' execution in the Ph'tt:do, a piece of self-assertion so at odds with 
his habit. Is it not as though he said: "Here is Socrates and yonder is Plato, 
separate and distinct beings; since I am relating, mark you, the death of 
Socrates"? At all events, however it is produced, some such special effect 
of portraiture is unmistakable in the Apology, thei Crito, and the Pha:do 
in spite of its discussion of the ideas-and, perhaps, in the Symposium. 
And it is perceptible elsewhere now and then, if not exactly definable. 
Nor is Plato's language, on the whole, any less literary than his com-
position. As he was without a thorough-going system, so too he had no 
special terminology. His style is idiomatic, even colloquial, for he must 
have written by ear and very much as he talked-such indeed is the sense 
of his genre; though toward the close of his life he developed a more arti-
ficial and even intricate style which is not without its virtuosity. Still his 
expression is seldom technical. What specialized words and phrases he 
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does use are merely handy adaptations of common speech,17 nor does he 
employ them with the invariability and consistency that we demand of a 
scholastic vocabulary. Even the terms which have come to be associated 
particularly with the doctrine of ideas appear frequently with other 
denotations.18 
As a result there is something wavering, tremulous, and a little un-
settled about his phraseology, which tempts the translator and commen-
tator and even the general reader to lend it greater exactitude and defini-
tion than it possesses by turning it into good set terms or by substituting 
modern catch-words. What mischief can be done in this way is illustrated 
by the reckless substitution of the word science for knowledge, or even 
wisdom.19 . As Huxley remarks in his modest hesitant fashion, "The Pla-
tonic philosophy is probably the grandest example of the unscientific use 
of the imagination extant."20 Quite so; the better the scientist the worse 
the philosopher.21 Would also in addition to scientific we might forswear, 
in speaking of Plato, all cant of naturalistic, materialistic, and what not, to 
the advantage of our thinking as well as of our English. It is imperative, 
however, to be wary of such expressions as substance, reality, essence, reason, 
to say nothing of matter, whose significance has so altered in the course 
of the centuries that their meaning for Plato involves an exposition of his 
entire philosophy. In short there is a constant temptation to force him 
verbally into a straiter garment than that which he actually wore and 
to cramp the freedom and flexibility of utterance which is not the least 
of his qualities as a moralist and philosopher, and which serves to moderate 
and humanize even his digressions into metaphysics.22 
Well, to turn a long lane at last, if this view of the Platonic dialogue is 
correct-if it is indeed an independent tableau from the drama of the ideal 
life of contemplation, devoted to the inspection of a single phase or aspect 
of reality; then it makes little difference in what order the dialogues are 
11 Like aui;o ,mit' am6 and ,;o ,;( foi;t. 
18 e[lloi; as late at all events as the sixth book of the Republic, 504a, while the 
Timtrus presents the curious anomaly of an amorphous idea, dv6Qa'tO'V dll6i; 'tt ,mt 
c'iµoQ<pov, Timtrus, 5 la. Cf. the use of Ullla unspecialized in the T hetrtetus, late as 
that is, 184d and 203c. 
19 ,;amov O.Qa EJtt<J''tfl!LTJ xal. O'O<pta, Thetrtetus, 145e. Even at his most ration-
alistic Plato is concerned less for science in our sense than epistemology. 
20 Preface to Hume. 
21 Notwithstanding the immediate Cambridgean reaction. But always in extremes! 
22 As an example of what can be done with the hard and fast system of translation 
of which I am speaking, apply it, just for fun, to Xenophon's Memorabilia, III, xiv, 2-
,;o lie lhi,ov aui;o xait' amo foitwvi;a-inunediately followed as it is by a mention of 
16yoi;, which ought to be as good as a nod to a pedant. Though seriously I often 
wonder whether we are not forcing Plato's hand as badly and more often than we 
think by just such abuses of interpretation. 
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read-and the less so, since he who reads them at all is likely to read 
the greater of them more than once and in more than one connection. 
For the student and even for the general reader the advantages of following 
Plato's development are evident. And yet for reading and even for study 
the chronological order has serious drawbacks too. Not only does it break 
up the logical sequence of ideas; for Plato was not a patient man and was 
prone to revenge himself upon his more intractable subjects by turning 
his back upon them temporarily whenever they threatened to become un-
manageable, so that the arrangement by approximate date of composition, 
while it gives effect to his variety and versatility, is inconsequent and in 
so far confusing. But what is more damaging, it does violence to his spirit 
-his faith in philosophy as a way of life as well as his conception of the 
dialogue as a representation of that life, a kind of moral drama. Hence 
I prefer for my part a reading that will take some account of these motives. 
And if this grouping differs little from the usual and popular, the coinci-
dence only goes to show how successful he has been for all his fits and 
starts in communicating his intention, having as he did to realize it first 
for himself. 
To this end the dialogues may be sorted into the following sets. There 
are first the biogmphical dialogues, as I may be allowed to call them for 
distinction; I mean those that appear to make a point of characterizing 
Socrates with peculiar intimacy and fidelity-the Apology, the Crito, and 
the Phtedo. The second set or series consists of the moral dialogues or 
the dialogues of the virtues-prominently the Charmides, the Protagoras, 
the Gorgias, and the Thrasymachus, to isolate under this title the first 
book of the Republic from the remaining books which belong in the same 
compartment with it, though giving a different turn to the virtue of justice 
with which they all have to do nominally. Another and third group will 
comprise the dialogues of the ideas-say, the Meno, the Symposium, and 
the Phcedrus; while the metaphysical dialogues make up the fourth-a 
rather ragged classification of the Parmenides, to which the discussion of 
the ideas serves as a sort of transition, the Thecetetus, the Sophist, the 
Statesman, the Philebus, and the Timceus, which is metaphysical in method, 
mythical or symbolic though it may be in spirit. And finally, existing in 
apparent isolation, stands the Laws like a pile of terminal stones or 
boundary. With these major dialogues are associated their minors, like 
the Euthyphro and the Laches, which may be made to serve the purpose of 
notes, addenda, and the like, and which may be integrated with the appro-
priate series wherever they seem particularly pertinent or instructive. 
For Plato, as a companion of Socrates and himself at heart a philosopher 
as well as a poet, it was only natural to look upon the master who had 
inspired him as the fitting exemplar of that life of the spirit to which 
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he had been converted from the "art" of the day and to make him the 
protagonist of that philosophic drama which his genius was early prompting 
him to write in demonstration of the faith which they had in common. 
On this account the three dialogues which purport to detach more or less 
realistically the person of Socrates and which refer to certain verifiable 
moments of his life-his trial, his imprisonment, and his death-come to 
have a sort of introductory priority or precedence as compared with the 
others. It is unfortunate, on the whole, that the term Socratic has not been 
reserved for these three compositions-the Apology, the Crito, and the 
Pheedo23-exclusively; they are concerned so manifestly to illustrate the 
Socratic life:-Such is the nature of the philosopher24 as Plato understood 
it; in such manner should he live; above all in such manner should he die. 
On the contrary it is not impossible that we have cause to congratulate 
ourselves on the failure of the Philosopher, which though projected was 
never realized, if it was intended to sophisticate or subtilize that stalwart 
advocate of good sense as its neighbors of the metaphysical or methodo-
logical period, the Sophist and the Politician, would lead us to suspect. 
However that may be, I like to prefix the Euthyphro to these three bio-
graphical dialogues after the fashion of a prologue partly because of its 
dramatic time and partly because of its subject, which relates it with the 
indictment of the Apology, though strictly it takes its place in the next 
group-and to affix the Symposium, not merely for its vivid evocation of 
Socrates in his more festal habit, but capitally for the inebriate tribute of 
Alcibiades, the apostate, bearing involuntary witness against himself-
in vino veritas. 
And there is one arrangement of the dialogues so curious that it is 
worth mentioning by the way, where I must pass over others in silence. 
I refer to Munk's chronology in accordance with the relative age of Socrates 
in his several confrontations. But even if all the dialogues were "dated" 
unmistakably after this fashion, it is hardly to be supposed that such an 
order would be very significant; it would place the Parmenides at the head 
of the procession, which would close, of course, with the Pheedo, the 
Symposium remaining where it is now-somewhere near the middle, say 
about 416 B. C. All that is of particular note in such consideration is the 
circumstance that the dialogues seem to crowd dramatically about Socrates' 
trial and death, the Theeetetus, for example, being "dated" also by the 
arraignment. Though the fact is not extraordinary in itself, yet by way 
of exhausting all the possibilities it might not be wholly without interest 
23 Again I ignore the discussion of the ideas in the Pha:do, which may be looked 
upon from this point of view as an accident of the date of its composition. 
24 The veiiQU cpLA.OCJocpou, in Epictetus' phrase: Diatribes, II, 8, 29. 
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to see how such a "derangement" would look if consistently carried out. 
However that may be, if we continue as we· began, disregarding chron-
ology altogether and reading for the dramatic logic alone, as nearly as 
may be, the passage from the first or biographical to the second or moral 
group is easy and natural enough. No matter when they were written 
it is apparently Plato's intention in these essays to ventilate certain views 
and even theses of his master. Their general theme is virtue or perhaps 
just that spiritual justice or righteousness of the good man whom no 
evil can touch, alive or dead, into which the single virtues melt and are 
absorbed-the piety of the Euthyphro ( which has thus a double content 
in my mind), the courage of the Laches, the sophrosyne of the Charmides, 
and the narrower political or civic justice of the good citizen and ruler, 
over which the dispute in the Republic begins and which constitutes the 
subject of the first book and suggests its titular separation from the others 
under the name of Thrasymachus. 
Of all these virtues and of all virtue at large the most obstinate and 
insidious enemies, in the eyes of Plato, as perhaps of Socrates, were the 
Sophists-the more dangerous by reason of the fairness of their profes-
sions and promises. That the appellation is a kind of Procrustean or 
omnibus term their rehabilitators have had no difficulty in showing, so 
diverse the characters and teachings of those designated thereby, though 
none the less, if we are to rely upon the evidence-and it is about the only 
sentiment which Plato and the Athenian bourgeois had in common-unani-
mously subversive of private and public integrity. In clearing the way 
for the Socratic ethic which went before his own, it is not surprising, there-
fore, that Plato should run foul of this gentry sooner or later as his leader 
is represented as doing also. Hence the space devoted in these moral dia-
logues to what may be called the anti-Sophistic elenchus. That their fa-
vorite instruments of seduction were rhetoric and art may partially account 
for Plato's animosity against these subjects-together with the fact that 
he was himself an :esthetic apostate. For though the elder Sophists (like 
the Socratic theses which they debated) properly belonged to the fifth 
century, it is not to be supposed that their current appeal in Plato's day 
was purely dramatic or even historical. The circumstance with which he 
treats them shows that their influence must have been prolonged into his 
own time. They had their heirs, of course;25 while their symbolic im-
portance as impersonating the persistent forms of a-moralism was, as it 
25 Compare Isocrates' discrimination of the good and the bad teachers in De Per-
mutatione, 99 and following. To be sure he uses the term Sophists in the good old 
connotation in contrast with the pretenders. But Plato would probably have lumped 
them all together under the one designation, granting at most that some might not 
be w bad as others. 
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still is, tremendous. The Sophists and the charlatans are always with us. 
And had they not been, and were they not still when Plato wrote, con-
founded with Socrates by the general public in a monstrous complicity 
from which it was obligatory to vindicate his memory? In fact some of the 
Socratics were by that time hardly to be distinguished from them-at least 
in Plato's eyes. 
From the dialogues strongly marked by the presence of this anti-
Sophistic polemic it is convenient, it seems to me, to set off the other 
members of the group-the Euthyphro, or "Piety," the La.ches, or 
"Courage," and the Charmides, or "Sophrosyne." These latter are united 
into an association of their own by their common anxiety for the Socratic 
identification of virtue with knowledge, which appears, if I may use the 
figure, as a species of minor intrigue or sub-plot, for it is a poor dialogue 
that handles but one theme. The Lesser Hippias, whether authentic or 
not, deserves a place, on account of its treatment of the same problem, 
with these other discussions, at least in the modest r6le of a scholium or 
appendix, particularly as it has a rather interesting bearing upon the 
modern sense for the subject. 
One wonders sometimes that Plato was not content to assert that the 
knowledge which is wisdom is-if not virtue-a virtue in itself, as, indeed 
it is and a rare one at that. Perhaps the manner in which the problem 
was transmitted, and was still a living issue to his generation, precluded 
such a summary solution. For undoubtedly in Socrates' mind the virtues 
were more or less technological and involved a knowing how as well as 
what. But that some such further notion of the virtue of wisdom as such 
was fermenting in Plato's mind is clear enough from his increasingly per-
sistent efforts, through the Euthyphro and the La.ches to their culmination 
in the Charmides, not, indeed, to demonstrate the virtue of knowledge 
exactly, but to condition morality somehow upon it almost as though 
every virtue were a variety or species of wisdom. As a matter of fact, in 
the Charmides he comes very near a positive conclusion to this effect. At 
least he leaves the reader pretty well convinced that sophrosyne consists sub-
stantially with the knowledge of one's own measure. It is this obvious 
advance in the development of the idea, together with the relative ma-
turity of the argument, which leads me to place the dialogue after rather 
than before the La.ches. 
Now, it is just the point of the Lesser Hippias that it does assert this 
virtue of knowledge unconditionally-maintaining paradoxically but con-
sistently that the deliberate liar is morally superior, by virtue of his knowl-
edge, to the unconscious liar, who lies through ignorance, not knowing 
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the true from the false,26 And at the same time it seems to brand the 
apparent paradox as an illusion of that modern and romantic casuistry 
which is forever trying to make the intention go bail for the act, to 
condone the deed at the instance of the motive. Still what can be more 
hopeless morally than the man who is unable to distinguish right and 
wrong? There must be something singularly obtuse or perverse in a 
generation which insists upon exonerating the wrong-doer on the score 
of his ignorance, even entrusting their lives and their fortunes to his 
bungling mismanagement on the ground and for the reason that he 
knows no better! To be sure the Greek had his casuistry too, which was 
busy in offering his wit in extenuation of his vices. But then the Greek 
was an intellectualist while we are sentimentalists; and that, no doubt, is 
the end of it; for how else is to be explained our rooted suspicion of 
understanding as a . people and our tenderness for the fool and his folly 
in spite of our lip service to education? 
On the whole, then, whatever the authorship and the execution of the 
Lesser Hi'ppias, its spirit and its contribution are not too un-Socratic to 
disqualify it for serving as an epilogue to the discussion of the virtues in 
their relation to knowledge. With regard to the three dialogues that are 
unquestionably authentic, they are united among themselves by another 
tie---their patent preoccupation with definition. It is an interest which 
falls into abeyance with the Protagoras, but comes to the fore again in 
the first book of the Republic and yet again in the T hetetetus and the 
Sophist. 
There is, however, a better reason for referring particularly to the first 
book of the Republic at this juncture. Not only does it evince the same 
concern for definition as the Laches and the Charmides, it also on the 
strength of the bout with Thrasymachus participates with the Protagoras 
and the Gorgias in their direct attack upon Sophistry, whatever name it 
goes by, and in addition seems bent, in distinction from the other books 
of the Republic, upon completing the tale of the cardinal virtues by a 
treatment of justice as a correlative of piety, courage, and sophrosyne 
rather than in the later sense as their integrator on general principle. 
Viewed in this perspective this first book becomes a kind of intermediary 
between the Charmides and the Protagoras. Possibly it belongs here or 
hereabouts by date of composition. At all events it does no manner of 
harm to multiply the associations of a dialogue. 
Of the three members of the sub-group or section whose characteristics I 
have been so hastily sketching, the most engaging is by all odds the Char-
26 The deliberate liar, if there be any such, since no man does wrong deliberately! 
Xenophon argues the same thesis in a rather different way. [Mem. IV, ii, 19. But 
then cf. the 11LO'O'Ot AoyOL.] 
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mides, for its setting, its subject-matter, and its tone. For sheer charm there 
are very few of the dialogues which surpass it. Its treatment, while simple 
and elegant, is serious and mature. And though it is classed as one of 
the dubitative or epochic discussions ( to adapt a Skeptic term) yet, as I 
have said, it leaves the impression that sophrosyne consists in knowing 
one's own measure and ensuing that knowledge agreeably with the thesis 
that no man does wrong wittingly. Such is the position to which Plato 
returns in the Republic; and if it seems to confound sophrosyne with 
justice, it is into the higher justice of the sound and .noble soul that Plato 
tends, since virtue is one, to run all the virtues. And though Socrates him-
self continues to exercise a skeptic reserve to the very close of the dialogue, 
he does so because the conclusion has come to be entangled with certain 
assumptions-in particular the assumption that happiness attaches to virtue 
-which he thinks too important to be taken for granted and which, 
as a matter of fact, he undertakes to establish later. And it is in the course 
of this attempt that he finds the Sophists, the Expediency Men of the time, 
like lions in his path. 
In this manner the Charmides leads into that section of the moral 
group which I have distinguished as the anti-Sophistic-the Protagoras, 
the Gorgias, and the Thrasymachus, to which should be added as a 
by-play, or possibly a preface, the Euthydemus. Their content is so im-
bedded with Plato's moral philosophy that it would be impossible, if not 
impertinent, to discuss them in detachment. They are all directed in their 
main issue to the final consolidation of virtue or righteousness with happi-
ness (EMmµov(a), as I must call it for the time being in default of a 
better English term and in anticipation of a definition, though it may 
not be amiss to notice that this happiness or eudaemony is quite inde-
pendent of pleasure in the ordinary sense and is not identical on the one 
hand with content or self-satisfaction in the worldly signification usual to 
those terms, or yet on the other hand with beatitude or blessedness in the 
Christian acceptation, being more moral and intellectual than the latter and 
more religious than the former. 
The Protagoras, or the Sabbath of the Sophists, posing Hippias and 
Prodicus as well as the titular character, propounds two problems: can 
virtue be taught? and, is virtue one? The former is an extension of the 
previous question, is virtue knowledge? For as knowledge it can be 
taught; otherwise, not. And yet the second question of the Protagoras 
is answered by the suggestion that all the virtues communicate in know-
ledge; while the first question is left, with apparent inconsequence, as a 
quandary, despite the fact that on the principle developed an affirmative 
answer would seem to be indicated. In extenuation of the absurdity of 
22 
THE DIALOGUES 23 
such an outcome, however, there are several more or less obvious con-
siderations. The characteristic Socratic pose consistently maintained hith-
erto is that of the ironic know-nothing whose office it is to test the founda-
tions of opinion, however imposing the superstructure. The elenchus has 
two arms; what blame if Socrates continues as he has been doing to use 
the left in this emergency against the clique of Sophists immediately con-
fronting him? The thesis that virtue is teachable was as indispensable to 
the Sophistic propaganda then as it is now-and is a concession that can 
never be granted them. There is more to virtue, if not to knowledge, 
than appears in the pedagogy of the Sophists, more than can be expressed 
in the formula, as we put it to-day, that education is a science. It is but 
a half-truth as so stated: and in the hands of Protagoras, or even a 
Prodicus, to say nothing of a Hippias, a very dangerous and even fatal 
half-truth indeed. Virtue consists not with the kind of knowledge that 
they possessed or imparted. It is not only wisdom; it is somehow happi-
ness too, as Plato had already begun to see in the Charmides. And it is the 
dt'eper implications of this dawning idea that he reserves very properly 
against Protagoras and his associates. 
To .an account of this connotation of virtue as righteousness, then, 
Plato addresses himself directly in the Gorgias. ,In; spite of apparent side-
issues and digressions the event is clear. For once Socrates commits him-
self, now that the time is ripe, to, an affirmation, and in the final para-
graphs, with their strength of the last judgment, summarizes in so many 
words the results of the discussion. But again, before he can reach a 
decision, he finds the Sophists barring the way. This time it is Gorgias, 
the belletrist, with his hypocrite rhetoric,27 and Callicles, the "naturalist," 
with his unabashed sensationalism, who dispute his passage.28 As against 
Gorgias, abetted by his pupil Polus, he denies the legitimacy of his "art." 
It is but practice-to play upon the Elizabethan sense of the word-or 
craft-to play upon our own word-it is empiric and imposture; at best 
it is a trade, not art. Its sole science is amathia, the assumption of a 
knowledge which it does not possess; its hope is in the gullibility of the 
ignorant; its profit in the masking and disguising of vice and the counter-
feiting of virtue:-there is no health in it. Against Callicles, on the other 
hand, he asserts, now that the way is cleared, his fundamental tenet-the 
concurrence of truth, beauty, and goodness in happiness as contrasted with 
27 I have not overlooked the distinction which Plato draws between Sophist and 
Rhetorician in the Gorgias, 520b; but for practical purposes I disregard it in accordance 
with Plato's more common usage; it is irrelevant to the present issue. 
28 It is difficult to translate these terms without ambiguity. The association is sug• 
gestive of Nietzsche's distinction of sch/echt and bose. The Greek words are 'tO 
LO')tUQO'tEQO'V, 1:0 XQEinov, ,:o tW,1:wv.-Gorgias, 488c-d. 
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the Sophistic coincidence of strength, superiority, and excellence with 
prosperity. 
"Among the many statements we have made, while all the others have 
been refuted, this alone is unshaken-that doing wrong is more to be 
avoided than suffering it; that above all a man should study not to seem 
but to be good both in private and public. . . . Take my advice, there-
fore, and follow me where, if you once arrive, you will be happy both in 
life and death. • . . And allow anyone to condemn you as a fool and to 
treat you despitcfully, if he wishes ... for you will come to no harm, 
if you arc a really good and righteous man, practicing virtue. . . • Let us 
therefore take as our guide the · doctrine now disclosed which indicates to 
us that this way of life is best, to live and die in the practice of justice and 
every other virtue."29 In such wise he justifies his reserves of the Charmides 
and the Protagoras at the same time that he discloses his own position. 
The Gorgias-in Renouvier's just expression, "certainement un des plus 
beaux et rares ouvrages des litteratures de tous les temps et de trms /es 
peuple/'80-is Plato's masterpiece. It contains not only the Platonic credo 
but the essentials of Platonism as well. In discriminating between pleasures 
and in disengaging happiness from material prosperity and attaching it to 
virtue, the dialogue seats morality upon a firm and intelligible foundation. 
In this respect Plato never surpassed or outdistanced it; he could do no 
more than develop and reinforce it. If anything, the first book of the 
Republic-sometimes called the T hrasymachus-would mark a retrogres-
sion, as I have already noticed, by its insistence upon the particular and 
singular justice of a part rather than of the whole man, if, there were not 
some reason to believe that the first sketch of this one book antedates the 
rest of the work. In compensation the first part of the second book, with 
its recognition of the absolute self-sufficiency of that integral justice which 
is the health of the whole soul-that virtue which is one-may perhaps 
be counted an actual advance.81 To be sure, the acknowledgment is made 
by Adeimantus hypothetically as a thesis for demonstration. But what of 
that, since Plato accepts the challenge and assumes the burden of proof? 
Such is the sense of the Republic. Ostensibly it is a similitude; actually 
it is a double entendre (in the literal sense of the words), and not with-
out ambiguity for the modern mind as the writer appears· to become 
entangled in his own figure. Taken as a symbol it is a· magnification, the 
majuscule or capital of the inner or spiritual city, the city of the soul.32 
Taken literally it is an image of virtue or justice in man as a social 
29 Gorgias, 527b-e. Substantially Lamb's translation. 
80 Philosophie Analytique de l'Histoire, t. I, p. 456. 
81 Republic, 367c. 
s2 71 Aav-iou n:61..t~, Republic, 592a. 
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being. On the whole, it may be said roughly to seek a solution to the 
problem of the happy state or society as that in which its members are 
regulated by the measure of justice. What confusion there is may be 
explained by the fact that our double justice-the personal': and the social, 
the moral and the ethical-did not exist for Plato; for him the good 
state was the state of the good man.32 
That Plato's doctrine of ideas is affiliated with his moralism is a 
reasonable supposition. Certainly the ideas themselves, in their first in-
tention, are not a necessity of epistemology but of morality. The originals 
have all something of the character of moral standards. Piety, courage, 
sophrosyne, justice-even phronesis, or intelligence, and beauty connote an 
obligation, as does all knowledge; they are at least suggestive of what we 
should call duty. If virtue does not subsist by favor either of man or of 
gods, it must have being somehow in itself. In this light the dialogues of 
the ideas appear as supplementary to the dialogues of the virtues. And 
with a little good will the Greater Hippias may be taken, together with the 
Euthyphro, as an introduction. It still holds to some of the earlier threads: 
it is intolerant, in the same old fashion, of sophistry masquerading as 
wisdom, and culminates with the confusion of Hippias, the "knowledge-
able"; it is equally ardent in the pursuit of definition and equally incon-
clusive in the upshot. But in particular, while simple and plain-spoken, 
it is conversant with certain turns of phrase and thought peculiar to the 
doctrine and is familiar with the general notion of participation.34 It is a 
sprightly dialogue too, whoever wrote it. One might do worse than to 
read it before proceeding to the Meno, the Symposium, and the Phtedrus, 
with which dialogue the Phtedo is to be properly affiliated. 
While the subject of these dialogues is too vast for this sort of cursory 
analysis, the ideas in their broader significance may be loosely defined as 
those lovely forms ( µo()«.pat), those beautiful apparitions ( Etl>ri, ll>Em) of 
reality to the soul by whose assistance it is enabled in some sort to make 
the world of sense intelligible so far' as it happens to resemble them. Their 
presence to the mind is explained in the Meno by the supposition of 
reminiscence. Use and wont notwithstanding, I hesitate to speak of it as a 
doctrine; for taken literally it carries little or no conviction. It is rather a 
mythic expression, a figure, for the common experience wherein our happier 
conceptions seem, not to be invented or excogitated, but discovered--or 
33 I should like to cite /as in point an open letter from one of our great American 
politicians, reputed a stateman, before a late Presidential election, urging the voters to 
let the moral issues alone, and to direct their attention, where it belonged, to economic 
ones. 
34 For example, a:irto To ,wJ.ov oTt foTl, 286d; and a.u'to To ,mMv, qi ,ml 
'tUAA(J. ltU.V't(l xo<1µ1,i:'tm xal xaA.u <pULVE'tat, Z·89d. 
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rather, recovered, so that the perception of truth appears as a recollection 
of something known long since and lost awhile.35 It is a kind of symbolism 
akin to that which distinguishes the Symposiumi and the Pha:drus among 
the other writings of Plato; and as a characteristic it marks the close of 
the period in which Plato was able to rest satisfied with the spiritual 
apprehension of truth, untroubled by rationalistic misgivings. 
As for the Symposium and the Pha:drus, they are directed rather to 
the process and discipline whereby the soul may come to a better appre-
ciation of these divine manifestations, the ideas. With the Apology they 
are probably the best and most widely known of the dialogues and are of 
themselves mainly responsible for the romantic Plato, the mystic and 
ecstatic Plato of common report. Like all symbolic or allegorical present-
ments they are, it must be acknowledged, fluid and elusive, as it were 
images or reflections in water; the worst that can be said of them, even 
by one who sympathizes rather with the severity of the moralist, is that 
they are poetry. Nevertheless they have, each of them, a solid core of 
actuality. No more dramatic representation of life and character was ever 
written than the Symposium. The Pha:drus, on the contrary, is a curious 
medley, with its idyllic setting undet the plane tree, its' ode and palinode, 
it& rhetorical criticism, its passing comments on current and contempor-
aneous authors, and its lofty myth of the charioteer and splendid vision 
of the celestial clime ( -rov 'U:ltEQO'UQCI.VLOV -r6:1tov, 247e ), the region of 
truth (-ro w.'l]'3dai;: :1tEMov, 248b) and the abode of the ideas. 
It is at some such point as this-perhaps, with the very vision of the 
Pha:drus-that Plato's philosophy culminates. Not that the remainder of 
his course is unillumined; but that the spirit-I am tempted to call, it the 
justice-which makes him what he uniquely is, that balance of faculties 
which constitutes his greatness as a moralist has been disturbed. His 
respect for the rights of good sense ( the xowal evvotm of which Plutarch 
makes so much as a good academician against the Stoics), his appreciation 
of actuality, his faith in insight-in a word his feeling for the just measure 
begins to fail him; and he inclines more and more to prefer "intellection" 
before intelligence ( dianoea before noesis) and to put his trust in that 
"false secondary power" of the reason which ignores or neglects the pri-
mary distinctions of consciousness in the interests of an artificial logical 
consistency. The problem of the one and the many degenerates into the 
"Pythagorean" dogma of the "mixture" or "composition"; the doctrine of 
M For the romantic notion of truth and its apprehension compare Emerson: "When 
good is near you, when you have life in yourself, it is not by any known or accustomed 
way; you shal\ not discern the footprints of any other; you shall not see the face of 
man; you shall not hear any name:--the way, the thought, the good shall be wholly 
strange and new.''--Self-Reliance. The italics are mine. 
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ideas is metamorphosed into a grammar of predication and a logic of 
categories ( YEVl'J); the nature of truth and error, of reality and unreality 
(the very foundation of Plato's dualism) becomes hopelessly involved in the 
umbrageous mazes of ontology; definition is stripped to a skeleton of 
dichotomy-the whole Platonic ideism totters precariously on the brink of 
idealism-what we call idealism.36 It is with this Plato and his works 
that the epistemologists and the whole busy army of rationalists of one 
stripe and another find their affair. But for the reader whose interest is in 
the moral interpretation of life a hasty summary of this period should 
here suffice. 
That Plato was more or less subject to distraction in a manner which 
makes him appear inferior to Socrates in the article of character is a 
fact which his admirers have to make the best of. It is accountable, to a 
certain extent, for his unsystematic treatment of his ideas-fortunate though 
in this instan.ce we may esteem the consequence; and to this extent we 
have been reckoning with it in following the windings and meanders of 
his philosophy. To the impatience of youth and the impetuosity o{ man-
hood some degree of desultoriness is excusable. But Plato's two visits 
to Syracuse as a sexagenarian, in the fourth decade of the century, are 
another matter. To the former it is probable that he sacrificed the 
Thea:tetus, upon which, there is reason to suppose, he was working at 
the time, and whose spirit he never succeeded in 'recapturing after his 
return to Athens. But be this as it may, is it unreasonable to see in these 
two inconsequential excursions an index to his state of mind, corroborated 
as it is by the unhappy exposures of the seventh epistle-a momentary 
vacancy of vision, a consequent vacillation or self-distrust and a suscepti-
bility to irrelevant 'suggestion, which his lack of any great popular success 
or general influence-let us say with his Republic-may have tended to 
aggravate? 
Under the· circumstances, then, since his entire philosophy-a practical 
moral philosophy and way of life-had come to depend finally on knowl-
edge, it is hardly astonishing that he should have felt a certain anxiety 
for the cornerstone of his structure and that a teacher, the head of the 
Academy, exposed to objection and confrontation, he should have found 
himself driven to seek, over and above the inarticulate testimony of the 
spirit, some rational account of this knowledge upon which he had built 
his house. Nor does it seem improbable either that the searching and 
86 With these facts in: the immediate foreground it strikes me as not wholly un-
natural to feel more sympathy than irritation with Huit (La Vie et l'<Euvre de Platon: 
see t. II, pp. 261-311 in particular) in his summary rejection of the Parmenides, the 
Sophist, and the Politician from the Platonic canon; the scenery would be so much 
more regular and comfonable without them. 
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expounding of the philosophers his predecessors which his duties imposed 
upon him, should have confirmed him in this rationalizing vein. So Par-
menides, Heraclitus, Pythagoras, even Democritus appear, in the evidence 
of his own writings, to have swayed, if not to have shaken, his own mind 
successively or alternately. And since to Plato knowledge was essentially 
knowledge of the ideas, the Parmenides, which impartially covers the diffi-
culties of the doctrine, may as well be read in advance of the dialogues 
which I have huddled together under the title of metaphysical. 
Considered light-heartedly, the Parmenides is one of the funniest things 
in philosophy-the youthful Socrates, the future champion of sound sense 
and right reason, taking a lesson, open-mouthed, in ontological rigmarole 
from the old Eleatic dialectician, in the company of Zeno, the subtle 
juggler of apory and paradox! And what is the sense or the symbolism 
of Socrates' posing not merely as one of "the friends of the ideas" but 
as their responsible proponent? Is it part of the comedy of the situation? 
Or a pretext, in compliment to Parmenides, to run the ideas into his harbor 
and under his guns? Seriously, however, the dialogue does seem to dispose, 
in ironic wise, of the Parmenidean unity, as the Thea:tetus supplementing 
the Cratylus reckons in a corresponding portion with the Heraclitean 
mutable, which is, to all intents and purposes, a multiplicity or many. 
Whatever the force of the argument as such, the impression finally results 
somehow that neither of these two principles, the absolute and the flux, 
being and becoming, is adequate individually as a complete account of 
reality in the extensive sense of the term. 
By this time-with the second part of the Thea:tetus, to be more exact-
the Platonic genre has begun to lose its character. Philosophy appears; no 
longer as a way of life capable of dramatic representation. Dialogue and 
dialectic have parted company; discussion is supplanted by disquisition. 
The responses of the auditory become scanty and perfunctory or lapse 
altogether; while like "an imperfect actor on the stage," the old inquisitor 
himself "is put beside his part" or elbowed aside by some docent or 
other with a cut and dried system or Methodenlehre. The genial pursuit 
of truth with its companionable give and take has ceased forever. The 
Socratic conversation has stiffened into a set and apathetic convention. 
For the rest, the Thea:tetus, apart from the suggestive conceit of Soc-
rates' midwifery and its attack upon Protagoras, is overshadowed by what 
has now grown to be pretty much of an obsession with Plato--the problem 
of epistemology. Not that he ever finds a positive answer to the question, 
what is knowledge. The only answer possible to his philosophy he has 
already given in the Symposium and the Pha:drus; for "it is not definable 
like the sciences; but after being long brooded and dwelt upon it springs 
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up of a sudden in the soul, as light kindles on the throbbing of a fire, 
and there maintains itself." The pity of it is that he should have wasted 
so much of his precious time in searching for a definition that when found 
would have been at best only a definition of science after all. For the 
Sophist and the Statesman too, though their bearing is quite different from 
that of the T heeetetus, betray the same preoccupation. It is apparent in 
the dichotomy, that abortive attempt at methodology, peculiar to the two 
later dialogues, to say nothing of the curious quirk given to the dis-
cussion of truth and error in the Sophist, as well as 'in the Theeetetus, 
whereby the contradiction of reality and unreality is rationalized into the 
complement of some and other · in the predication of being and not being. 
As for the Philosopher, the final member of the trilogy ( or tetralogy, if 
the Theeetetus is to be counted in) which was to draw, in contrast with 
the Sophist and in extension of the Statesman, the portrait of the genuine 
ruler or legislator, no trickster or bungler, but master of the royal art, 
the kingly man who knows and is able (in Carlyle's dubious but sug-
gestive etymology )-as for him, it may be that in default of such a 
rationalistic definition of knowledge or truth Plato felt in his mood of 
disappointment too heavily handicapped to undertake him. Or did he 
hesitate in despair at last of the philosopher's competence to deal with the 
vice, intolerance, and folly of this sensible world? 'It is inconceivable that 
he could have voiced the doubt so eloquently as he has done in the 
Theeetetus and elsewhere37 if it had not lain so cold and heavy on his 
old age. 
Defeated, then, in his attempt at a "critical" philosophy-a failure to 
which he frankly confesses in the Philebus38-he drops, with his usual 
impatience at difficulties, the plan for a Philosopher altogether, and turn-
ing from knowledge itself to its subject-matter or content, launches in the 
Timeeus upon an account of creation, the metaphysical kernel of which 
is discernible through the account of the mixture ( 'tO µtx't6v) as it is figured 
in the Philebus.39 Call the Timeeus myth or metaphor or what you will, 
there is still a doubt in my mind whether Plato for the nonce was not 
the dupe of Empedocles and Democritus.40 To the Plato of the Meno 
and the Pheedo, the Plato of the ideas and of the reminiscence, for whom 
the mystery of being lay within, in the soul of man, absolute commence-
ments were at best absurdity; and it is tempting to ascribe to the Plato 
of the Timeeus a consistent sentiment: "That for your physical genesis! 
But since there is no certainty about becoming, nor any sense or knowledge, 
37 ThetEtetus, 172-177. 
38 Philehus, 59a and b. 
39 Philehus, 23-27. 
40 See Eva Sachs: Die fiinf platonischen Korper. 
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let us conceive of actuality genetically, as men are ever prone to think of 
nature, in this patricular way, as if and as though." 41 And yet agreeable 
as such a subterfuge is, still in view of the sources and the chronology of 
the dialogue, it strains my credulity to believe that Plato did not attach a 
positive or even scientific value to this cosmology, as the last recourse, it 
may be, of his rationalizing speculatioru. To think otherwise is to mis-
represent the character of this particular stage of his development. Partic• 
ularly in view of the renewing ascendancy of science after its "bank-
ruptcy" in the fifth century it is difficult to see the Tima:us otherwise than 
as an attempt on the part of its author to produce at last a Natur-Philo-
sophie, a complete deductive account of natural phenomena. The specu-
lations and experiments of Archytas, Theodorus, Thea!tetus, and Eudoxus 
-the comprehension of the five regular bodies, the discovery of irrational 
numbers, the foundation of stereometry, the deduction of the form of the 
earth and perhaps of its mobility-were all of a nature to arouse Plato's 
curiosity, and in his state of mind to stimulate his faculty of generalization 
and synthesis. How otherwise are we to account for the final transforma-
tion whereby the ideas incline to become a kind of concepts which can be 
formulated as number-that is to say as ratios comparable after their kind 
with our H20's and ½MV2's? 42 No, whatever you may make of this 
period scientifically, it is impossible to dispose of it philosophically other-
wise than as a period of gradual though fairly constant decline. 
Nor is the Laws, at the end of the long procession of dialogues, excep-
tional in any way or out of order. Taken as a whole-if what is properly 
a collection of remains, a Nachlass, may· be so taken-it represents in 
another field the rationalism of Plato's final period: as compared with the 
Republic it is so unmistakably practical and mundane in temper that it 
amounts to little less than a palinode of the earlier dialogue. What has 
become of the gold and silver men who graced his earlier polity, and of 
the higher education which was to elevate and sustain them? Where is 
the noble aristocracy of philosophers, legislators, and guardians of the com-
monwealth? For these regimented colonists of the Laws are all alike and 
of one sort, without distinction, hence without justice-as it were the 
third estate, the estate of concupiscent or average sensual men, drawn as a 
pis-aller from the obscurity in, which the Republic had left it-a Platonic 
Philistia. To the impartial reader the main interest of the compilation, 
for which we have to thank the pious cares of Plato's famulus or pupil 
41 Compare Philebus, 59a. 
42 I say nothing further of the Platonic doctrine of mathematical figures and ideal 
numbers as it may be inferred from Aristotle; whatever it amounts to it lies at all 
events outside the dialogues. See Leon Robin: La Theorie platonicienne des ldees et des 
Nombres d'apres Ari.tote. 
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Philippus, must consist in detached sallies and aperrus, of which there 
is naturally no dearth, for the voice is still the voice of Plato, though 
some of his accents, it may be, will sound sufficiently disconcerting to the 
student of his prime.48 
Such, then, is the way in which I read the dialogues-or rather, think 
of them when I think of them all together and in the mass. That they do 
not form a sequence like the chapters of a book, that they are not severally 
links in a chain, requires no demonstration. And it is this method, or 
want of method, of composition which compels us, when we would ex-
amine Plato's thought, to sift it somehow or other into topics. Whatever 
the light behind the medium through which he has chosen to transmit it, 
it has been broken up and dispersed, as by a kind of literary refraction, 
into a diversified spectrum of dialogue, from which it is necessary to pick 
and match the several colors through all their bewildering gradations of 
hue and shade. His conceptions of immortality, of the soul, of reality; 
his opinions of rhetoric, art, education; his views of virtue, wisdom, happi-
ness are not revealed completely in a single dialogue or consecutively in 
any set of dialogues, but must be sought from one to another and com-
posed at the reader's discretion. That the task of organizing all these 
partial syntheses into a single inclusive and consistent system seems to me 
impracticable, I have already declared, since I do not believe that such a 
system existed whole in Plato's head. Still I would not deny that such 
a construction is possible as a tour de force. I would only suggest that it 
is much more reasonable and more agreeable with the spirit of Plato to 
look upon these traceries and recollections as images, not so much of a 
single Platonic idea, as of that one transcendent truth of which Plato's 
thought itself was but a faceted reflection. 
43 For example, the manner in which he compromises the good old Socratic thesis 





Of all Platonic themes the doctrine of ideas is the most profound and 
serious. Not that I pretend to understand it save in a general way; very 
likely it is one of those intuitions which are never to be understood exactly 
even by their author. But I have a suspicion that if I could get to the 
bottom of it, I should find myself not only at the root of Platonism but 
of all philosophy and religion as well-perhaps "within the eventual ele-
ment of calm" itself. So much of stability amid "the wheel and the drift 
of things" does it seem to promise. How it may be with others I cannot 
say, but for my own part I am unable to find very much satisfaction in 
the perpetuity of change, or take any great comfort in the eternity of 
progress. Even the contemplation of illimitable imperfection and the pros-
pect of unceasing process fail to inspire me with enthusiasm. A life that 
slips through our fingers moment by moment, a world that shifts uneasily 
from one inconceivable transformation to another-such contingency, to 
my mind, carries but slight assurance of reality. It is not that I deny the 
existence of what we call an outward or extended world, a world of fact 
or event; what I question is its credibility. Its secret, if it has one, I doubt 
we shall ever learn. And so we busy ourselves with our little myths and 
fancies, just as Plato did when he too was at a loss-poetry, art, meta-
physics, science. In such a world I can put no greater faith than in the 
fictions which purport to represent it. It affords me no security or peace; 
it only fills me with incredulity and misgiving. Nor, indeed, if I may 
rely upon my own convictions, is this the only world in which I live. 
I have at least intimations of another, not of my own making either, for I 
must claim no greater originality for consciousness than for sense. They are 
both witnesses, as both worlds are presentations. Only as the eye per-
ceives the visible, may the mind discern the intelligible. But the intelligible 
has at least the advantage for me of being the more authentic and trust-
worthy. Such, as I understan~ it, is the teaching of Plato in his doctrine 
of ideas; such, its gravity and consequence. 
"Change and decay in all around I see; 
0 Thou who changest not, abide with me." 
"Denke class die Gunst der Musen 
U nvergangliches verheisst, 
Den Gehalt in deinem Busen 
Und die Form in deinem Geist." 
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When it is remembered that Plato began his career as a moralist and 
so continued for the greater part of his life; that he turned logician and 
metaphysician only in what are admittedly his very late if not his latest 
dialogues; that in the dialogues which are generally acknowledged to 
intervene between the two periods he is occupied with the ideas-when 
these considerations are mustered and reviewed, it would seem like the 
veriest chronological blunder to search for the origin of his ideas amid 
the logical and metaphysical speculations which engrossed his declining 
years. The evidences point so unanimously to another antecedent. Even 
his dabblings in logic and metaphysics and rationalism in general, when 
viewed in their natural perspective, appear but the result of the perplexities 
of the moralist, as witness his constant references, when engaged in such 
discussions, to difficulties already incurred and admitted. And this docu-
mentary testimony to the moral genesis of the doctrine is confirmed by 
a recollection of its author's character and situation. 
The pre-eminence of Plato is established in his moralism. If anything 
were needed to prove the ascendancy of the moral motive over his spirit, 
the Republic alone would serve the turn. The projected polity is a moral 
institution founded upon the moral constitution of the individual and for 
its advantage and improvement, while the governors or rulers are qualified 
not merely by the superiority of their moral character1 but by their know-
ledge of thei good itself as essence or idea. In Matthew Arnold's phrase, 
life was to Plato in all its concerns a moral affair. As a logician and meta-
physician he has been surpassed and superseded; as a moralist he belongs 
in the succession of .iEschylus and Sophocles, and that is as much as to say 
in the great indefectible1 tradition of human culture. 
For an exposition of the views of the two dramatists this is hardly the 
occasion.1 It is enough to say, what perhaps no one will feel like disputing 
when stated in general terms, that their tragedy may be conceived philo" 
sophically as an attempt to illustrate the operations of a moral law in-
herent somehow in the ultimate constitution of reality, if not constituting 
the ultimate itself. Very likely I should be better advised to call it a 
principle, since it was thought of neither as a statute nor as a formula, 
the two notions which we commonly associate with the word law to-day. 
Rather it was looked upon as a character or nature, the nature of the 
cosmos as the institute and seat of order, and hence itself the principle 
or essence of that cosmic seemliness and propriety. To be sure, it might 
find tentative and partial expression in some semi-articulate sense of para-
mount or "divine" obligation or duty, like Antigone's ayQM'ta v6µtµa; 
but on the whole it was not to be comprehended in prescripts or edicts or 
1 I have already discussed the subject at some length in my Romance and Tragedy. 
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to be otherwise defined or circumscribed by words. Indeed, what strikes 
the reader of 1Eschylus and Sophocles is in the last resort the atmosphere 
of baffling and impenetrable mystery with which it is invested.2 But for 
all that it had its evidences. Whoever neglected or omitted to conform 
to this order or organization-whoever failed, that is, to participate in its 
nature or virtue-was automatically determined to disaster or destruction. 
He was unfit and invalid; and his activity was bound to be a source of 
moral offense and frustration. 
Nor, it is only just to remark, are glimpses of such a morat disposition 
wanting to the "physical" speculations of the early philosophers-the last 
place where one would be likely to look for them who allowed his mind to 
be swayed by the tyranny of scholastic names and classifications. To heap 
up citations would be easy; but one or two should serve the purpose. Take 
for example that fragment of Anaximander's in which he declares that 
"into those things out of which all are generated, into these they decay 
again, as is meet; for they make reparation and compensation, for 
their wrong-doing, to one another, according to the order of time."3 
And may I be excused the rather obvious reference to Heraclitus' obser-
vation, "The sun will not overstep his measures; otherwise the Erinyes, the 
handmaids of Justice, will find him out"? 4 As a religious teacher Emped-
ocles is not so much to the point, perhaps; still the following fragment is 
interesting in this connection: "But the law for all extends far and wide 
through the wide-ruling air and the measureless splendor of heaven."5 
But these are adumbrations, or perhaps reliquite. It took the genius of 
1Eschylus and Sophocles to disentangle the principle from the physical 
clutter in which it was involved and to apply it to the problem of human 
happiness and misery. And even they, for all their powers of divination, 
succeeded in tracing it but darkly through the envelopes of exceptional 
circumstance and in, the dubious fortunes of particular men. 
That is the disadvantage of art. At best it is but "the illusion of a 
higher reality"-but still, as Plato saw, an illusion after all. It may illus-
trate truth; what it purports to represent are facts, whose authenticity is 
open to question and whose interpretation is subject to doubt. Its actu-
ality is a fiction; its reality, a similitude. It is only a symbol, and its 
2 Observe how studiously Plato at a much later and more advanced date declines 
Adeimantus' and Glaucon's invitation to define the good, the supreme moral reality 
or idea.-Republic, 506. 
3 Diels: Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 2, 9. Cp. Burnet: Early Greek Philosophy, 
3d ed., p. 52, note 6. 
4 Bywater, xxix; Diels, 12B, 94; Burnet, p. 135. 
5 Diels, 21 B, 135; Burnet, p. 225. For the incubation and gestation of these 
notions I am not here concerned. Anyone who is will find sufficient pasturage for 
curiosity and amazement in F. M. Cornford's From Religion to Philosophy. 
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significance is always implicit and equivocal. And yet beneath the mask 
of Attic tragedy it is possible to detect more than one feature which 
should put the reader in mind of Plato-the conception of a universal 
moral frame or structure ( and what else is implied by the Platonic terms 
form and idea) and of the cosmos as a system existing in view of a 
supreme or spiritual6 good; together with the notion of this moral principle 
as a kind of essence communicating reality or being to its participants and 
in its regulative aspects or activity insuring the virtue or order of the 
universe by the inevitable force of a native bent or propensity. 
It may be objected that in what precedes I have been arguing the 
obvious. Every human being, I may be told, is convinced in his heart 
of the moral administration of the world. And to a certain extent, perhaps, 
the reproach is just. But to the popular imagination such policing has 
usually been done by one or more superhuman beings in their own 
interest and in accordance with their own will or caprice; it has been pretty 
much the conveniency of the mighty; and with them it has been possible 
to bargain and compound. With the decline of religion, however-a transi-
tory aberration of the human spirit in any case, I shall probably be 
assured-the edifice of morality is securely reforming on the foundations 
of social convention, somewhat after the conception of the Sophists; man-
kind may have doubts about the day of judgment, but they are certain 
of public opinion, and the approval or condemnation of their neighbors, 
with the rewards or punishments accruing. But all this is very different 
from a faith in an impartial moral constitution or nature, to which all 
men are as liable as they are to gravitation ( whatever that may be) and 
which they can neither browbeat after the fashion of Thrasymachus nor 
cajole after that of Euthyphro; it is not a belief in a cosmos fundamentally 
moral in character and operation. Nor does Matthew Arnold's "power 
not ourselves that makes for righteousness" bespeak just such a confidence 
either. Very likely there is a sense of virtue in all but the most debased-
or so we are pleased to think. Incredulous as man may be of moral conse-
quences, he will nevertheless recognize and even admire goodness; he 
will probably, like Polus, consider the state of the just man more re-
spectable, possibly more desirable, than that of the wrong-doer. But this 
is to make of righteousness an ideal, as Grote seems to think that Plato 
is trying to do in the Gorgias.7 And it was in none of these ways that 
those earlier sages who had the vision conceived of the good. For them 
it was neither a superstition nor a convention nor an ideal; it was neither 
incidental nor accidental nor wilful: it was an essential and fatal reality. 
And it is for this reason-because Plato enters upon this faith and makes 
6 Such is the sense of the Greek word divine. 
7 See Grote's Plato, Chap. XXII. 
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it his possession-that I have written him m the succession of 1Eschylus 
and Sophocles in the place of Euripides, who sold his heritage for a 
portion of rationalism and took up his dwelling, though the greatest of 
them, in the tents of the Sophists. 
One other name it might have been necessary to interpolate in the 
series, if Socrates had had the genius or knack of authorship. Perhaps-
for it is not impossible that Socrates' philosophical powers have been over-
rated. It is so hard to lay hands on the man himself. There is the Socrates 
of Aristotle, the inventor of definition and "induction;" and the Socrates 
of Aristophanes, the "meteorologist" or physicist; and there are the Socrates' 
of Xenophon and Plato, not to say of Antisthenes and 1Eschines, moralists 
all of them, however they may differ among themselves. But what are 
the respective contributions of sitter and painter? It is curious at least 
that the attempts of the Platonic Socrates at definition are so generally 
abortive.8 Curious, too, that the Xenophontic Socrates deems physical science 
not only useless but impious,9 while the philosophical stock in trade of 
both the Xenophontic and Platonic Socrates consists of several common-
places of fifth century controversy. What transpires through the repre-
sentations-at least those of Xenophon or Plato-is not so much a phil-
osophy as an influence, not a doctrine but an inspiration. 
As a matter of history there are few teachers who have been successful 
in uniting so many diverse suffrages-Euripides, 1Eschines, Euclid, Ph.rdo, 
Xenophon, Aristippus, Antisthenes, Plato himself; Socrates must have had 
a side, if not several sides, for each of them. Indeed I sometimes wonder 
whether his various elements did not to some extent balk one another, as 
the rain flattens the sea and the wind checks the frost. After all, say what 
you please, there is too often a kind of one-sidedness or immoderation 
about great achievement, be it what it will; it is seldom the result of a 
perfect equilibrium. Certainly there must have been a good deal of the 
rationalist about the man Socrates, or he would never have found so 
ready an audience in Euripides. That he was hard-headed, shrewd, ironic, 
skeptical, all his witnesses agree. And if he seems a little nai'f, as well, as 
he does to Aristophanes, the note is not wholly incompatible with the 
character of rationalism either. The interview with Theodote the courte-
san, wherever it comes from, must have been appropriated by Xenophon 
8 I need refer only to the Charmides and the first book of the Republic with their 
defective definitions of sophrosyne and justice; though at the same time it must be 
added that Socrates occasionally brings off a definition by way of illustration, as in 
the Meno, 75b and 76a. But for that matter, if his chief merit lie in the discovery of 
definition, why are not the genuine Socratic dialogues, for example, the Sophistes and 
the Politicus? Cp. Stenzel: Studien zur Entwicklung der platonjschen Dialektik tton 
Sokrates zu Aristoteles, pp. 47-48. 
9 Memorabilia, I, iii. Cp. the Phtrdo, 96-100. 
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for cause.10 It may seem like caricature; but the impression is rectified by 
one stroke and another-of a curiosity whetted with inquisitiveness, avid 
of all kinds of miscellaneous information; the common-sense appetite for 
odds and ends of knowledge with its vexatious questioning and disarming 
simplicity-a "picker-up of learning's crumbs." Nor was his intellect 
without astringency either; it is always slightly styptic-a contractile mind, 
as is illustrated in Antisthenes. Whence his taste for definition-for what-
ever his dialectic skill, his penchant for that sort of exercise cannot be 
gainsaid. He has a passion for neatness, definiteness, exactness; for the 
right line and the truci edge-for the just level and the plumb. And un-
fortunately much of Plato's philosophy was loose and unknit and elastic; 
it was the price he paid for reality-an extravagance at which Socrates 
would not unlikely have boggled. 
The so-called Socratic theses into which Socrates' moralism would 
seem to have knotted itself in accordance with this disposition of his 
spirit are three or four in number. The questions to which they served 
as answers were moot questions of the fifth century, the spring-time of 
Greek rationalism or enlightenment, and subjects of debate particularly 
among the elder Sophists. It would be surprising if Socrates, being with-
out a system or framework of his own whether by principle or tempera-
ment, should not have sought to define his convictions by reference to 
such "burning questions" of his day, so that the propositions by which 
he has done so may be taken to reflect, in a manner, his whole moral 
philosophy. Nor is it any less natural that Plato at the beginning of his 
career, himself in turn wanting as yet a settled habit of belief, should 
have picked up such pregnant sentences with the idea of clarifying his 
own thought in the act of expounding and illustrating his master's. 
Where he innovates and originates it is not always possible to decide 
with certainty. There are those who would have us believe that the 
single hand of Plato is at work only in the logic and metaphysics of the 
latest period. But on the whole it seems unprofitable to attempt to sepa-
rate decisively the Plato and the Socrates of the dialogues. After his 
derivation has once been noticed it is saner-certainly it is easier-to look 
upon the Platonic Socrates as a dramatic character and to follow the 
thought rather than the thinkers. What discriminations we do make, 
when we must discriminate within the dialogues themselves, are much 
better made in the sense of tradition. At best they are only hypothetical 
and suggested in the interests of a thought to which Plato, in salvaging 
it, has established an indisputable title, no matter from what port it first 
sailed. In fact, if I dare express myself to that effect, I think the historical 
10 Memorabilia, III, xi. 
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Socrates' contribution to the dialogues much smaller than we generally like 
for sentimental reasons to believe-with the exception I have just mentioned 
in favor of his inspiration. 
"Virtue is one," "virtue is knowledge," "virtue is happiness," "virtue 
can be taught," "no man does wrong willingly"-these maxims named of 
Socrates, represent at all events Plato's point of departure. That' he is not 
certain as yet in just what manner they are to be taken is evident from 
the dubitations and contradictions of the earlier dialogues-it is very 
largely from this source that Socrates has drawn his ironic reputation of 
the know-nothing;11 he is downright and opinionated enough in Xeno-
phon.12 It results clearly too from the same premise that in Plato's eyes at 
least these aphorisms served to formulate the Socratic creed, whatever 
might be their proper interpretation. There is between them an obvious 
2nd matter-of-course connection which could hardly have escaped his notice. 
If virtue is knowledge-and it certainly presupposes some sort of discrim-
ination, just as knowledge in turn implies and carries an obligation-
it must be one and capable in so far of being imparted; while if it 
ensures well-being or prosperity, as the phraseology of experience seems 
to argue-to have done well is as ambiguous in English as in Greek-
no one will deliberately traverse it save in ignorance of his own interests. 
But such an argument is wholly superficial. And Plato must have often 
wondered, even while the voice of Socrates was yet in his ears, what 
knowledge this is which is virtue; that it is any kind of common or 
technical knowledge he explicitly denies, Socrates' constant suggestions to 
the contrary notwithstanding. For us, with our after-information, to answer 
the question for him is easy enough: knowledge of the ideas, we should 
say, and of the idea of good in particular. But it took Plato a great while 
and a great many steps to reach this conclusion; in a sense his whole 
philosophy may be viewed as the result of his attempt to solve the problem 
in its several developments; most of his first and some of the succeeding 
dialogues are concerned with it specifically. Such is the theme of the 
Charmides and the Laches; it underlies the Protagoras, the Euthydemus, 
the Meno; in short, it was always more or less in possession of Plato's 
mind. Nevertheless, while this very possibly is the spur which incites 
his moral speculations, it is not always in his flank. Indeed he can 
hardly be said to have slighted any of the questions raised by his master. 
But the subject which gradually comes to predominate over the others 
and engrosses his interest is rather that of the relationship of virtue and 
happiness. It is the topic of the Gorgias and in a large way of the Republic. 
11 See The,ztetus, 150c. 
12 Possibly through the influence of Antisthenes? 
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If we are to judge from the length of his journey alone, he could 
not have taken the solution ready-made from Socrates. And in addition 
there is the character of Socrates to be reckoned with. For Socrates, with 
his practical prejudices and his good- sense, the well-being which was the 
reward of virtue was not wholly divested of worldly advantage or at 
least of physical satisfaction,13 for the Greeks were naturally men of 
this world. I will not deny that he had transcended the vulgar notion 
of material prosperity or that he had discriminated among pleasures and 
gratifications. Ilut his conception of happiness must have been a great 
deal more like that of Aristotle than that at which Plato finally arrived: 
his virtue was at best a kind of policy, a relatively sublimated policy, but 
still a mode of insurance:-"No evil can happen to the good man alive 
or dead." It is fair, I think, to argue that such at least was Plato's under-
standing of his code, and that at first he was swayed by it as in the 
Protagoras, where he is identifying good with pleasure. But in the end 
and by the time of the Republic, very great evils and very many of them 
might happen to Plato's good man without affecting his happiness. He 
might be poor, infirm, and despised; in "disgrace with fortune and men's 
eyes;" in pain and misery; imprisoned and in danger of death; he might 
even fail to win the approval or consideration of the gods-and his 
felicity would remain intact with his virtue. 
That Plato actually proves any such proposition, however cheerfully 
he undertakes the task, as that man is or can be happy absolutely and 
independently of circumstance, is not a fact. In the nature of the case 
such a demonstration is impossible. The sentiment must be taken as a 
forensic paradox such as Plato, like his compatriots, was so fond of. At 
the same time he, and I think Socrates also, would have preferred the 
rack to the throne of Archelaus.14 In any case Plato's conception of justice 
would deny the permanence or continuance of any such fate for the 
righteous; it would have contradicted his belief in the structural justice 
of reality and his doctrine of ·reminiscence and the persistence of the soul, 
to say nothing of subverting his theory of ideas and of the supreme good 
by which the connection of happiness and virtue seems to him to be guar-
anteed. So difficult is it to divest oneself of all the prepossessions of one's 
faith that Plato, I fancy, was incapable of arguing the question in its 
stark nakedness at all. But at all events the assertion has this much truth: 
not only does it evoke the memory of the Christian martyrs, but it points 
unmistakably to Socrates himself, whose practice so far kept pace with his 
13 Precisely as his good was not without a strong tincture of utilitarianism. 
"•~1..la µ~, lcp?), dy' teco!~I: µe et 'tt dya~ .. otlla, 8 µ'1'jllevo1: dyaitov fo·nv, 
oih' o[lla, ecp'l'j, O\l'tl! lleoµat. -Xen., Mem., Ill, vm,. 3. 
H See Gorgias, 470d. 
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precept that it was upon his example, as we can hardly doubt, that Plato 
drew for his own philosophy of the happy man. 
Already there is a little something elusive-or as the worldly might 
think illusory-about such a conception of virtue and happiness.15 It 
reduced happiness to a spiritual state. And to Plato the horror of wicked-
ness or evil was precisely in this effect-the condition to which it inevitably 
by a kind of moral fatality reduced the soul; he likens it again and again 
to disease, as he compares righteousness with health.16 To the grosser 
mind of his contemporaries such a notion of virtue as consistent with a 
happiness totally insubstantial was wildly fantastic. None the less it was 
to Plato the fundamental and final reality; and it is in the attempt to 
make a place for such a transcendent causality-to show that virtue and 
happiness are states of the soul, the former as its health, the latter as its 
well-being-that he found himself led to the discovery of the ideas. 
To appreciate the novelty it is necessary to remember how strange to 
the Greeks was the conception of an incorporeal reality. Even to Plato 
the higher soul was material still-wonderfully fine and tenuous and 
subtile-a simple, unitary, indissoluble substance, but by no means im-
material.17 It is the difficulty which Plato has to meet over and over 
in arguing his philosophy-the inability of his auditors to grasp the 
reality of the idea as such independent of its particular embodiments and 
concrete manifestations.18 As far as they were concerned, ideas might 
just as well be things; very probably the ordinary Greek would have 
thought of justice as a kind of thing, if he had thought of it as a reality 
at all. So far then from Plato's introducing a "reification" of abstractions 
in the usual sense, he actually spiritualized the commonplace acceptation 
of reality by detaching the ideas from their reflections and images 
at the same time that he insisted upon their being, as attested in particular 
by the conjunction of happiness and virtue, which he accepted finally 
as an ultimate datum of consciousness. On this point, where the matter 
hinges for the modern, since the immateriality of the ideas is not likely 
to disconcert him-on this point there is no chance for mistake, as the 
demonstration of the Republic is undertaken to show; in the absence of 
other conditions virtue alone is capable of producing such an affection of 
the spirit, so that in the rendering of Plato's thought it is hardly too 
15 Grote, for example, seems to have difficulty even in understanding it. See his 
chapter on the Gorgias again. 
16 Cf. Gorgias, 477-478 and Laws, 731c-d. 
17 Compare St. Paul's oiiiµa '\l)U)Ctx6-v and oiilµa ii:veuµa,:txov, I Corinthians, XV, 
44-45. 
l8 See his retort to Meno, "Stop making many out of the one," etc.; Meno, 77a. 
Cf. 72d; and on the other hand the compliment to Thea:tetus for his ready compre-
hension of this sort of conception, Thea:tetus, 147. 
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strong a figure to say that virtue is happiness. What is doubtful is 
its status with reference to the sensible world. What kind of reality is it? 
And what is its mode of influence? 
That Plato ever answered these questions, even to his own satisfac-
tion, it would be idle to maintain. They have no answer. But they did 
lead him directly to the recognition of a moral nature. If virtue is pro-
ductive of happiness, if there exists such an intimacy of relation that the 
two are found to be inseparable like health and nourishment, can we 
go further in the one case than in the other? As well ask why is gravita-
tion. Such is the fundamental order of the world; such is its diathesis. 
For after all it is a world of human beings as well as of things, and in so 
far it is moral; such is the nature of it. And in this sort it is presided 
over by a higher and greater idea even than justice or righteousness--
the idea of good.19 
And here it seems but prudent to interpose a word of caution with 
regard to the use of the term idF-a. In current parlance our idea of good 
is the notion that we entertain of it, or pretty nearly what we think 
about it. In Platonic language, however, the idea of good is the good 
itself, as we speak of the quality of mercy or the science of chemistry. 
In this signification the existence of the idea and the good are con-
joined-though the kind and manner of its existence may of course 
remain doubtful. Whereas in our common nomenclature the existence 
of the idea does not imply the existence of its object, or that of which 
it is the idea, but merely of the idea alo1,1e; or if we identify the two, 
the existence of the good becomes notional as in the Cartesian argument 
for the existence of God, which reduces, in our minds, the existence of 
God to the existence of the idea of God, and, if anything, rather dis-
credits it in that it is an idea. The matter is elementary, but, as the suc-
cessive philosophical transformations of the word itself show, it is all 
the same an insensible cause of a never-ending confusion, and is responsible 
for any amount of nominalistic and conceptualistic misunderstanding and 
misrepresentation. On this account the employment of idea for Et~o~ or 
t~fo has been unfortunate--as well as for the reason that it fails any 
longer to render that suggestion of form or figure which still clings to 
the Greek as a synonym of µoQ<pTJ and which is at least illustrative of 
Plato's notion of the ideas as giving shape, if only exemplarily or inform-
atively, to the sensible and visible world. To be sure, the Greek word 
was as confusing as our own, though after a different fashion; but in 
view of our particular quandary it· cannot be insisted too often that Plato 
does not differentiate the idea from what we should call its content or 
subject. Nor does he mean to attribute to that content or subject the sort 
19 Republic, 509. 
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of merely abstract existence, the ghostlike reality or subsistence with 
which we have come to fob off our ideas and "essences;" in his mind the 
two are one and are both real objectively. 
As far, then, as there is required an intermediary and connecting term 
between virtue and happiness it is supplied by the idea of good. Beyond 
this reach, however, Plato does not go. The good is what gives the 
world a decisively moral and hence intelligible disposition, what informs 
it with significance and relevance-as far as the world has sense and 
reality, it is the idea of good which confers that character upon it. I have 
spoken hitherto, perhaps, as though Plato thought the universe to be 
moral through and through. But there is another side to it. In addition 
to the presence of good his philosophy admits a second presence, the 
presence of evil-or to mince matters no more than he does, a principle 
of indiscrimination and illusion. "It is impossible to be rid of evils," he 
says, "for there needs must ever be something opposed to the good."20 
And for him this other is &vaywr1 or necessity, the senseless obstinacy of 
change and mutability, that inveterate perversity which makes what we 
have come since Aristotle to call 'UA'l'J, or matter so intractable, obdurate, 
and unmanageable-yes, and incomprehensible. Viewed in this way it 
is identifiable with physical causation, "the realm of law;" for what 
is such causation but; the unreasonable persistency of things in their own 
shifty and alien ways? In short, it is indistinguishable from matter con-
sidered in its principle rather than its material-for Plato had conceived 
no substratum for that change which constitutes the subject of necessity. 
Or to be free of modern connotations which have reversed him so bewilder-
ingly, it is mere becoming, the flux itself, flowing forever in swift verti-
ginous eddies and counterfeiting in its fleeting swirls the ideas of reality 
which transcend it while incapable of retaining more than a momentary 
resemblance to their inalterable perfections. 
Such is, according to Plato, the nature of the phenomenal or sensible 
world, that world for which we now reserve the name nature exclusively. 
In some way or other, which he never succeeded in explaining, this 
world of particular things arises by reflection, as it might be, from the 
supervention of the ideas upon an originally indeterminate or undiffer-
entiated medium, which is to Plato hardly more than a place or locus 
( ,:6:n:o; or )'.O>Qa) as it were the visionary depth of a mirror or other 
featureless receptacle (u:n:oao:x;~).21 At all events, whatever it actually was 
or is to which Aristotle later gave the name of hyle or matter, it is still 
to Plato little better than a simulacrum without permanence or solidity, 
without form or consistence, a mere insubstantial screen or impalpable 
20 Thea:tetus, 176a. 
21 Tima:us, 49 ff. 
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background of smoke or shadow, unintelligible in itself, assuming or 
rather receiving shapes and appearances mimetically after the pattern of 
the ideas alone which impend upon it.22 
But whatever the mystery of its origin or its natural state, the universe, 
or rather the aggregate, divides into these two distinct parts or regions--
the moral and intelligible and the sensible and conjectural. On the one 
hand Plato was too much of a Parmenidean to credit the reality of the 
flux in its endless perturbations; on the other, too much of a Heraclitean 
to deny its sensationality-if I may coin a word to cover an implication in 
which our vocabulary seems wanting-namely, the impudence with which 
the phenomenal forces itself upon our attention as though significant and 
veritable in its own right. Even to Protag~ras he is willing to concede, 
as far as this latter world is concerned, a modicum of truth to the dogma, 
"man is the measure of all things." 23 What he will not grant is the 
adequacy of this relative as a ground of certainty and a subject of knowl-
edge. Such is the function of the ideas-to serve as the form of knowledge 
and of being or reality. With regard to their independence and transcend-
ence he never wavers; they are distinct from the world of concretions 
(XWQLCJta) and beyond it (1btbtttva). What perplexes him is their manner 
of intercourse or communication with this world, which he denotes by 
such vague terms as immanence ( rt<XQOUcr(a) on the side of the ideas 
themselves, and participation and imitation (µ(µytcru;) on the •side of the 
sensibles (µt3E~tc;), and association (%otvwv[a) of either indifferently, 
though rather curiously, while he uses a wealth of illustration drawn from 
images, he seems never to have thought of the flux realistically as a kind 
of uncleal" mirror or obscure reflection of reality. 
Such then is the genesis of the ideas. The core of the Platonic phil-
osophy is stated in so many words by Adeimantus in the Republic and 
is accepted by Plato as the thesis for demonstration. The happiness of the 
just or righteous-this is the central tenet of Platonism; and it involves the 
entire doctrine of the ideas, for it presumes a belief in the objective 
reality of virtue as something beside a purely human ideal or a social 
convention, and along with it a belief in a congenial moral and intelligible 
order. It was a conviction which Plato had reached with the assistance, 
perhaps, of his conviction of happiness as the health of the spirit, subject 
in the nature of the case to conditions analogous to those of the bodily 
or physical soundness. Either there is this efficacy in goodness alone; 
or else what passes for justice must be reducible to other terms--expedi-
22 I need hardly call attention to the fact that under the ministration of our recent 
scientific and mathematical metaphysicians philosophy seems to be receding, with the 
dissolution of matter, into a pre-Aristo~lian, though I doubt into a Platonic stage. 
23 Theiztetus, 166-167. 
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ency, utility, convention-in which alternative the universe itself ceases 
to be moral or intelligible in the proper sense and turns out to be merely 
"natural" in the sense of the Sophists, or as we should say physical ( though 
as a matter of fact our own use of the word natural is hardly distinguish-
able from that of the Sophists themselves) and hence subject exclusively to 
blind and inscrutable necessity. 
His problem, therefore, is the problem of human happiness-the only 
study worthy of the philosopher-the end and aim of living, the summum 
bonum. The morality of Socrates is his starting point, which in some 
way or other effected a conjunction of virtue and well-being. His first 
concern is, after the manner of his master, for a definition-not so much 
of virtue (he has not come so far as yet) as of the individual virtues. 
And he is inclined to follow his leader in the conjecture-was it much 
more to begin with?-that they all have a common ground in knowledge. 
To a certain extent his first attempts are miscarriages. The Euthyphro, 
the Charmides, the Laches throw him back upon his first position and its 
defence-particularly against the Sophists, whose pretensions to the secrets 
of knowledge, virtue, and happiness he undertakes to confute. It is a 
controversy which results in the deepening and purifying of his own 
conceptions: happiness is detached from pleasure and success and refined 
of all worldly admixture and dross. Knowledge is liberated from common 
opinion or conjecture ( Mi;a); righteousness or justice is separated from 
calculation or policy and associated as a higher reality with the supreme 
good. Unfortunately, in the case of such a subject, anything in the nature 
of demonstration in the ordinary sense is out of the question. It is a kind 
of ideal construction upon which he is forced to rely, in lieu of proof, 
for the justification of the conclusions at which he has arrived and con-
sistently with which he erects his spiritual polity, his inner city or city 
of the soul. His plea reduces finally to something like an appeal to 
the idyllic imagination of his auditors. 
II 
It is impossible, however, to proceed without clearing away what are 
bound to appear from this point of view certain misapprehensions and 
misrepresentations of Plato's conception. Nor is such a labor merely 
negative. Any serious discussion of Platonism, however mistaken its 
conclusions, ought to be instructive in some wise. Even this history of 
error is of service in turning up the soil and loosening a few of those 
obstinate aftergrowths which in gradually fastening themselves upon our 
minds finally come to seem an integral part of philosophy itself. We 
have travelled a great way, much of it circuitous, since Plato's time, and 
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have undergone a great many dubious experiences, until it is one of the 
most difficult undertakings in the world to recover the directness and 
simplicity of consciousness which was undoubtedly characteristic of his 
thought. 
Now, of all such distortions or perversions the most humiliating is 
that which would make him and his associates the dupes of language and 
would see in them the hapless victims of a tricksy vocabulary. It is in 
this manner that the ambiguity of such expressions as to do well ( ,:o E'O 
:rq_>cinetv) is supposed to account for the Socratic identification of virtue 
and happiness. 
But while such a supposition is too absurd to deserve serious atten-
tion, particularly when it -is recalled how perspicaciously Plato sees through 
the duplicity of not-being (-ro µiJ ov), it is not so easy to dismiss the 
critics of a more philosophical stripe who incline to reduce his philosophy, 
wherever possible, to terms of grammatical and logical predication.24 
Inasmuch as languag<; is representative, after a fashion, of thought, there 
is nothing unreasonable in supposing that some of the problems of mind 
should have become implicated in its structure and should in turn be 
recoverable from it. In this way metaphysics may come to appear, as 
sometimes it is, a pure logomachy or pother about words; but on the other 
hand, language may not be incapable on occasions of giving philosophy 
itself a lesson. Hence it will perhaps be worth the time and pains to see 
what sort of vista such a grammatical or syntactical view of the ideas 
is capable of opening. 
That all language embodies a sort of general or popular psychology 
nobody will dream of disputing. Everyone who undertakes to express 
himself through such a medium, tacitly adopts for the purpose a whole 
i:et of ready-made hypotheses or assumptions regarding sensation, per-
ception, cognition, and the like. But ancient and even elementary as 
some of them may be, the character of these beliefs and conjectures becomes 
evident only on reflection at an advanced stage in the development of 
the tongue and of those who use it. In this manner we may if we, please 
imagine Plato-or if we have scruples against compromising Plato himself, 
we may imagine someone else in his place, some Aristocles or other-
without formal grammar or codification of usage, beginning to concern 
himself for the signification of his phraseology. 
With regard to that class of words which we know as nouns and 
which was one of the very few divisions of speech for which Plato may 
have had a distinctive designation,25 though there is some question of 
the exactitude of his knowledge even in this case, the general sense was 
24 Gomperz, I think, is a fair example. 
25 See Sophist, 263d. 
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superficially clear. Such words appeared names attached to persons and 
objects or associated with them, as Aristides or horse. For I take it that when 
the Greek, including Plato himself, said, "That is Aristides" or "That is a 
horse," he believed that he was referring to an actual man or beast, the 
conception of mental figments as the subject of reference being a late, 
even a modern, subtlety, although it was forecast by Protagoras. Nor 
was he doubtful, either, of the purport of his answer when he replied 
appropriately to a certain type of question, "Aristides is just." 
At this point, however, he might begin to lose confidence. To be 
sure, the interpretation of Aristides offers little or no difficulty, or that of is 
-so far. Subject and verb seem perfectly simple and transparent at first 
sight-though later they were to make trouble enough and to spare. But 
how about just? Suppose our Aristocles under examination, as by the 
old inquisitor himself, with respect to the predicate: "What is just?" In 
order to frame a reply, aside from the difficulties of definition which are 
out of our way at present, he has now to turn his predicate into a subject. 
His method of doing so, whatever ingenuity it might have cost in the first 
place, had come to be easy enough in the end. He would prefix the 
definite article to the neuter singular of the adjective, as we speak of 
"the beautiful" or "the just," and he was prepared to make statements 
about his predicate too: "The just is so and so." 
But how long would it be possible for him to dodge a Socratic cross-
examination concerning the status of this 'to St1(mov or the just? Other 
subjects appear to be names-ostensibly of persons and things; what is this 
'tO S[1(aLOv the name of? 26 As long as the form of the adjective was 
retained-as it was for a great while in some instances-this sort of interro-
gation was not likely to importune the curiosity of the average Greek 
citizen unduly, quick-witted as he might be-at least Hippias in the 
Hippias Major has difficulty in appreciating the force of it as regards 
'to 1(aA6v or the beautiful; and his perplexity is not without parallels in 
Plato.21 But in those cases where the neuter adjective had been already 
supplanted by a noun or paired with one,28 even the most heedless could 
hardly remain insensible of the point when pressed. What then is the 
significance of such a subject as justice, and what does it name, if anything? 
Now, it is conceivable that in calling such subjects ( or rather their 
reference) as the just, 'to SE1(atov, and the beautiful, 'to 1(aA6v, ideas, our 
26 With the logical legitimacy of any such performance as I am sketching, I have, 
of course, nothing to do just now. The question at present is one of Plato's actual 
procedure--did he or Socrates arrive at his ideas by turning predicates into subjects 
(not, is it justifiable to do so)? or at all events, how far is such a supposition likely 
to illuminate or add to the understanding of his doctrine? 
27 Cp. Meno, 72d. 
28 As happened to 'tO O'O>qJQO'V, the temperate, and O'COqJQOO'll'V1J, temperance. 
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Aristocles-for I still hesitate to commit the Plato of the dialogues-it is 
conceivable, I suppose, that he, in place of Plato, might have meant 
nothing more, to begin with, than to provide a convenient handle for 
this new or newly acquired variety of subject. Nor is it wholly impossible 
that in insisting upon their reality and independence he would simply 
be affirming their genuineness and distinction as subjects in comparison 
with other subjects. "To be sure," he might reply to his Socratic ques-
tioner, "they differ from other subjects like Aristides and horse; but at 
the same time in the sense of subject they are equally real and viable." 
And it may be too that in originating expressions like airro ,c.a{}' a'U't6 he 
would have been emphasizing, at first, this contrast as between subject 
and predicate, noun and adjective; though by the time he had reached 
this point-if he ever had-ho should have been on the verge of a much 
more considerable discovery. 
I have no desire to be otiose; but since I have spent so much! breath 
on this topic already, I may as well run the risk of carrying it a little 
farther. Let us suppose, then, that our Socratic quiz, impatient of the 
predicate adjective forl the time being, has shifted his questioning to the 
verb: "You call M,c.mov or the just an idea, do you? Well, pray what 
do you make of the is when you declare that Aristides is just? What 
is this is the name of?" There is but one way out; if such a question is 
to be answered at all, it is necessary to recognize the is, after some fashion 
or other, as an expression of being and to represent it by some form of 
words capable of serving as a subject in its turn-'t'O sivm or something 
of the sort. On reflection, however, such a conception is seen to branch 
in two direction-into existence ( 't'O ov) on the one hand, and into essence 
(oi,a(a) on the other.29 And from these premises this Aristocles of ours, 
who by this time is by way of being a metaphysician as well as a logician 
and grammarian, may be trusted to argue that in the assertion, "Aristides 
is just," he is affirming of Aristides not merely existence and substance but 
essence also or that whereby he is and has his being; that is, since he is 
just, he is, and is so by virtue of justice.30 Whence it follows that the 
ideas, which began as predicate adjectives, turn out to be essences, from 
which the sensible world derives its significance by participation. 
Thanks to the nature of language, which lends itself so obligingly to 
a confusion of words and meaning, it is but a step at most from a belief 
in the relative reality of ideas as subjects to a belief in their absolute 
29 I omit the notion of identity as inconvenient, since my remarks are only illus-
trative anyway. As the reader has noticed already, I am making no effort to be exact, 
much less exhaustive. Besides, identit}I is another matter altogether. 




reality as substances. There is no difficulty about such a transition-least 
of all for the supposititious author of the foregoing reflections, particu-
larly if we assume, as we must by hypothesis, that he shares the Platonic 
view of reality as identical with the intelligible-a specification to which 
the ideas answer perfectly. While further, since reality is one with the 
ideas themselves, its nature must be open to the same instrument of 
research and investigation-namely, definition, which thus becomes the 
sole means for the apprehension of being. 
To this conclusion I imagine my logico-grammarian to have come 
as it were in the first burst and enthusiasm of discovery. But with the 
outlines of his system spread out before him, it is impossible that he 
should not awaken little by little to its difficulties and embarrassments. A 
genuine reality has certain claims which it is not always easy to satisfy 
speculatively. Such a reality is not wholly unwarranted, for example, in 
asserting a right to some sort of individual consistence and even local 
habitation. And while it may be possible to endow these logical 
notions with transcendence and relegate them to a region of their own, 
like "the intelligible place," the procedure fails to stifle objection com-
pletely. Nor is it altogether clear in what manner such an idea may be 
shared by a number of participants and still retain its integritn not to 
speak of the complementary hardship involved in a single individual's 
owing his character, like Aristides, to a number of different essences 
at once, for Aristides is not only just but unpopular, at all events 
temporarily. 
Into these apories, however, I must decline to be led by this particular 
route. Since this manner of discussion seems to me impertinent to an 
understanding of the authentic Platonism, it is unprofitable to give it 
more than passing notice or to allow it to arrest our attention.31 But 
with regard to two difficulties I must make an exception-namely the 
inclusion in the system of such substantives as those of identity and differ-
ence, and the extension of the doctrine to include generalities or classes 
like man and horse., 
Everyone who has read the Sophist in immediate connection with the 
Republic must have been struck with a sense of confusion, if not of 
dismay, at finding such logical or ontological categories as being, rest 
and motion, identity and difference supplanting or at least ranking the 
moral and intelligible realities of the earlier dialogues, justice and the 
rest of the virtues ( fJ lHJ.:n <lQE'trJ), above all the good, in contravention 
of Plato's e:xpress statement in the Republic of the superiority of the good 
31 Gomperz has viewed the landscape pretty thoroughly o'er from this point of view. 
See for instance what he makes of the hobgoblins of predication and inherence in his 
Greek Thinkers, Eng. Trans., Vol. II, Chap. VIII. 
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over being. To be sure Plato at first appears to distinguish these inter-
lopers by a designation of their own; he begins by calling them YEV'l'I or 
genera. But he ends by including them among the ideas proper.32 And 
yet that the two are mutually incompatible is clear on inspection. If good, 
for instance, is an idea it must. exist in itself, by virtue of its own being, 
and not by participation in another. In other words being is a relative, 
not an absolute, and exists according to all his previous teaching in 
function of the good.33 It is, in Plato's own expression, only as it were 
the namej of a name.34 While the confusion is worse confounded by the 
circumstance that in the course of the dialogue these genera, as I shall 
call them for the sake of distinction, are shown to shift their natures from 
time to time in a manner inconsistent with the stability ascribed to ideas 
essentially, so that not-being turns out to be other or different and hence 
comes of itself to partake of existence together with the same or identity, 
and being in like fashion may be either at rest or in motion, to say nothing 
of other transubstantiations equally or even more anomalous.35 
Now, however Plato succeeded in reconciling to himself these dis-
crepancies between the genera and the original ideas, if he ever did-for 
his attack upon "the friends of the ideas" in thiS! same dialogue, if taken 
in its plain and obvious intention, is\ not particularly reassuring-116-still, it 
is clear enough that he had smuggled in these aliens, so much must be 
conceded, by the way of predication. There is always a strong temptation 
-perhaps it is the besetting sin of intellectualism-to confound discourse 
with fact, to mistake the structure of language for the structure of reality. 
Such, as Santayana seems tOJ think, is the error of metaphysics, to substi-
tute grammar for physics, as Pythagoras substituted arithmetic for it-
or at least to erect the parts of speech into ontological substances.37 And 
this inclination was tremendously strengthened by the Sophists, whose 
existence depended upon their ability to, pass off words for things. How 
far Plato may have succumbed in the end to their example, is an open 
question; but it is distressing to find that in the very dialogue which he 
undertook for the purpose of demolishing Sophistry in its principle he 
ll!2 See 247a and 255e. For example, llw. 'to J.1,l!'t6l(EL'V 'tij~ t6fo~ 'tij~ -&a'tSQOU; 
such is the manner in which he comes to speak of them. And cf. the discussion of 
'to xaMv, 257d, e. 
33 Republic, 509b. 
84 244d. "The idea of existence, then, is the very same with the idea of what we con-
ceive to be existent."-Hume: A Treatise of Human Nature, Book I, Part II, Section VI. 
3li For a summary discussion of these perplexities see Bonitz: Platonische Studien, 
190-195. 
86 248a, etc. 
81 See for an amusing illustration Life and Finite Individuality, edited by H. Wildon 
Carr, Symposium II, wherein the reader is invited to consider whether the soul is a 
rohject or an adjective. 
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himself should have become entangled in the Sophistic fallacy-and that 
in spite of the fact that in the Republic, as though in prevision of the 
danger, he invalidatedi such speculations by his discrimination of the two 
minds and their functions (v6'1'}«ni; and auxvoia), the latter the organ of 
judgment or predication, the former that of divination or insight. Hence 
if Platonism is fundamentally a search for reality, it cannot be referred, 
on Plato's own showing, to the formal subjects of grammar and logic. 
Platonism proper is not in predication and cannot be got out of it. In a 
word, Plato at the moment when he is most himself protests that reality 
--a fortiori the all or aggregate with its mixture of the intelligible and the 
unintelligible-is not a logic, to say nothing of a grammar. 
The fact is that Plato at the close of his career had saddled his phil-
osophy with three passengers, none of which rode very comfortably with 
the others-the ideas proper ( s'i'.a'I'}), the genera or categories ( yiv'I'}), which 
though themselves relatives he insists upon treating as absolutes, and the 
common or class notions. These several conceptions, which were gradu-
ally forced upon him by the pressure of his own thought, he never at-
tempts explicitly to reconcile ( for the Parmenides can hardly be consid-
ered in such a light); but after his habit simply neglects or ignores the 
others when engaged with any one in particular. With the general or 
class notions he had indeed little to do at any time; they appear to interest 
him only incidentally as in the Parmenides. But of the genera (yiv'I'}) 
he makes a good deal in those of his later or Eleatic dialogues that have 
won the regard of the commentators by their air of profundity as well as 
by the problems which they offer for the exercise of the critics' ingenuity. 
And it is the labor of such exegetes in bringing together by hook or 
crook what Plato himself has discreetly kept asunder which has caused 
not a little of the confusion befogging this portion of his teaching. 
In view of these considerations it seems unwarranted to assign to the 
doctrine of ideas, whatever excrescences it may have grown, a purely 
formal or methodological origin. Not only does such a supposition falsify 
its character; it also violates its obvious chronology. The substitution of 
categorical relatives for the ideas marks a decline-or at least a later and 
elderly age of Platonism. It was only when embarrassed with the empirical 
difficulties of his philosophy-in itself a kind of def aillance or defection-
that Plato had recourse to the expedient of bolstering up his doctrine by 
a kind of rationalistic mechanism, or rather, perhaps, of distracting at-
tention from its difficulties by a sort of confusion or ignoratio elenchi 
such as he not infrequently practiced on other occasions. 
On the other hand, if it is a mistake, for all these perplexities, to 
confound the ideas in their purity with predicates or predicaments, it is 
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hardly better than a blunder to identify them with concepts or abstrac-
tions or universals. If such were not the case, there would be no problem 
in the questions propounded by Parmenides touching the ideas of man 
and fire and water and even of hair and ordure.38 If the ideas wiere 
nothing more than generic or class notions the apory which had at this 
time begun momentarily to unsettle Plato's mind would never have 
troubled him. But no matter what his later embarrassments and how he 
undertook to be rid of them, it is he himself who discriminates, in so many 
words, against conceptual notions; and behind his own words it should 
be unnecessary to go. 
The text for the statement is the well-known passage in the sixth book 
of the Rcpublic,39 the work which is authoritative for the maturity of 
Plato's thought. It is the passage in which he divides the all into two 
worlds or realms-the sensible or visible, and the intelligible or noetic. 
The former, which is the realm of opinion or common knowledge, cor-
responding to the field of modern science, he subdivides into two portions. 
The lower or the region of similitude consists of images, which he defines 
both as shadows and as reflections in waters and solid surfaces, in such 
things as have a close and polished consistency .40 The upper portion or 
the region of belief or conjecture comprises the actual objects themselves, 
whose images constitute the plane preceding. Such is the inferior or 
phenomenal realm, the world of becoming that never is. The superior or 
intelligible realm is likewise divided into two sections. But in this case it 
is not so easy to understand or explain the principle of division. What it 
amounts to, however, is something of this sort. The higher region of 
the intelligible realm includes the ideas proper. As to the lower sub-
division, the actual things or objects themselves in the upper level of the 
phenomenal world on the plane just below become a kind of images, in 
their turn, or reflections of a yet higher sort of something which Plato 
illustrates by the mathematical conceptions of the square, the diameter, and 
the like. Those conceptions are drawn from visible objects and things 
but are not identical with them. Nor are the figures that the mathema-
tician actually describes the subjects of his reasonings; he is reasoning 
rather about what these figures represent or symbolize-the square or 
the triangle in itself, of which no sensible figure is more than an image 
or refl~ction, though taken in itself such a figure is a denizen of the 
phenomenal world and in this sense is capable of casting its own shadow 
within that world like its fellow members. 
38 Parmenides, 130b. Cf. Julius Stenzel: Studien zur Entwicklung der platonischen 
Dialektik von Sokrates zu Aristoteles, s. 27, et seq. 
39 Republic, 509c, et seq. 
40 EV 'tOt~ ooa m,xv6. 'tE xat <pava (11JVEO'tYjXEV.-Republic, 510a. 
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Now, when it is remembered that at the time mathematical concep-
tions were the only abstractions or general notions or universals in good 
standing, the significance of the preceding classification will become clear. 
By this lower division of intelligibles ( Ta µa{h1µamu:i) Plato seems to 
mean what we have come in a comprehensive sense to call concepts or 
abstracts-and while including them in the section of intelligibles he 
intends to distinguish them from the ideas, which he places above them 
in the higher division, the superior range of all. And as though to provide 
against misunderstanding he assigns to each its own faculty; to the con-
ceptions or concepts, intellection (~u:ivota); to the ideas, reason (voiii;), 
whose exercise he characterizes by the term insight or vision ( mjni;, -Ofo) 
and whose activity alone is capable of yielding a knowledge of reality or 
wisdom. 
About the general sense of Plato's distinctions there is little doubt. 
That the lower intelligibles should be designated mathematic ( Ta 
µa&rjµau,u:i) is an accident of nomenclature due to the state of learning 
at the period. The explanation puts it beyond question that they are 
things ( that is, visibles, Ta OQa'ta) reduced to the nature of abstractions-
as by geometry, since geometry was the only authoritative science in ex-
istence, and had in fact arrogated to itself the mathematic or science, as 
distinguished from E:rttO''t'llµ't'), exclusively. For these reasons it would 
seem as though the mathematics (Ta µa-011µaux&.) were more under-
standingly translated in this connection by scientific than by mathematical 
in our acceptation-scientific concepts being the nearest approximation. 
As for what further conclusions may be drawn from Plato's arrange-
ments, that is a matter of discretion. Is it permissible, for instance, to 
infer that the same relation existed in,. his mind between the upper and 
lower intelligibles as that actually specified between the two visibles or 
sensibles? That is to say, are the concepts ('ta µa&rjµaTLXa) to be taken 
as a kind of images in their own province of the ideas-discursive or 
rational duplicates ( duplicates of reflection, if I may use the words with-
out levity) of the divine ideas?41 Unquestionably Plato saw a possibility 
of ascending to the ideas by this route, though it may have been merely 
disciplinary, a kind of training of the philosopher's sinews that he was 
thinking of and not a progressive acquisition or extension of knowledge. 
Be that as it may; one of the most striking features of the passage, 
aside from its purely doctrinal aspect, is this illustrative use of images. 
That Plato found them a source of wonder and admiration is not sur-
prising; it is rather surprising that no one else should have been affected 
so strongly by them. In themselves they are still puzzling enough in 
all conscience. But before mirrors were a matter of course, when reflec-
41 Corresponding to the distinction that he seems to have drawn later between 
mathematical figures and mathematical ideas [ or between mathematical numbers and 
ideal numbers}. 52 
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tions were more or less accidental and imperfect-usually surprised in 
streams and pools under conditions of constant disturbance, or glimpsed 
in vague surfaces; how mysterious and baflling they must have appeared! 
Where is the image that glimmers for an instant and vanishes? Which 
seems but is not? Which is visible to the eye but impalpable to the touch? 
Which is so specious and so furtive? What is it but an evidence ot the 
phenomenal-the other itself? Like becoming, it is unreal and illusory, 
here an instant and gone the next, a fertile subject of uncertainty and 
conjecture, quite sufficient to inspire and explain Parmenides' book of 
opinion on -co µit ov. It is so apt a symbol that one is half inclined to 
take Plato to task for not representing the phenomenal flux in such terms 
as a shifting reflection of the ideas. To anyone who has watched the 
rufiled effigies of trees and clouds and sky in running water and has 
turned his eyes upon their untroubled originals in the air above, the figure 
seems almost inevitable. And yet it is only a figure after all; and these 
apparent realities that look so secure and self-sufficient are but apparitions 
and manifestations of sense themselves. And Plato was not likely in so 
serious a matter to content himself with a superficial metaphor for the 
inherence or immanence of the ideas. 
The fact that the general disposition of Plato's universe is so different 
from ours in so many respects, does no more, perhaps, than raise a pre-
sumption against its identity in any one other respect. But it ought to 
count for something. Where the topography is so diverse, it is hardly 
fair to assume that a certain configuration is a counterpart of that which 
we are used to. At all events it is worthy of notice, in face of the modern 
mclination to decorate Plato with an honorary degree in science, that the 
province which we have taken for the subject of certainty is just the oppo-
site for him-a limbo of opinion and surmise composed of counterfeits 
and their inconstant correlates; and that the latter, in particular the 
modern type of solidity and assurance, is to him the subject of belief 
(31fo-cti;), to be taken on trust, as a matter of guesswork. Under the 
circumstances is it likely, aside from his direct deposition to the contrary, 
that the ideas, the highest and unique reality and subject of knowledge, 
should be nothing but our subjective abstractions from this conjectural 
patchwork of the senses? · 
Nor does it help matters to refer to hypostasis-to use a word beloved 
of the whole Platonic faculty.42 In this view the ideas become creations 
of the mind, and projections from it, having an existence indistinguish-
able from that of Shakespeare's Hamlet and relying for their being upon 
the imagination. So considered, they challenge comparison with the idees 
42 This, on the whole, is Zeller's system. 
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forces of Fouillee, whose philosophy owes not a little to his early study of 
Plato, and with the illusions of art and literature. The difficulties of such 
an account, when taken literally, are two-fold. It restricts the actuality of 
the ideas to a sort of hypnotic influence or obsession; and at the same 
time it retains their conceptual origin and nature. And neither of these 
positions is good Platonism. That Plato may have been wrong is quite 
conceivable; conceivable too that we may not be able to make anything 
of the ideas save so many glorified quasi-personifications. But that is not 
the point. The point is whether Plato meant by his ideas what we mean 
by concepts, or more broadly, conceptions. And to that question the 
answer-Plato has given it himself-is No. 
What hinders us in understanding Plato's thought (and this is our 
main reason for offering so many substitutes for the ideas-that we do 
not understand them, though we should probably reject them just the 
same even if we did), what stands between us and Platonism nowadays 
is the fact that we have no appreciation, no conception of an effective 
moral order. We do not believe in moral consequences. Ethics we regard 
with Protagoras as a convention or expedient. Morality, so far as it is a 
reality for us at all, is the work of society, as it\ were a kind of etiquette 
and not very much more serious. In our eyes society makes morality; not 
morality society. And we have an idea that by ignoring or making 
light of crime-like murder-we shall somehow or other render it of no 
great account, as though we were passing off a gaucherie, a kind of! social 
solecism. In the same manner we have convinced ourselves that we can 
commit injustice with impunity; there are so many ways of doing wrong 
and escaping the consequences-if not alone, by the connivance of others 
-it is but a matter of stipulation or agreement, a bargain anyway.43 We 
are blind to the fact that the issue is always out of our hands. Peace is 
the health of nations as happiness is the health of the individual soul, 
and its essence is justice. The nation or the polity or the society or the 
individual that deviates or diverges from the idea of justice is diseased 
and vitiated; all alike· they have forfeited their being; their reality has 
departed from them with their virtue-they have become merged with 
the flux and are playthings of necessity and chance, of corruption and 
decay, accident and mishap. 
Such is the law of the ideas. And in such a sense I am quite willing 
to speak of the ideas loosely in the same breath with law-though I should 
prefer principle if I must use one or the other. At any rate, so far as 
43We make a dozen Alsace-Lorraines in Europe where there was one before, and 
we expect to maintain a permanent peace arbitrarily on such a basis by conspiring 
together to· that intent against our victims. 
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they are comparable at all, it is with moral law or principle that they 
are so; and as inherent in the nature of reality above man and his inven-
tion, they are religious or, as Plato would say, divine obligations, and 
have nothing in common with our mechanics or with our scientific meth-
odology. They are regulative of man, not of matter. For law in our 
sense Plato had indeed no very high regard. At best it is but an affair of 
necessity, the stupid inveteracy of that mysterious something-call it matter 
or energy or clan vital-which we shall never know save in as far as it 
resists our efforts, and like a: blank illimitable void blocks our vision and 
defies our penetration. For him necessity, then, is characteristic of the 
Bux and is one with accident or chance, strange as the conjunction may 
seem to our minds. They are both immeasurable, incomprehensible, and 
amoral and inhuman. The statue falls upon the head of the bystander, 
or the traveller is killed at the crossroads.44 That is necessity, the sense-
less obstinacy of that refractory something indeterminate or a:n:EtQOV which 
lies behind the phenomenal-or rather, which is the very phenomenal 
itself. But this is accident or casualty as well. If it were an intelligent 
principle, it would recognize and provide for the emergency. If it were 
intelligible, it might be foreseen and avoided. The two are but diverse 
faces of the same event. We prate of prediction and prevision as though 
science had the future under its thumb, and yet we suffer thirty-five 
thousand-odd deaths a year by "unavoidable accidents," powerlessly one 
might say, with idiotic complacence when one considers the disparity 
between our professions and the facts, until civilization so called has 
become more hazardous than was ever savagery itself. Such is the "reign 
of law," as we understand it. But so monstrous was such an ethics to 
Sophocles and Aristotle that they could not rest until they had harmon-
ized the death at the crossroads and the fall of the statue with justice; 
necessity is no explanation.45 As for Plato there may be a law of the ideas 
though he never stated it; but one thing is certain, it has nothing in com-
mon with our law. An invariable operation, like one event to the righteous 
and the wicked without discrimination or distinction, was bound to seem 
to him utterly senseless, and iniquitous too. To speak of law in connec-
tion with Heraclitus, now, is much less inappropriate; he was concerned 
with incessant variations, and had very possibly conceived of such varia-
tions as concomitant. But the Platonic ideas, in themselves and as they 
stand at the height of Platonism, are another matter. At loosest they may 
be described as determinations or determinants, exponents or indices by 
44 Make it but the tourist and the railway crossing, and you will have a modern 
instance. 
"" Reference to <Edipus Tyrannus is unnecessary. For the statue of Mitys sec 
Aristotl~'s Poetics, IX, 12. Moliere after Molina has made the tragedy suggested. 
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which matter is affected-but such language is purely figurative and can-
not be taken literally. 
I have not perhaps given this subject of the equivalence of idea and 
law the space or the attention which it may seem to demand in view of 
the vogue which such an interpretation of Plato's doctrine has momen-
tarily acquired.46 But frankly, the case of law and concept appears to my 
mind to be bound so tightly by the tie of generalization or induction that 
they must stand or fall together. And Plato is so obviously not attempting 
to generalize or induce his ideas from observation that it looks a little 
gratuitous, in spite of plausible analogies, to carry the argument any 
farther. His procede is fundamentally deductive, the procede of definition. 
And the same sort of criticism is true, I believe, of the methodological 
explanation,47 with the additional objection that such a view affiliates 
the ideas not only with generalization but with predication and judgment 
also. It is at bottom a conceptual interpretation. That the ideas are 
somehow or other principles of intelligibility, Plato himself declares. But 
they are so, simply because they are principles of reality-and let me add 
principles of moral reality at that-while they are, further, active prin-
ciples and not merely epistemological. They involve in some way an obli-
gation, even a duty, and they penalize its dereliction. That they are but 
methods or means or forms for unifying a perceptual manifold, as the 
phrase goes, a bare mechanism or mould or systematization of the mind-
ingenious as the suggestion may be-such an exposition is at variance with 
their author's own account of them. It is possible that he was edging 
toward such a compromise with rationalism; there are passages which 
indicate that he had coquetted with the notion of intellectual schemata 
or even logical figures. But for that matter did Plato ever believe with 
Kant that knowledge is in any sense of our own creation? Such at least 
is not the Platonism of the Republic; and for that reason, if for no other, 
the notion may be dismissed from this particular consideration. 
All these efforts to pass off some modern substitute or other for the 
ideas themselves are in principle mischievous enough. They are in their 
sort no better than subterfuges, undertaken in the not wholly unlaudable 
desire to modernize Plato in the hope of conciliating those who can not 
46 For an unusually perspicuous example of this sort of jugglery whereby Platonism 
is made over into a philosophy of change, see C. E. M. Joad's Essays in Common Sense 
Philosophy, pp. 143-146. My stricture, I may add, is meant to cover only this passage 
and those akin to it, for there is much sound Platonism in the essay as a whole, it seems 
to me, as well as in that entitled "The Objectivity of the Concept of Beauty," though it 
should be added that Plato's 'to xa.Mv was a moral reality too. ' 
47 As sponsored, for instance, by Natorp, who looks upon Plato as a pre-Kantian, 
so impossible is it for a German to free his mind from Kant-though as a matter of 
fact it is rather the Sophists who were the pre-Kantians. 
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or will not understand him as he is. All alike they show an unwilling-
ness both to reject or repudiate him outright and to accept him freely and 
frankly at his own estimate. They are compromises and accommodations, 
and do their subject more harm than good. But while those of which 
I have been speaking try at least to rationalize their original in reducing 
the ideas to terms of mind, in some sort or other; much less scrupulous 
and much more vicious is the inclination, so agreeable with contemporary 
laxity of thought and conduct, to debase them to the irresponsible level 
of sentiment and caprice by confounding them with ideals and the doc-
trine to which they belong with what we like to call idealism. 
To define a state of mind as nebulous as that which passes popularly 
under the name of idealism is pretty difficult. If it consists with any-
thing at all, it is with nothing more definite than the glorification of 
velleity and whim. Whatever we think desirable under the circumstances, 
whatever we believe would gratify our present mood, whatever seems to 
be after our own liking-such is the general sense of an ideal. Peace, as 
it happens, is, or appears to be, an ideal for the time being, and so does 
democracy-not, alas, justice. As an expression or term of discontent, of 
dissatisfaction with things as they are and of a hankering after some-
thing quite different, a sort of moral nostalgia, an escape from reality, 
our ideals are nine times out of ten based upon a false conception, if not 
a total negation, of experience, or an unwillingness to face it, and are a 
source of error and disaster. They represent, as a rule, nothing but an 
instinctive revolt from actuality. Whatever truth they possess is at best 
a pragmatic truth-in fact, ideals are the sole standards of the pragmat-
ists. Being non-existent they are such stuff as dreams are made on, and 
the enthusiasm which they inspire depends on their illusoriness. Even 
when an ideal is realized, as we say, by some process of pragmatic self-
deception, there is no surety that its possession of our minds may not be 
injurious and even ruinous-as is quite conceivable-yes, very probable, 
in the case of democracy. An ideal may be and usually is evidence to 
nothing but impotence or perversity or distaste. 
On! the contrary-is it otiose to say so again?-an idea in Plato's con-
ception is not a fancy, not even an aspiration-not a contrivance of our 
own at all. As far as we know it, it is a discovery and we ourselves partake 
of it or participate in it. Inasmuch as we do so, we are members of a 
moral and intelligible order; inasmuch as we do not, we are creatures of 
physical or mechanical necessity, subjects of cause and effect, playthings 
of evolution or whatever name you choose to confer upon the remorse-
less successions of change and decay, of generation and corruption. It is 
not our ideals that will save us; they are but the effervescence of change, 
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breaking and reforming incessantly. Peace without justice, democracy 
without virtue, luxury without happiness-they have neither stability nor 
efficacy; they are but blown from the stream and fall back upon it. 
"The earth hath bubbles as the water has, 
And these are of them." 
To search out the ideas, to meditate them, to honor them, to pattern after 
them-this is the Platonic wisdom and morality and religion. 
III 
To recommend such a programme to the generality of mankind would 
be no light, if not an impossible task. With the aims and ambitions of com-
mon experience Platonism, has little or nothing to do. It is not a receipt 
for getting on or making a figure in the world, like the Nicomachean 
ethics. And to those engaged in such an affair it will seem impractical 
and preposterous as it always has done.48 In fact Platonism was a failure 
after this kind in its own day. Few readings are sadder for the anxious 
optimist than the passage in the Thetetetus, composed not impossibly after 
the second visit to Syracuse, in which Plato appears to accept the fact. 
It was Aristotle, the mentor of Alexander of Macedon, not Plato, the 
censor of Dionysius of Syracuse, who succeeded in gaining favor with 
the powers of this world. And yet with a little good will something may 
be done toward that sort of mutual tolerance which results from the 
assignment of its own rights and titles to each party of a dispute. 
Jn their purity, then, the Platonic ideas, as l havei been doing my best 
to show, are characterized by several notes in conjunction. In the first 
place, they are realities in their own right, independent of the mind 
which apprehends them, and of the matter, as we call it, through or 
in which they may be darkly and uncertainly discerned and to which 
they lend an illusion of reality in as far as becoming happens to fall for 
an instant into this form or that and take on the appearance of objects 
and things-
"like a water vexed with storms 
Pale tempestuous reflections of a higher world of forms." 
To that extent they may be said to impart to generation a transient signific-
ance, though they can hardly be spoken of as efficient causes or even laws, 
-since necessity remains the sovereign of the flux. In as far, however, as 
matter-to give a name to change considered substantively-is capable of 
conforming to the pattern of the ideas, it becomes related for the time 
~8 Crito, 49d. 
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being to another nature, which, after Greek usage, we should have a 
right to call divine, as is the case with man ( as well as "the heavenly 
bodies"), who has not merely an animal but a spiritual nature too. 
With regard to the being man, I confess, I am not entirely at ease. 
Thus much, however, seems certain. In agreement with his dualistic con-
victions, Plato thinks of him as a combination of body and soul, par-
taking of generation and decay by the former constituent, and of real 
being by the latter. Of the soul he appears to conceive as a simple, subtle, 
indecomposable element, akin to the ideas but not an idea itself, in 
accordance probably with the ancient axiom that like alone can compre-
hend like.49 As for man's activity, it must be confined effectively to the 
moral nature, for as far as he belongs materially to the flux he lies under 
the ban of necessity or determination, though with some capability, perhaps, 
of influencing the phenomenal as far as its refractoriness allows. But this 
at least is his office and function-"as he sees the beautiful through that 
which makes it visible, to breed not illusions but true examples of virtue;"50 
and as far as he fulfills this function he has his part in the incorruptibility 
of the ideas; as far as he fails to do so he fails to attain to the proper 
virtue of his kind. 
In this aspect the ideas are after their several kinds not merely beati-
tudes but duties. Even about a table or a bedstead-if we take Plato's 
illustrations as anything more than analogies or images in language-
there is something which a table or a bed ought to be if it is to be a table 
or a bed in good earnest, and falling short of which it is by so much 
the less a table or a bed and by so much the more an indeterminate and 
undifferentiated nonentity or Unding. So much is it the case that knowl-
edge involves an obligation that Plato is unable to conceive the possibility 
of a man's doing wrong save from ignorance-since the good is obviously 
a good-and affirms that righteousness consists in such a knowledge with-
out further qualification. And why not, if the ideas are such as have 
been indicated? The man who derogates from the virtue of humanity 
becomes a moral outlaw. No longer informed by his proper essence, he 
falls under the sway of necessity; he is the sport of irrational forces and 
circumstances-he ceases to be a human being, a little less than kind, and 
turns into a thing, a part of the huddling indiscriminacy of the flux. 
It might be instructive to compare briefly this reading of the ideas, 
which represents approximately the spirit of Platonism at its peak, with 
49 Cf. Pha:drus, 230a, Sophist, 248a, Pha:do, 78c, and 79b. There is no real incon-
sistency, as I see it, between this view and that of the tripartite nature of the human 
spirit as developed in the Republic, the soul of the Pha:do being evidently limited to 
the foremost or uppermost member of the trio, the TJ'YEµovix6v in Stoic phrase. See 
Note 40, "The Sophists," p. 96, infra. 
50 Symposium, 202a. 
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..£schylus' and Sophocles' treatment of their erring protagonists and the 
ruin which overtakes them. For such, if I am right in my understanding 
of Plato's doctrine, is the explication of their tragic philosophy. Whether 
they ever formulated it to themselves or even exhibited it with perfect 
clearness to their audiences, it was some such vision of human responsi-
bility and defection which they had at the back of their minds and which 
they were intent upon illustrating in their drama. The incompatibility 
of error and well-being, the fatality of wrong-doing, the ethical consistency 
of character and its consequences-these are Platonic as well as ..£schylean 
and Sophoclean motives. And about the fate of the offender there is 
something wild and irregular which is equally Platonic. It is not only 
pitiable as an instance of mortal frailty but it is horrible because it is 
irrational and inhuman. And it is so, as Plato makes clear, because the 
transgressor is literally, in our expressive metaphor, a lost soul, an aban-
doned creature-one who in lapsing from righteousness has passed beyond 
the pale and in overstepping the bounds of virtue has delivered himself 
into the confusions of accident and chance. He has lost his portion in the 
"divine" and in becoming a thing among things has made himself obnox-
ious to their law, to the necessity of change, in whose interminable vortices 
he is helplessly involved. Hence the bafllingness of Attic tragedy-the 
unfathomable obscurity of its catastrophes. It is the wrong-doer that 
perishes; justice has thrown him to the wolves of chaos and turned her 
back upon his dissolution. 
But Plato has done more than annotate the tragedy of his great coun-
trymen. He has seated the evil in the soul, not in the act. It is the 
spirit of the culprit that harbors the lie and without correction becomes a 
source of infection, a miasma. As in so many respects, his thought in 
this particular is not without its Christian analogues. For stranger as he 
may have been to the conviction of sin, he was no stranger to the sense 
of duty. Granted that no man does wrong willingly as no one willingly 
makes a mistake, yet for the ignorance by which he blunders he is alone 
accountable, whether by sloth or conceit of wisdom. His ignorance is 
his fault; and that he does not err with intent to err-as who does?-
is no excuse for the defect of the knowledge which he lacks of his own 
volition. Whatever the immediate object, it is ultimately the intention 
that counts and adjudicates the blame, call the transgression by what 
name you will. The sun of good is in the heavens and the transgressor 
has chosen to act with his eyes sealed. 
Such is the verification of the ideas.· Whatever is, maintains itself for 
a longer or shorter time by virtue of its association with the good. The 
limits of the idea are broad and inclusive. Not impossibly-in fact, quite 
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certainly-Plato was prepared to find merit, as I have mentioned, in a 
table or a bed. Even his -ro xaAo\l or the beautiful is not an exclusively 
a:sthetic reality by any means, as appears from his condemnation of art 
for art's sake as an imitation of an imitation. That Plato, if not; Socrates 
himself, had hoped for an explanation of the universe on such lines from 
Anaxagoras' nous is evident from the P,luedo.51 Such a relation, as is 
virtually stated in so many words, would have consisted of a redintegra-
tion of "physiology" or physics in terms of the idea as comprehensible 
alone; that is to say, it would have amounted to a final reason, a kind of 
teleology. That it was not forthcoming was as sore a disappointment to 
Plato as to his Socrates, if we may judge by his constant preoccupation 
with the quandary of the one and the many and his inability in later life 
to resolve it or to rid himself of the second member of his dualism-
that something else standing over against the moral and rational, the 
irreducible "other." 
For Plato, then, the universe in the broad sense, the all or aggregate, 
divides into two worlds, the intelligible and the sensible. The principle 
of the former is the idea of good. The principle of the latter is neces-
sity. It is the principle of change and variation and multiplicity; it ac-
counts for "progress"-for generation and growth and decay. It is the 
element of incoherence, confusion, and indistinction-the source of error, 
illusion, and insecurity. As far as this world is explicable at all, it con-
sists of simulacra of the ideas, which are comparable in this respect with 
their own images or reflections in water, constituting our objects and things 
-or what we are coming for the nonce to call with greater propriety 
"events." But while the ideas are of themselves each one and simple52 
as well as eternal and immutable, the copies or imitations, which make 
up the phenomenal world, are not only transitory and impermanent but 
many, perhaps innumerable, in accordance with the nature of indetermin-
ation and illimitability, for infinity was to Plato as to the Greeks in 
general a, property if not the essence of imperfection. 
As shadows or effigies, however inadequate, it is not impossible that 
objects-or should I say space-time events?-possess a certain or rather 
an uncertain semblance of realitY' which lends them some sort of relative 
significance or importance; they have their uses for the moral nature if only 
as reminders of the ideas. If they are considered perspectively as subjects 
of observation, it may be said without excessive impropriety that jnas-
much as they are manifested as sensible imitations, owing their phantasmal 
existence to the ideas, the ideas themselves come to appear amid them in 
111 96-100. 
52 See Meno, 72d, and notice the peculiar form of the question. 
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the semblance of essences, which, as we catch their fleeting appantJ.ons, 
seem to us to inform the flux without being intrinsic to it. The effect is 
illusory, to be sure, since of the inner character, the self of that world 
we know nothing. The stuff of it, if it has a stuff, we are acquainted with 
only as phenomena, and these phenomena are only similitudes, while to 
ideas and phenomena there is no common ground but this fugitive and 
accidental resemblance. 53 
With the exception, therefore, of the ideas, which are the sole deni7..ens 
of the intelligible world, and as such constitute the only\ genuine reality, 
experience consists exclusively of the "other," the sensible or phenomenal, 
which has the sort of existence attached to becoming and, aside from its 
transience, is irrational, and on that score unreal and specious. It may 
force or coerce or compel us as far as we are partly engaged in it; but it 
fails to convince us. We may sense or feel it; we may conceivably recog-
nize certain of its phases, even when they bear no resemblance to a 
celestial archetype; we may possibly formulate certain of its concomitants 
of change, as Plato thinks in the Philebus; but our "laws" are only 
problematic notations, as it were of chance and probability.54 Its affiliation 
is with the mechanic mind, which is itsc:M a parallel of the mutable, as 
William James' expressive phrase, "the stream of consciousness," recog-
nizes, and which moves with it by a habit of association in a kind of 
"bastard reasoning." From our higher nature and being it is, however, 
hopelessly estranged. 
On the whole, then, we shall not be so very wide of the mark if we think 
thus of this sensible world, this seat of unreason and necessity, of im-
permanence and mutability-we shall not go far astray if we conceive 
of becoming in its ceaseless unrest as falling occasionally, like a reek of 
vapor or a fume of smoke, into certain patterns, distinguishable from the 
usual meaningless huddle proper to it. As dispositions or forms these 
patterns are not in the nature of the flux at all, nor do they belong to it 
any more than the constellations belongi to the celestial topography. They 
are counterfeits or simulations, like the figures we see in the clouds, 
though the closer the resemblance the more real the apparition (if I may 
use such an expression), the phenomenal in such instance being not 
merely an appearance but as it were an evidence, and borrowing in that 
manner a sense which it does not possess of itself but which remains the 
exclusive property of the idea that it happens to resemble, while any con-
course or confluence, any whirl or eddy that fails to effect such a con-
53 See the parable of the cave at the opening of Book VII of the Republic. 
54 It is not irrelevant to note that J. M. Keynes considers induction a proper subject 
for treatment in his Treatise on Probability. All our "laws," therefore, would reduce 
lo statistical averages and necessity itself to chance, as seems indeed to be the direction 
of modern thought. 
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figuration, as well as any wisp or outlying fringe that fails to conform 
to the implicit design, is likely to escape attention as meaningless and ir-
relevant. In short the ideas are patterns to which objects and things-or 
events, if you prefer--conform. These are the patterns into which the 
latter fall. Whenever we find what falls into a pattern, or conforms to 
an intelligible order, there we may be sure that we are looking upon the 
imitation or similitude of an idea-only an imitation, but still an indica-
tion-an evidence to real being. 
So it is, for example, by the recurrence of such fortuitous patterns that 
we become confirmed or at least reassured of our belief in such another 
world, a world of ultimate reality. Indeed, it is only by such recurrence 
as feigning a kind of persistence or permanence, that mimetic forms which 
are never twice alike exactly but only approximately, come to seem im-
portant or pertinent in the first place. The very fact that they are repeated 
in some fashion gives them a sanction or guarantee as though symbolic 
and purposive, like a recurrent dream. Possibly, if such a combination is 
repeated frequently, it tends to become a habit, maintaining itself loosely 
and precariously but with a relative degree of stability (in the midst of 
the flux) as we see a civilization or a culture doing, though absolute 
security is not to be expected or hoped for, and for that it has come 
together, it must dissolve again. Nevertheless there is a possibility, since 
we are swimming in the same medium, that we may do something, when 
we have recognized a contour as of an idea, to preserve it for a span 
like a bubble, or blow another in its place, or even, as Plato would do in 
his Republic, create something of the sort deliberately after a model laid 
up in heaven. 
On the contrary, injustice, to take a specific instance, is merely in the 
concrete the want or absence of justice. It is a negative or chaotic state 
or condition, though a positive evil. It is not-being, essentially, or un-
reality ( -ro µ~ ov); the lack of pattern or form, sheer indetermination and 
chaos. In this respect not-being is, to be sure, "other," something else than, 
with reference to justice; but from the point of view of reality it is neant, 
or nihilism, too, just as Parmenides took it to be. It is an inconsequent 
swirl or eddy, the rheum of change, comparable with a crowd of human 
beings who have happened together somehow-by force of necessity, by 
dint of the whirl-on the corner of the street, but who consist in no one 
purpose or end and can be covered or taken up in no one expression, who 
as a crowd are nothing at all, neither a family nor a society nor an asso-
ciation nor aught else save illusion. But of what mischief is such a con-
geries capable! And the comparison will hold of; all the vices in contra-
distinction from the virtues. As a life loses the pattern of its virtue, it 
63 
64 PLATO 
falls apart and disintegrates into a shapelessness and confusion; it becomes 
as it were a center of disorder and demoralization. Hence in this sense 
there need be no ideas of evil at all, so Plato thought, since evil is merely 
the incoherence of becoming-illusory in respect that it is irrelevant and 
unavailing, that it means nothing and points to nothing, that it fails to 
compose and is dissolute, but maleficent too in that it is conjoined with 
necessity and subversive of reality. 
Of the moral world, therefore, the world of ideas, it is possible, ac-
cording to Plato, to learn, something. Or this world, however, we know 
and can know little or nothing. Of its self we are quite ignorant and 
always shall be. Only as it happens here and there and diversely to 
resemble the Platonic forms may we hope to make anything of it. Hence 
the ideas may be spoken of, not as, phenomenal causes, but as causes of 
the intelligibility of phenomena, since it is solely by such resemblance that 
they appear at all and are distinguishable from the formlessness of change 
as such. And further, since without this resemblance there would be 
no phenomena, only a nebulous lapsing, it is permissible to speak of the 
ideas as the cause of the existence of such phenomena, or simply of 
phenomena. 
In what precedes I have been trying to take a general survey of the 
doctrine of ideas as Plato himself, so it seems to me, saw it at the summit 
of his discovery. In so doing I have touched upon several points which 
I should by good right have reserved for: detailed examination elsewhere, 
if they were to be mentioned at all. But then I am not trying to be 
exhaustive; I have been rather concerned to comprehend and discrim-
inate, to catch, as best I could, the feature and expression of the doctrine 
before it was altered by the cast of afterthought. The title doctrine, 
therefore, is itself almost a misnomer for what I have been trying to get 
at. As every philosophy should be, it is a vision, and like all vision it 
is subject to the conditions of mental perspective. For practical purposes 
it requires, as its author admits in the Philebus, the collaboration of that 
vulgar science which enables us, when once abroad, to find our way 
home again; for I do not know that Plato would deny that becoming 
has its own ways and hence its own "laws" and formul~nly that those 
ways are ultimately knowable and have to do with human happiness or 
well-being. In itself his philosophy is not a map or chart; it is a picture 
of the vista which is opened before the eye of the mind by the moral 
consciousness at its proper elevation. Suppose that we had to represent 
all the features of nature by mechanical drawing, geometrically, without 
point of view or atmosphere, in a single plane or projection? Such is 
analogically the task of rationalism, scientific and metaphysic, realistiC' and 
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idealistic.55 The result may be uniform and consistent, it may even have a 
deceptive air of completeness and finality, to which its self-complacency 
contributes not a little. But it is hardly recognizable; it is not a like-
ness. It is a tabulation, a plot or graph. The association of philosophy is, 
not with science, or even with metaphysics, but with ethics and religion. 
And to the simple moral sense Platonism, inexact and unfinished though 
it may be, presents a sketch of consciousness more convincing than the 
labored diagrams of metaphysics. 
IV 
Nevertheless the story requires an epilogue, unfit though I am to 
write it. That Plato did not rest in thei general conception which I have 
been outlining so roughly, I have already suggested. Anyone who has 
read below the surface of his language can not have failed, in spite of 
his partiality for the world of ideas, to realize how severely his spirit was 
exercised by the riddle of becoming. Formally there are distinguishable 
amid the folds of his development as a whole three cares or anxieties-
one, ethical or moral; another, logical or dialectic or epistemological, how-
ever one elects to lay the emphasis; and a third, cosmological or scientific. 
In the earlier dialogues through the Republic the moral is the paramount 
or predominant issue, the dialectic being incidental and ancillary. In 
the T hecetetus and the Sophist the second concern is in the ascendant 
and the difficulty is to reconcile its interests with the preceding and to 
harmonize the two orders of consideration-a difficulty that is perhaps 
more serious for the reader than for Plato himself, who has at times a 
rather disconcerting way of cutting old acquaintances when they threaten 
to become inconvenient. Finally in the Timceus the third theme or motive 
comes to the fore and is fused with the first in a fashion which, I must 
confess, I do not find wholly satisfactory or free from ambiguity. 
For Plato, to begin with, the ideas are essentially moral conceptions. 
This is to me with my limited sympathies, I may as well acknowledge, 
his significant moment, and it is this moment that I have tried to sketch 
with its more serious implications. But as Plato saw them at this time, 
the ideas-there can be no doubt on this point-were for him the source 
and principle (the UQX~) of knowledge and reality. Hence he found 
himself involved first in an epistemological and second in an ontological 
quandary. 
The epistemological problem made it necessary for him to assign 
ideas, not merely to moral values and obligations, but also to everything 
55 That l am justified in lumping them is shown by the tendency of current 
science to convert itself into metaphysics and vt'ce versa; while as for realism and 
idealism, what in the world are they up to an}way? 
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knowable or even perceptible, ordures and what not, as well. With this 
difficulty he wrestles in the Parmenides-it can hardly be said triumph-
antly. All that he succeeds in showing at best is that his system is no 
worse than its rivals ( and involves no more glaring inconsistencies than 
they do). As for the methodology of cognition, the manner in which 
the ideas are to be supposed to lend intelligibility to phenomena, the sub-
ject is barely broached. 
On the other hand for the solution of the ontological problem he has 
to thank what I can only call a recourse to a kind of theistic religion, such 
as is quite foreign to his earlier thought and the whole context of his 
speculation. In order to supply his ideas with the efficiency wanting to 
their original conception, and in order to account for the coincidence of 
the intelligible and the sensible worlds, he finds himself reduced to the 
invention of a demiurge whose sole office it is to shape and order creation 
after the pattern of the forms, which now appear undisguisedly as archi-
tectonic models or paradigms. In this manner he is able to explain to 
himself at last the apory that had vexed him for so many years, the 
resemblance of being and becoming. 
To this curious synthesis of religion and positivism which characterizes 
the Tim11:us he was prompted not improbably by the revival or rehabilita-
tion of science during the first half of the fourth century, particularly 
under the influence of Archytas and the so-called Pythagoreans.56 The 
discovery of irrational quantities, the inscription of the last of the five 
regular solids in the sphere by Thea:tetus, the conjecture of the general 
shape of the earth and the distrust of its immobility, the foundation of 
stereometry, the ingenious schematization of the planetary movements by 
Eudoxus-all these innovations and renovations undoubtedly had the ef-
fect of whetting Plato's curiosity and inducing him, in reversal of his 
position in the Ph11:do, to undertake, like so many later metaphysicians, 
such as Schelling and Hegel, for example, a complete Natur-Philosophie, 
as though nature were a branch of mathematics-a notion that he seems 
to have fastened unshakably upon our thought. 
It is important, however, to notice that even to the end there is in 
Plato's cosmological construction no material substratum, no matter proper, 
as there is no matter in the "solid" geometry so called by which it was 
inspired. It is a stereometry and consists exclusively of forms ( Et<>ri) and 
simulacra, reducible in the last analysis to triangles of one kind or another. 
All that is required for such a world is space or place for the figures that 
constitute it. In short, Plato's physical existent, his perceptible world, 
reduces ultimately to figure; it is exactly the configuration of space, as 
56 See Erich Frank: Plato und die sogenannten Pythagoreer. 
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correlative with the ideas or Et<'>f) themselves, devoid, as it were, of mass 
and inertia and such adscititious properties as we have invented from time 
to time in the interests of ponderability and impenetrability and persistence. 
Nor is it difficult to visualize space to ourselves in this manner, to per-
ceptualize the OQ<l't'OV,-after the fashion, perhaps, of the ideal figures 
and numbers in which Plato may then have been thinking. From this 
point of view it is possible even to glimpse a kind of rationale for what 
is no doubt the most bewildering of his transformations, the substitution 
of the ideal numbers for the forms. If the ideas are to be patterns of 
actuality, then as long as they remain qualitative as they began, actuality 
as far as it is intelligible must be qualitatively constituted too. But with 
this interpretation a geometrical world would have been inconsistent. 
Before such a world could come into existence, even in discourse, it was 
necessary that its patterns should assume a quantitative or mathematical 
character. And this condition Plato apparently tried to meet without 
sacrificing the qualitative character of his UQ)Cr] or first principle alto-
gether. Hence the baffiing intricacies of the final numerical doctrine with its 
commingling of quality and quantity, its confusion of figures and symbols, 
a doctrine which no one has ever succeeded in adequately expounding or 
even stating. 
And there is still another element of bewilderment. In his dialogues at 
least, it is to be noticed, Plato has kept his mathematics intact. They consist 
invariably of definitions, axioms, and postulates, together with the deduc-
tions therefrom. But as time went on, he failed to keep his ontology 
equally clear. To illustrate my meaning in an elementary way:-suppose 
in geometry he had finally ceased to reason from his definition of parallel 
lines as equidistant to the conclusion that they never meet; and had taken 
to measuring the distance between their representations in the drawings 
of the mathematicians, by the best substitutes that he possessed for instru-
ments of precision; or better suppose that he had ceased to demonstrate 
deductively and on principle that the sum of the three angles of the 
triangle is equal to two right angles and had taken mechanical measure-
ments instead57-what would have been the result of such a sort of 
operation? Mere proximation and average as in the case of "scientific 
law," or else some sort of compromise or evasion for the sake of "saving 
appearances" such as we are familiar with in current scientific metaphysics. 
But as a matter of fact what else is happening to his ideas in their onto-
logical aspect in the course of the Sophist, if not of the Thetetetus, when 
57 "Es konnte die Forderung ge~tellt werden, au£ die geometrischen Ideale zu 
verzichten und sich lediglich im Kreise des Sinnlich-Wahrnehmbaren zu halten."-
Ernst Cassirer: Das Erkenntnisproblem, 3. aufl., Bd. II, s. 371. 
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not-being ('to µ~ ov) shifts into the other ( {hhEQOV ), and the genera 
( yivri), if not the ideas themselves, betray an equally alarming readiness to 
change their spots by a kind of inductive contamination under our very eyes? 
At the same time Plato's reversion to scientism in these respects must 
not blind us to his accompanying conversion to what appears like a 
creative religion. That Plato's was ever a religious nature I take to be 
beyond dispute. But the religion of his earlier years, if I may so put it, 
had always been a diffused religion. It consisted in a rooted conviction 
of man's intellectual kinship with a something in the universe-an order, 
a propriety, a nature ( or structure) not unlike his own and partially 
comprehensible by it, but higher and greater and better-and together 
with this conviction a devout acceptance of the obligation imposed by that 
relationship. It was a feeling that had for long been satisfied by the ideas 
and supremely by the idea of the good. For Plato they had constituted 
the divine; for his Parthenon is after all either myth or poetry-his manner 
of realizing verbally and imaginatively, of picturing, if you please, these 
influences and presences. Nor is his creator a substitute for the Zeus of 
popular belief or superstition. As a demiurge he is obstructed, if not baffied, 
by the intractableness of necessity, the recalcitrancy of the flux, and can 
at best work only in conformity with the ideas, which exist independently 
and in their own right. Whether he is in any sense a personality of 
himself is questionable. And the question, fair or not, will obtrude whether 
he was in the first instance much more than an expedient for coordinating 
ideas and phenomena-for the resolution of Plato's ontological problem. 
And yet perhaps to look upon the introduction of the demiurge and 
his activities as a mere device to explain the immanence or presence of 
the forms is to ignore the optimism of Plato's old age. I would not 
speak of Plato with disrespect; but I can not overlook that characteristic 
of advancing years-it may be (L speak humbly and in ignorance) but a 
kind of ripeness and wisdom to which I have not attained-
"Man must endure his going hence 
Even as his coming- hither-ripeness is all--" 
but at all events I cannot ignore that trait of age which so often induces 
a man to build a great house when he has little or no time to live in it, 
and which leads him so often to shut his eyes to the menace of evil 
or the horror of the shades, or to seek for hope and consolation in the 
promptings of his own desires, as it were the instinct of self-preservation 
in extremis, as though one could build a fortress against death and by 
denying render it of no effect. But whether I have put the motive properly 
or not, it is clear from the Timteus and from the tenth book of the Laws 
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that Plato was moving out of his former courses toward a kind of monistic 
optimism prefiguring in many respects the philosophy of stoicism.58 
But this is not the phase upon which f prefer to dwell. It might very 
well be that my view of the later dialogues is mistaken. But in\ any case 
I would always return to those clear and simple colloquies in which the 
splendor of the ideas remains forever untroubled and untarnished. 
58 I may add perhaps in apology of my presumption that it is in some such light 




It is to the early Greek thinkers, to the Ionians and their successors, I 
suppose, that we are indebted in the first instance for the conception of a 
physical nature, that aggregate of "things and their forces," in Huxley's 
phrase, which for reasons of our own we have come to regard as the sole 
reality of any particular importance. Whether we ascribe this result 
to discovery or invention or discrimination will depend very largely on the 
character of our philosophy. Undoubtedly primitive speculation had little 
sense of those distinctions, obvious as they now appear, which we have 
resumed in such terms as physical, ethical, social, political, religious, and 
the like. Not that the original Greek observer was destitute of such ideas 
but that he had still to segregate them; his universe, like his conscious-
ness, was relatively undifferentiated. The order of nature and the course of 
justice, mind and mechanism, causation and conation, perception, cognition, 
conception mingled in inextricated confusion not only for"physiologists" 
like Anaximander and Anaxagoras but for later comers like Heraclitus 
and Empedocles. And yet by the middle of the fifth century at least 
philosophy had succeeded after a fashion in isolating the germ of ma-
terialism-the notion of an exclusively mechanical system, the atoms and 
the void, comparable if not identical with our own. 
But significant as this achievement may seem from our point of view 
-for it is not impossible that we have exaggerated its "scientific" im-
portance-we owe at all events an equal, if not a still greater debt to that 
loosely associated band of itinerant publicists of whom Protagoras has come 
by force of his ability to serve as a kind of unofficial leader and spokesman 
and who are known ambiguously enough as Sophists. To be sure, the word 
publicist is as much of a misnomer as sophist, the Sophists themselves having 
no common specification as they have no common definition. But while 
collectively they formed no school or sect, each playing pretty much for 
his own hand, yet in spite of their extreme individualism they did at 
least form a kind of clique or coterie, more or less connected and affiliated 
by their business; and in trading upon the ambitions of the public upon 
whom they depended for their livelihood they acquired at all events the 
unity such as it was of their clientele. In as far as their customers possessed 
a common mind and taste, they were professionally bound to cultivate 
that particular stripe of opinion under penalty of losing, their trade. And 
as their patrons were grouped, so would they naturally group them-
selves. In the event, then, though they were neither sages on the one 
hand nor on the other statists or politicians, their anxieties were social 
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and practical, "real" and "timely," within the current meaning of the 
terms-a circumstance that accounts perhaps for recent attempts, be-
ginning with Grote, to rehabilitate their memories after so many cen-
turies of obloquy. Without going so far, however, we may in justice accord 
them this one merit at least: in spite of their shortcomings they were the 
first to expose in something like clear relief the outlines of that concep-
tion of "men and their ways," to quote Huxley again, which we now 
designate in its various aspects by the Procrustean title of humanism. 
Of the elder or first generation Sophists, whom Plato dramatizes after 
his usual fashion in his dialogues, the most prominent are Protagoras, 
Gorgias, Prodicus, and Hippias. To complete the list there may; be added 
Gorgias's understudy Polus and the otherwise obscure Callicles, much as 
the latter might resent inclusion with some others of the gentry. Nor 
should the inimitable Euthydemus and Dionysodorus be forgotten-to say 
nothing of the obstreperous Thrasymachus, who is capable of speaking 
sufficiently for himself. 
How equivocal is the name of Sophist, in any event, is clear from the 
circumstance that even after the word had developed its invidious con-
notation of a mere pretender to learning, it was still used more or less 
indiscriminately of sage and charlatan alike, not infrequently by the same 
author, and was never again fixed, like our term, in a single denotation. 
And while Plato employs it pretty consistently, though he does on occa-
sion draw a distinction between Sophists like Protagoras and rhetoricians 
like Gorgias, whose instruction was oratorical and forensic, still even his 
application of the term was in any particular instance a matter of discre-
tion and open to dispute and contradiction. Nevertheless on a single point 
the users of the word in its pejorative sense are unanimously agreed; their 
Sophists have one common characteristic: whether taking part in public 
affairs or not, they all pretended to impart the secret of success to those 
who would do so-in a word they were all professed and professional 
teachers. 
It has been remarked of them by one of our own critics that in refer-
ence to their time, they combined the two modern roles of "journalist" 
or editor and professor. But the comparison, while ingenious, is not quite 
accurate in introducing a meaningless distinction. Their nearest counter-
part is the present-day "educator," with his appetite for publicity and his 
turn for propaganda-especially the professor of pedagogy, as he used 
to be called before he had the nai:ve assurance to confiscate the whole 
province of human culture for his own. Nor is the word "educator" 
without its own duplicity either. An educator properly would be and 
once was a teacher of any sort or kind, one engaged in the onerous, if 
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no longer honored, service of education. But by some hocus-pocus the 
designation, with all its question-begging implications, has been arrogated 
to their own use by the members of a self-constituted profession who 
pretend, like their ancient prototypes, to have reduced education-in 
imitation of other interests of our time, not excepting literary criticism-
to the status of a "science," more or less exact or at least terminological, 
and have come to figure in their own conceit, not as mere educators them-
selves, but--the quirk is curious-as educators of educators. In their hands 
"education" so called has become, like rhetoric ancient and modern, a 
purely formal subject, pretty well indifferent to matter and concerned 
mainly for method-a knowledge of knowledge, the knowledge "which 
conveys no other knowledge than itself,"1 such as Plato contemptuously 
turns his back upon in the Charmides and Euthydemus. The parallel is so 
nearly exact that we are in no great danger of aiming wild if we think 
of the Sophists in their popular r6le as the "educators" of their time, 
intent, like those with whom we are personally acquainted, on making 
of education not only a trade but a business. 
Now, if it is true that Socrates, as many of his analogies suggest, 
looked upon every occupation, even that of statesmanship, as a kind of 
craft, requiring for its successful practice a certain amount of technical or 
specialized skill, then it is difficult to understand why he should have 
quarrelled with the Sophists for making of education a trade in its turn. 
In this respect it is not impossible that Plato has given us in the long 
run a false or exaggerated impression in his own sense. On the evidence 
of the Memorabilia and the earlier Platonic dialogues themselves it hardly 
appears that Socrates viewed the Sophists with the unrelenting animosity 
that came to characterize his disciple's later years. His tone is at worst, 
rather, one of ridicule sharpened with sarcasm, as in the Apology,2 and 
at best one of indulgent tolerance; on occasion he even recommends them 
to inacceptable candidates for his own fellowship. Plato, for his own part 
we must suppose, exhibits-is it much worse than a kind of grudging con-
sideration for Protagoras and certainly for the aged Gorgias in the dia-
logues which bear their names, though to be sure he displays little enough 
regard for Hippias and the smaller fry. 
No, what offended Socrates and Plato, to begin with, was undoubtedly 
the Sophists' habit of teaching for hire rather than the nature of their 
ideas.8 Had they not themselves dabbled in the same questionable sources 
-as pupils, Socrates of Anaxagoras and Plato of Cratylus the dumb-
show man, the disciple of Heraclitus the Dark? And had they not lain 
1 Euthydemus, 292'd. 
2 19e-20c. 
8 Memorabilia, I, vi, 13. 
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under the same imputation of skepticism and innovation? It was only later 
when Plato's clairvoyance was sufficiently developed to detect the mis-
chievous consequences of the Sophistic propaganda, as they too began 
to discover themselves undisguisedly-for after all it was the Sophistic 
inheritance that Plato was best acquainted with-it was only then, when 
the genuine issues became clear to him, that he came to resent so acri-
moniously the entire movement and its proponents near and remote. 
In the first instance, however, the traffic in learning, as though edu-
cation were a commodity that could be peddled for a price, would appear 
in itself sufficiently vicious to inspire distrust of the whole profession 
even in the insensitive minds of the general public. As indeed it is. 
With the possible exception of subjects of a strictly utilitatrian or "voca-
tional" sort such as may be turned to the pecuniary advantage of the 
purchaser, the practice was felt to degrade all instruction to the level of a 
staple, subject solely to the law of supply and demand. And while at the 
present time education has become so thoroughly commercialized that such 
a custom no longer seems shocking, yet in the case of the original Sophists 
it was still hard for the unspoiled intelligence to reconcile their claims 
to the possession of a knowledge indispensable to human happiness and 
well-being-to say nothing of their pretensions to high-mindedness-
with their willingness to trade upon that knowledge or even to withhold 
it until their cupidity was satisfied. So at least many of the Athenians 
felt. Hucksters and hawkers are the least unflattering names that Plato 
finds for them; while innumerable are his jibes and scoffs at their venality. 
Professional hunters of young men for fees on the pretense of preparing 
them for citizenship, such is the manner in which he describes them in 
the Sophist and to the same effect the Socrates of the Cratylus: "If I had 
only been able to afford his fifty-drachma course of lectures,"4 so he sneers 
at Prodicus, "I were capable of telling you all about this matter of language; 
but unfortunately I have only had the benefit of his one-drachma lecture." 
To be sure, these rates do not seem particularly exorbitant nowadays-a 
drachma being worth about a shilling; and though tradition has it that 
Protagoras charged his pupils the round sum of a hundred mimr: or 
in the neighborhood of two thousand dollars, 5 still Isocrates remarks of 
Gorgias, who appears to have been his leader, that in spite of his long 
life-he lived to be over a hundred-and his unusual opportunities for 
amassing a fortune, he left but a few thousand dollars behind him at 
his death.6 Nevertheless, so touchy were the Greeks on the subject, par-
ticularly if tradition is to be trusted, in this case of Prodicus, who had 
4 Cratylus, 384b. 
5 Diogenes Laertius, IX, 52. 
6 "A thousand staters"-De Permutatione, 155-157. 
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agents to search out young men of family and wealth for him,1 that 
Plato finds it well within the dramatic proprieties to put into the mouth 
of his Protagoras a kind of apology of his own fair-dealing with his pupils 
in the matter of fees. For his part, he says, he has arranged his charges 
on a special plan. "When any one has had lessons from me, he pays me 
the sum that I ask if he like; if not, he goes to a temple, takes oath to 
the value he sets on what he has learned from me, and disburses me 
that amount."8 And this trait may be regarded, I think, as indicative 
of an uneasy consciousness oi! their vulnerability at this point on the part 
of the more scrupulous members of the profession. What was likely to 
become of education under this system we can see by comparing the state 
of things at present.9 
As for Socrates in: ,his own person, it is not unlikely that he felt even 
for the most eminent representatives of the clique that sort of amused 
contempt which common sense has for those who preach without practis-
ing. Unquestionably his idea of education was influenced in no small 
measure by his relation of master workman and apprentice, the master 
being qualified as an instructor by his application, as well as by his pos-
session, of knowledge. In fact some such scruple may have lurked behind 
his own disclaimers of competence as sage and teacher. For if right action 
is impossible, as he believed, without exact knowledge, it is not entirely 
unreasonable, since the two are correlative, to look upon the one as the 
sign of the other. Of such proficiency at all events as he was willing to 
recognize, the Sophists, with the possible exception of Protagoras, had 
given little or no proof; they were neither the statesmen nor even the 
citizens whose craft they undertook to teach; they were strangers in a 
strange land, without residence or domestication, travelling salesmen and 
touts for their own concerns. And while an exception might be taken 
in the case of the rhetoricians, who were eloquent enough in all con-
science, still their subject itself was empty of instruction, a bladder of 
flattery and persuasion, an imposture equally with sophistry, like cookery 
and cosmetics-an opinion which Plato, no doubt, would share with him. 
But, after all, Plato's. suspicions, when he began to write, must have 
gone deeper than a mere distaste, call it snobbish or priggish if you like, 
for the Sophists' mercenary motives, deeper than a respectful deference 
to his master's prejudices or prepossessions. As teachers or educators for 
hire the Sophists were under the necessity of deferring to any wind that 
gave promise of filling their sails. For their experience of human nature, 
7 Philostratus. See Diels, 77 H, la. 
8 Protagoras, 328b. 
9 Pythodorus, general in Sicily, 427, spent 100 minz on a Sophistic trallllllg 
(Camb. Anc. Hist., vol. V, p. 225). Proxenus the Breotian, the friend of Xenophon's, 
was a pupil of Gorgias. 
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from which their humanism was in great part derived, they were un-
avoidably indebted to those with whom they were most intimately asso-
ciated. And reciprocally, in the very process of adapting their knowledge 
to their pecuniary advantage, they were likely to be affected to a greater 
or less degree in their own characters. In particular were they warped 
in these respects by that portion of their public to which they immedi-
ately appealed, those ambitious and not always over-scrupulous young men, 
like Alcibiades, upon whom as followers and disciples they depended for 
their reputation and income. They were obliged at the same time to depre-
cate, as far as possible, the disapproval of the general, which might other-
wise have imperilled their security, as it did Anaxagoras', and to adapt their 
teaching, revolutionary though it might be, to the social conditions in which 
they found themselves, not merely for the sake of safeguarding their own 
persons but for the sake of satisfying the political ambitions of their pupils. 
That they were not completely successful at all points is no great matter 
for amusement. On the whole Gorgias appears to have been the most adept 
at this sort of thing, for tradition preserves a note of admiration for his 
adroitness in recommending Hellenic unity to the Athenians, while he 
dexterously avoided shocking the Athenian passion for empire by any ex-
plicit reference to a friendly understanding with the other cities, dwelling 
on their triumphs over the Persians with the implication that victories 
over the barbarians were occasions for rejoicings in contrast with those 
over Greeks.10 But Protagoras, on the contrary, who was confident enough 
in boasting of his occupation, suffered the mortification of being expelled 
from Athens and having his books, all that could be collected of them, 
burned in the inarket-place; while Prodicus for all his precautions is sup-
posed to have died of hemlock no less than Socrates.U Under the, circum-
stances it is intelligible enough that none of them should have been able 
to avoid the danger of degenerating into charlatans on the one hand or 
trimmers on the other and opportunists on both. 
To the Athenian of the period in which Plato was personally interested 
man had become in the words of Aristotle's famous definition, a "political" 
animal almost exclusively. That is to say, in modern terms, he was not 
merely an intellectual, moral, and social being, though he was all these 
too; but he was essentially and above all a public character. Not only did 
he feel himself most at home when abroad in the city-in the agora, the 
gymnasium, the palrestra, the theatre; as a member of a small and exigent 
democracy he was a citizen the greater part of the time-not by fits and 
starts as with us, at odd moments of a periodic election or the like; he 
was continually in service, as a soldier, a dicast, an ecclesiast, a liturgist. 
10 Philostratus, lives of the Sophists, I, 9. 
11 I give this gossip for what it may be worth-as a posterior recognition of the 
perils to which the Sophists must have been exposed from the general public. 
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So narrow were the dimensions of the state that all its interests were 
bound to seem peculiarly instant and pressing, as all its members were 
bound to appear in the light of neighbors, in the guise either of personal 
friends or rivals. As a free man, if this be freedom to live without privacy, 
his privilege as well as his duty was the government and on that account 
he guarded and cultivated it jealously. His own interests were inextricably 
bound up with the policies of his country, if not completely absorbed by 
them. And as his existence so was his ambition-to attain authority in the 
affairs of his city and among his fellow-citizens. 
That Plato himself inherited what had come to be a kind of tradition 
in his day and in his family is clear enough from his constant preoccu-
pation with statecraft and the constitution of society. Nor is there much 
doubt of his chagrin at finding himself debarred from a public career, 
whether by virtue of his own conscientious scruples or by force of adverse 
circumstances, so that in taking up the cudgels against Callicles in favour 
of the philosophic as contrasted with the political life as he does in the 
Gorgias he has perhaps a little the air of making a virtue of necessity. 
But however he may have come by his final conviction of the viciousness 
of democratic politics, the sincerity of that · conviction is unquestionable--
as is the depth of his aversion for those whom he felt to be responsible 
for it. 
For it was to this very vice, as he: saw it, that the Sophists had catered 
in their address to the young men who Bocked about them; and in so 
doing, if they had not directly and at first hand infected their own con-
temporaries, had fastened the evil upon their countrymen. What they 
offered in exchange for their hire was a complete preparation for public 
life, or in our language, "citizenship." To be sure they had not the 
foresight to anticipate the modern cant of "service" as a cloak for the 
self-seeking activities which they encouraged; they had few pretensions to 
altruism or humanitarianism-that was reserved for the Antisthenic heresy 
of Stoicism. But they did, the cannier of them like Protagoras, make a 
great pretense of virtue. "Young man," he says to Hippocrates, who is 
thinking of joining his classes, "on the very day you first attend them 
you will go home a better man; and so on day by day you will continue 
to improve unceasingly."12 Even Gorgias, who is praised among his 
fellows by Meno, with the tacit concurrence of Anytus, the Sophist-baiter, 
for his freedom from this sort of hypocrisy,13 is driven to admit, when 
cornered, an esteem for justice as a prerequisite for public life, and a 
willingness and ability to impart it to his pupils.14 Prodicus finds his affair 
12 Protagoras, 318a. 
13 Meno, 95c. 
H Gorgu11, 460a-b. 
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in a highly edifying apologue of the youthful Hercules and the solicita• 
tions of the forward Kakia, alias Eudaimonia, who is finally dismissed, we 
must suppose, for her more respectable, if less seductive rival Arete.15 Of 
such disguises, however, convenient as they may have seemed to men of 
greater prudence like Protagoras, Gorgias, and Prodicus, their hardier and 
bolder colleagues and admirers Polus, Callicles, and Thrasymachus were 
frankly disdainful. And not only so; they were equally free in proclaiming 
the incentive by which they actually drew and held their youthful clientele 
-the possibilities of personal advantage and promotion opened to their 
ambition by the prospect of democratic leadership. 
Democracy and leadership! And what, pray, we may ask with Plato, is 
leadership in ~ democracy but demagogy? Whose instrument is oratory-
not philosophy or "science" either in the Greek or in the English sense, 
but rhetoric, the art of flattery and persuasion, or, as Plato has it, the trick 
of inducing irrational belief. Such, to make a distinction rather than a 
difference, was the special subject of the rhetors, like Gorgias, who boasts 
-they are always boasting-that it was< the orators not the architects that 
built the walls of Athens. And while the Sophist might be supposed in 
strictness to busy himself after a braver fashion with legislation or state-
craft, our "political science" so called, yet in the nature of the case every 
Sophist was perforce a rhetorician too. Like the rhetorician he gloried, 
after the example of Protagoras, in his ability to speak on either, or for 
that matter on both, sides of every question and to make the weaker 
cause appear the stronger. In short, there is so little to choose between 
rhetor and Sophist that Plato finds his own distinction untenable and 
abandons it in the long run. Not virtue, not justice-however they might 
shuflle when pushed-was their common means and aim-but expediency 
and success, policy and preferment. 
Naturally the youth of the period were not immune to the kind of 
virus which the Sophists had to administer-if it were not that the latter 
chosei their toxin with particular reference to their patients. It is hard to 
say whether the victim invites his exploiter or vice versa; probably the 
election is mutual. But the youth with whom the Sophists had to deal 
was a peculiar one. Youth is a disquiet and uneasy age at best. And 
yet as long as the spirit of the age-what we used quaintly to call the 
Zeitgeist-is strong enough to engage their activity and to impart a favour-
able bent to their activity, their restlessness is rather an advantage than the 
contrary. Their impetuosity and enthusiasm may as likely as not make 
them agents, even advance-agents, of progress-provided the current which 
carries them is setting in that direction. But unfortunately the age of the 
15 Xenophon, Memorabilia, II, 1, 21. 
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Sophists was itself a backwater, a period of unsettlement and indirection. 
The very causes that had so recently brought about the material prosperity 
of Athens were already at work upon her moral undoing. Hardly had 
the Persian wars left her pre-eminent among the cities of Greece than she 
began to take advantage of this supremacy to enrich herself by a kind 
of fraud with the revenues of the Delian Confederacy and to use them 
for her own aggrandizement. Wealth, luxury, power, and art had begun 
to sap the integrity of the national character. The traditional simplicity 
of manners and the ingenuous piety of the past were lost forever. Politic-
ally she had become in fact that most anomalous of human institutions, 
a democratic empire, exacting tribute from her former allies and wards, 
and subject to all the ignominious shifts, evasions, and equivocations inci-
dent to a false position, until she acquired the cold-blooded cynicism to 
throw off her disguises and appear to the Melians as what she actually 
was-a despot. Nor was the Peloponnesian War with its ghastly sequel 
the Sicilian Expedition so far below the horizon that its ominous shadow 
might not have been visible to the far-sighted eye of a philosopher. And 
to all these unsettling influences must be added the gradual incursion 
of natural or physical philosophy or "science" and its disintegrating effect 
upon the national consciousness. And yet foreign and inimical as it was 
to the Athenian genius, that philosophy contained at worst a tincture of 
animism, a strain of "pan-psychism," that sufficed to lend it an illusion 
of intelligibility and ethical significance; it had held out to the open minds 
of its day like Socrates at least a mirage if not an adequate image of 
reality--only to break down at last into the "flowing science" of Hera-
clitus, the first of those hopeless time-philosophies,; that seem to supervene 
fatally upon the wreckage of all these grandiose systems of nature, whether 
metaphysical or positivist. Of the consternation with which the event 
must have been viewed by serious inquirers it is possible to form some 
idea from Plato's moderate and measured account in the Phtedo of the 
perplexities of Socrates, 
rcoU&.; 6'66ou; EA:Oov,;a (f)QOVl't6o; :nid.vot;, 
after the disaster, supplemented meagrely as it is by the Memorabilia. 
"When I was young," says Socrates, "I was tremendously eager for 
the kind of wisdom which they call the investigation of nature. I thought 
it was a glorious thing to know the causes of everything, why each thing 
comes into being and why it perishes and why it exists at all. . . . Then 
one day I heard a man reading from a book, as he said by Anaxagoras, 
that it is the mind which orders and causes' all things. And I was pleased 
with this theory . . . and delighted to think that I had found . . . a 
teacher of the causes of things quite to my taste. . . . But my glorious 
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hope was soon snatched away from me. For as I went on with 
my reading, I saw that the man had made no use of intelligence and 
did not assign any real causes for the ordering of things, but mentioned 
as such air and ether and water and many other absurdities. . . . And 
so it seems to me that most people, using a name that is utterly inappro-
priate, when they speak of that sort of thing as causes, are but groping 
as it were in the dark."16 
But why insist? Have we not ourselves been sufferers of a like stupe-
faction from a very similar disappointment of our own? Have we not our-
selves suffered from a similar sense of loss and vacuity, chagrin at the 
"bankruptcy" of our own grandiloquent science and its specious promises? 
And yet for the Athenian-if like us he had not taken it already-there 
was still a further step to go with Leucippus and Democritus, who were 
to leave him with nothing substantial but the atoms and the void and to 
reduce morality, if not reality itself, to an affair either of convention or 
of nature. 
To such conditions may be assigned in the main the rise and ascend-
ancy of the Sophists. By them those young and eager spirits who had 
been so recently bilked of their confidence in "science" were offered a 
new interest agreeable not only with the temper of their years but with 
the distemper of the times. While Socrates was trying-not with com-
plete success it must be acknowledged-to find a remedy for the incredulity 
and libertinage which seem the inevitable outcome of such moments 
of disenchantment, and by suggesting some principle of personal integrity 
and control was endeavoring to fill the vacancy left by the lapse of re-
ligious and moral conviction and to encourage man to set up of himself 
a law against his members-and to establish an ethical autonomy or 
autarchy against the anarchy of self; it was the weakness of the Sophists 
that they found nothing better to do in the emergency than to flatter the 
passions and instincts that were reigning at the instant, a source of con-
fusion to their possessors and of danger to society and to culture itself. 
The quibbles and ingenuities and doubles entendres of Euthydemus and 
Dionysodorus, the contempt of Thrasymachus and Callicles for decency 
and their identification of virtue with temperament and of happiness with 
pleasure, so like our own contumacious paradoxes, are indicative of the 
mood of their youthful contemporaries-no less than the rhetorical du-
plicity of the orators with their conscienceless indifference to subject or 
theme--and their disregard for consistency in truth. In fact there is pre-
served in the so-called ~wcrot A6yot or "The Double Tongue" what 
amounts to a text-book compiled as it might be by a graduate of the 
16 Pha:do, 96a-99c. Cf. Sophist, 242c-243b; Memorabilia, I, i, ii, etc. 
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school for the instruction of students in the politic art of facing both 
ways. Of the good and the evil, the just and the unjust, the true and 
the false it furnishes arguments to prove alternately their identity and 
difference and with equal facility demonstrates that wisdom and virtue 
are and are not capable of being taught. Whoever the author of this 
invaluable educational compendium, not so very unlike a modern manual 
of debate, he would seem to have taken his cue from Protagoras, whose 
boast to make the weaker reason the stronger (-rov i\-r-rw 'Aoyov %QEL-r't0> 
n:otELV ), insincere if not actually deceitful in itself, was fated to lead into 
this very kind of ambiguity and confusion, the weaker and the stronger 
soon becoming precedents for the worse and the better with a complete 
reversal of normal values. 
Nor are the meagre fragments of Protagoras' works that are preserved 
to us wholly reassuring with respect to his ingenuousness. "About the 
gods," he remarks, in his essay "On Divinity,"17 "I can be certain of 
nothing,-whether they are or are not or what they are like ( on:oi:o( nvE; 
lMav) for there are many hindrances in the way-the obscurity of the 
subject and the brevity of human life." There is, of course, no little 
danger of interpreting such detached and scattered dicta, wrenched, as 
they frequently appear to be, from their context and quoted in connections 
and for purposes controversial and other which their writers would never 
have approved. But in this instance the author's practical agnosticism, 
which would debar the gods from citation in human debate,18 is attested 
by the complementary pragmatism of what was undoubtedly his most 
famous utterance, that sentence from his "Truth" or 'A1.11{}ua which strikes 
the key-note of Sophistic humanism-"Man is the measure of all things; 
of what is that it is and of what is not that it is not." After this fashion, 
in denying the existence of a general or universal truth, says Sextus Empir-
icus, 19 he first introduced relativism into philosophy.20 And to much the 
same effect Gorgias in his treatise "Concerning Unreality or Nature"21 
undertakes to maintain three theses: first, there is no such thing as truth; 
second, even if there were such a thing, it would be unintelligible and 
past finding out; and third, even if it were intelligible, it would be in-
communicable and inexpressible-contentions which he proceeds to dem-
onstrate in a style of reasoning not a little like that of Plato's Parmenides.22 
While Prodicus describes the whole circle, disposing of divinity and reality 
17 IIEQt 0erov. Diels, £rag. 5. 
18 q. The,efetus, 1~2d-e. , , 
19 i;tihJcrt 't(l lj)<lL'VOµEV(l E%<lO''t<p µova. 
20 i;o ltQO~ 'tL, Cf. Diels: 74 A, 14. 
21 II £Qt i:ou µ-iJ <>"V"to~ t\ iteQt 1pucrEro~. 
22 Diels: 76B, 3. 
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at a single stroke by making man the measure even of the gods, whom 
he held, so it is reported, to be merely the apotheosis of whatever and 
whomever mefi\ have found useful or beneficial to themselves.23 
Now, whether the Sophists were altogether sincere in such expressions 
or spoke and wrote solely out of a vain delight in literary ingenuities and 
verbal coquetries, for the sake of displaying their rhetorical skill and 
cockering the self-conceit of their youthful auditors is no great matter. 
In the latter case it is only their character which is at stake; in the former 
their philosophy-the one being exposed at worst to the charge of levity; 
the other to that of shallowness. In neither event is their influence particu-
larly affected. Whatever their convictions, they were at all events, like 
Huxley, great popularizers. And it is seldom indeed that a popularizer's 
influence is dependent either on the depth of his thought or on the ele-
vation of his principles. He needs only to cocker his hearers' self-esteem 
by echoing distinctly what is already ringing confusedly in the recesses of 
their inner consciousness. The great system-makers are not as a rule those 
who have had the strongest appeal even with the intelligent public. Had 
the late William James never written so compendious a work as his 
Psychology, his vogue would have been diminished no whit. His versa-
tility and his timeliness would have seen him through; he knew the 
word and the season, above all that XatQ6i; upon which the original 
Sophists were always harping. And in whatever manner we take them, 
as exhibitionists or sciolists-and the two characters are by no means in-
compatible-the gravity and extent of their influence is unquestionable. 
The dialogues of Plato are alone sufficient evidence; he at least was not 
one to expend his strength in an empty bout with shadows or men of straw. 
With the extrusion, then, of the divine or spiritual the Sophists had 
pretty well succeeded in delimiting humanity at the one extremity, and in 
establishing a precedent of which humanism has seldom or never rid 
itself. It was not that Protagoras and his immediate followers, any more 
than their later-day successors, abjured the gods outright; that would 
have been too impolitic-professed atheism was no more in fashion at 
Pagan Athens than it was in Renaissance Europe or Victorian England 
or than it is at present in Methodist America. What they denied of 
spirituality was relevance tacitly or explicitly. Possibly, like Huxley or 
Spencer, they would have allowed it a figurative or symbolic sanctuary 
in poetry or, following the suggestion of William James, would have 
relegated it under strict censorship to the subconscious. But practically, 
like Montaigne, having once made it obeisance, though with rather less 
ceremony, they were content to ignore it and go on about their business, 
which was so pressingly with this world and its denizens. 
23 Diels: 77 B, 5. 
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And yet clear as their pos1t1on appears in this respect, they failed 
signally to define the other end of the scale with anything like equal 
precision, being satisfied-for reasons of their own, no doubt-to leave 
it in an obscurity which continues to becloud it to this day. That it is 
man that is the measure of all things, and not the pig or the tadpole 
with which Plato twits him, is so far forth to Protagoras' credit; and 
Plato himself retracts the taunt on reflection. But there are so many 
slippery gradations between man and animal-as witness Pyrrho's pig-
that practical humanism has never been quite sure of its footing since, 
or secure against sliding insensibly even past the tadpole to its native 
ooze.24 In so far the advantage-the argument of historical tendency-
lies with Plato, whose sneer had thus much justice in it, despite his 
retraction, that it did recognize what was indeed the bearing of the whole 
movement, whether of conventionists or naturists, to confound sooner 
or later nature and human nature in a single amalgam, obviously and 
directly on the part of the naturists; but equally so, though less immed-
iately on the part of the conventionists, in denying any sanction to morality 
other than pure convenience or utility. And this, it must be granted, was 
equally the inclination of the Renaissance-namely, to run the two natures 
into one and to integrate man with physics, or mechanics-machina mundi 
-only the Renaissance, it would appear, with the assistance of science, 
carried the work to a successful conclusion, upon which Protestantism 
with its natural law in the spiritual world, seems to be setting the seal. 
So life becomes not a psyche but a blind elan. 
Aside from such confusion, incidental perhaps to its Heraclitean sen-
sationalism-vigorously as Plato protests it on this score-could Protagoras' 
dogma-for dogma it has virtually become-have ever been anything 
but anathema to him? "Man is the measure of all things." Whatever 
else the formula may mean, it means at least that man is the sole maker-
the "creator" as we like to say-of values, even-as Prodicus would add 
pragmatically with William James if it were not humanly impertinent-
of divinity. "The noblest work of man is god." As a result justice and 
"the other virtues" are deprived of objective attestation; the whole edifice 
of ideas collapses; and truth and reality, like sensation and perception, 
become subjective and fail of other authority or sanction than can be 
found in the convention or the nature to which the Sophists referred. As 
between these two horns of the dilemma upon which they had cast them-
selves, it would appear from their own utterances and from Plato's hints 
and innuendoes that the former alternative was elected by Protagoras, 
24 1'0 what particular humane category, for instance, is to be assigned the refined 
pleasure of scratching oneself incessantly [ Gorgias, 494d], or for that matter those 
delights for which Polus envies the Great King and Archelaus of Macedon? 
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Prodicus, and possibly Gorgias, the latter by Thrasymachus, Polus, Callicles, 
and Hippias. 
To judge by Plato's off-hand and allusive references to it the distinc-
tion between nature and convention had become a commonplace by his 
time. At all events it was sufficiently matter of course to furnish point 
for a jest.25 But to the historical Socrates it was no doubt a novel polemical 
weapon and one of which he was not indisposed to avail himself in a 
pinch, as Plato's Callicles, speaking in character and with verisimilitude, 
presumably, is shrewd to observe. "And this ... is your smart trick for 
getting the better of us; when anyone speaks according to convention you 
smuggle nature into your interrogations; and contrariwise, if one mentions 
nature you switch to your convention."26 Evidently it was not always 
Socrates' methods that distinguished him from his adversaries-the con-
fusion of his contemporaries on that score is not unintelligible-but his 
principles and, be it added; his conclusions likewise. In the first instance, 
the controversy would at any rate appear to have revolved about the 
sanctity of law and custom ( the v6µot). And it is not impossible that 
the original turn was that given to it or recorded by Xenophon in the 
discussion between Hippias and Socrates as to whether such institutions are 
to be considered human or divine in origin-a debate in which Socrates, 
like Montaigne at a later date, distinguishes, as he does so often.27 Some 
laws, he is sure, are divine, and unlike those of human provenance, 
ineluctable. 
In Sophistic circles, however, with the abrogation of divinity common 
to the unqualified humanism of an age of enlightenment, the interest had 
shifted from the question of legislation as such to that of the law or prin-
ciple proper to man. As with Socrates it had become an ethical as well as a 
legal or juridical problem. In this division of opinion Thrasymachus and 
Callicles come forward as the counsel of nature. "Justice is the conven-
iency of the powerful;" what is agreeable to the strong-that is justice. 
Like Nietzsche after them they explain existing customs as in the main 
a defensive or protective mechanism on the part of the weak against the 
encroachments of the strong and as such subversive of natural-that is, 
of genuine-right and equity. In effect one' party is by all accounts quite 
as selfish or "instinctive" as the other; so that Socrates is well within his 
rights in retorting upon Callicles that the weaker and inferior actually 
turn out in that case to be the mightier. 
But while this general attitude of both Thrasymachus and Callicles is 
very much similar, still it is possible to discriminate, since Plato is hardly 
25 Protagoras, 337c-d. 
26 Gorgias, 483a. 
27 See Memorabilia IV, iv. 
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likely to have intended a duplication of character in the two of them. 
Obviously, then, as Socrates' retort indicates, the Sophistic relativity is 
capable of serving as a principle of democracy as well as of autocracy. 
If man is the measure of all things and what appears to each is what it 
appears to him, there will be as many goods as there are individuals. And 
further, inasmuch as there is no standard, no authority by which the 
priority of one or another may be settled other than the good-seeming 
of the individual-since all interests are themselves on an equality, equally 
good and equally valid-it follows that the only possible decision as be-
tween conflicting interests will be some form of might-that of the 
superior individual, the bedeutendes lndividuum, at the one extreme, or 
an overwhelming combination of inferior individuals at the other-tyranny 
or democracy. In either case indifferently might makes right. But while 
Thrasymachus for his part is prepared to accept the consequences of the 
premise and to recognize by force of necessity the might of confederated 
numbers and the might of native superiority;28 Callicles is willing to 
acknowledge the latter alone, resenting bitterly the former as a kind of 
usurpation or abrogation. In other words, Thrasymachus, who seems the 
more skeptical, the more annihilatory character, considers justice to be 
but a figment of the imagination, a mere ideal, while Callicles identifies 
it positively with nature as the Sophists understood it. 
At the same time there is no more doubt of Thrasymachus' position 
as such than of Callicles'. For them both the standard of human nature 
is set by the "original" spontaneous, the unspoiled "impulsive" primate 
with the will to power. It is this first of animals that is the "natural 
man." And Hippias differs with them only in entertaining a more benign 
and sympathetic sort of primitivism. Like Rousseau's his human nature 
seems to be endowed with a larger proportion of innate sentimentality. 
Whatever we may have become by custom we are all kinsmen, he 
declares, by nature.29 In other words this measure of all things is softened 
in his thought, as in Wordsworth's, into the innocence of a "child of 
nature." Indeed, Hippias might have felt at home among the Stoics or 
even the modern humanitarians. 
From this view of human immediacy or "instantaneity" Protagoras and 
Prodicus dissent-the former, at least, widely. Without transgressing the 
bounds that he has fixed to humanity he thinks of human nature as 
capable of correction and rectification by reason and experience, though 
how this desirable end is to be attained-let alone sighted-in the absence 
of a determinate standard he unfortunately fails to explain. Pragmatist 
28 Compare Thrasymachus' protest or appeal against the encroachments of Archelaus 
upon Larissa in Thessaly about 400 B. C. 
29 Protagoras, 337e. 
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and sensationalist as he is, he believes the race to be improvable-to some 
extent. Curious that the notion of human "progress" never broke in all 
its splendor upon the vision ,of these ancient speculators. Was it that they 
knew human nature so much better than we do or that their sense of 
moderation would have shrunk before the illimitable vistas of such a 
prospect? "Ka-r' livOQcmtOv <pQOVEt!" And thinking neither as a go<l nor 
yet quite as an animal Protagoras is evidently not altogether satisfied of 
the perfection of humanity in its "natural" and untutored state. He even 
conceives of a better nature in contrast with a worse, though to save his 
face he is obliged to deny that the one is "truer" than the other. "In 
education," he would say according to Plato, "it is necessary to effect a 
change from one state to a better . . . though no one ever made a man 
who once thought false think true, since it is impossible to think what 
is not [ ,:a. µ~ ovi:a] or other than one feels. But I believe that whereas 
a bad state of mind will give a man bad thoughts, a good state will give 
him thoughts of the contrary sort. Such ideas to be sure some call by 
inexperience true but I call them merely better, the latter than the former, 
but not true by any manner of means."30 
I assume as usual that Plato's proponents speak after the mind of 
their historical namesakes and that Plato's evidence to the views of the 
latter is at least as good as any other second-hand testimony to that effect 
which has come down to us. And although in this instance he is con-
fessedly putting his own interpretation upon Protagoras' philosophy, he 
could hardly afford, in the interest of his argument, to misrepresent its 
general tenor while it was still so fresh in men's memories. And yet for 
all his ingenuity-for I take it that in this passage from the so-called 
Apology of Protagoras Plato is making the best of Protagoras' case, 
feigning, as he says, to hold a brief for him-still for all that, he fails 
to extricate his client for the moment from the toils which the latter 
has spun for himself. In fact they are unescapable. What to the prag-
matist of the Protagorean stripe is the better or the worse but an opinion, 
which, as Democritus pointed out, may be invalidated by another opinion 
to the contrary? And while there may be states or conditions whose relative 
merit no sane man would dream of disputing, as health in comparison 
with disease, still in default of an objective criterion-like Plato's-such 
unanimity of opinion constitutes merely a fashion like another. Who 
knows but that in a community of ascetics or visionaries such values 
might be reversed just as they are with respect to health of soul in the 
30 Thei:etetu!, 167a-b. I read JtOVT)Q~ 'lj.lU)Ciji; ilf;Et rather than JtOV1]Qiii;, and supply 
ilf;ti; rather than 'ljlU:X:f] with :X:Q1JC1't1] as more agreeable with Protagoras' reasoning. I 
should like to call attention also to Protagoras' predilection for the words dµdvrov, 
)CC11]C1'tf], f3EA 'ttCO as more or less characteristically Sophistic. Cf. Socrates' summary of 
Callicles' creed in Gorgia!, 488. 
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every-day world? And yet, although the best to which Protagoras dare 
consistently aspire is but a "seeming good," still we must in fairness give 
him credit for catching through his envelopes of error a glimpse of an 
acquired and superior habit, "a second nature" and a better as within 
the possibilities of humanity. 
In somewhat the same way it is possible to detect on the part of 
Prodicus a recognition, however cloudy, of man's double nature. To be 
sure, he externalizes it, but that is inevitable under the circumstances. 
What else is the point of his apologue of Hercules, already referred to? 
As it is reported by Xenophon the young demigod is represented as turning 
alternate ears to the importunities of Kakia and Arete, vice and virtue, 
who incite him, the one to a life of indulgence and pleasure and sloth, 
the other to a career of toil and labor and usefulness. And while he 
fails in this the sole version of the fable to come to a final decision, the 
event could hardly have been other than a foregone conclusion in the 
minds of those already familiar with his legendary biography. From this 
rather stilted and chilly fancy, which was long admired as a model of 
elegant invention, there emerge two ideas-both of which are totally foreign 
to the naturalists or naturists-whichever you prefer to call them-the 
reality of temptation and the efficacy of choice or "free will." To Callicles 
and those of like kidney the one idea would appear as inadmissable as the 
other. How is it possible to be misled by the infallible promptings of an 
impeccable nature, or what is to be preferred before her faultless perfec-
tions? Nor is it going too far, perhaps, now that we are trying to make 
the most of the Sophists' possessions,-to suggest that in the case of the 
former idea, the idea of temptation with the accompanying implication 
of duty that seems to haunt it, this Prodicus, the verbalist with his meticu-
lous concern for the discrimination of synonyms, had stumbled upon a 
conception in advance of his age and contemporaries, even the majority of 
the Socratics themselves? 
But this, very likely, is to be too sanguine. And I am content to rest 
the case for those whom I have distinguished, awkwardly enough, as con-
ventionists, upon what is clear on the face of the evidence-particularly 
since Gorgias for his part has little or nothing to contribute. He does, 
to be sure, betray a rather queasy sense of justice-at least he is ashamed 
to acknowledge that rhetoric is wholly conscienceless; in defense he would 
shift the blame for the faults in which it is detected to those who use it 
improperly. But beyond this rather timid compliment to the v6µoi he 
hardly ventures-possibly in awe of his strident young associates Polus 
and Callicles, who have no hesitation in asserting that this subject is 
valuable just in proportion as it enables its practitioners to evade the law, 
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and to do_ as they like with impunity. In the upshot, then, the evidence 
for this brand of Sophistic, taken at the foot of the letter, hardly carries 
beyond a politic deference for fashion-that is, for official received and 
accepted opinion-whether re-enforced or not by legislation.31 
There is no use in arguing. The only possible philosophy for an age 
without standards, "an age of ideals," is some form or other of prag-
matism. Without standards there are but two virtues-the virtue of 
nature and the virtue of convention. And how rickety are their founda-
tions we have had an opportunity to see in our own instance, and in 
what danger they stand of collapsing into moral solipsism or protestantism: 
"my own mind is my own creed," which is again but another anarchy 
of self. 
Nevertheless it was upon some such philosophical ground that the 
ancient Sophists proceeded to erect their "ethics" of citizenship. No doubt 
to some of them such an end seemed to be1 the most satisfactory within 
the reach of human endeavor and politics, indeed to be "the good life" 
itself. Such was the case with Callicles. But fortunately they constituted 
by no means the sole party in Athens--they and those who sought to 
them from one motive and another-the young and ignorant and in-
genuous, the dissatisfied and disaffected, those who had broken with the 
past and despaired of tradition and "the wisdom of the ancients," placita 
majorum, and were desirous only of new things, the restless and disquiet 
and unruly, the irreligious and skeptical and unprincipled. A veritable 
motley, comprising, as we know, many a naive and simple spirit like 
Hippocrates, son of Apollodorus, who rouses Socrates before sunrise with 
the inspiring news of Protagoras' arrival in Athens--as well as many an 
amateur and dilettante and tuft-hunter like Callicles, who dissipates his 
patrimony in toadying to the intellectual snobbery of knowledge-to say 
nothing of such perverse and lawless resolutes as Alcibiades--parasite and 
host, knave and dupe. To all the confessors of the modish time and flux 
philosophy, "the partisans of progress"-to these mobilists in particular 
the Sophists served as a centre and rallying point. But however they 
might, as no doubt they did, flatter themselves after the manner of their 
kind upon their advanced ideas, they had still to reckon with an obstinate 
and formidable mass of the citizenry, "the great beast" of the Republic, 
inert and sullen of itself but rousing to dangerous activity at the prod-
dings of the Aristophanic or old Athenian faction. As an opposition that 
particular coterie had on the whole one advantage. Composed variously 
enough of the reactionary and conservative, the belated and backward, the 
timid and stupid, the pietistic and superstitious, the formalists and ob-
81 See for Gorgias' attitude, the Gorgias; and for the conclusion of the paragraph, 
the T hetetettiJ. 
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scurantists and precisians, it was solidly welded by a unanimous desire to 
strangle speculation in its cradle before it had done all the mischief it 
was capable of. Not that as a body they were themselves any more deeply 
religious, in spite of their professions of orthodoxy, than were many of 
those with whom they quarreled. And for all their solidarity they had 
the counterbalancing disadvantage of being on the defensive; and con-
scious of fighting a losing fight with their backs to the wall against the 
spirit of advance, they abused and hated indiscriminately those whom 
posterity has in the long run approved as prophets and condemned as 
charlatans. For the Sophists as compared with these obstructionists there 
is a good deal to be said; and it is only fair to take this point of view into 
account in appraising their apologists. For my own part I seem to see 
in this indiscriminate hostility an explanation of Socrates' indulgence of 
the dissidents and dissentients. The intemperance of the "puritans" and 
"fundamentalists," as we should call them in our barbarous jargon, in 
the confounding of him and his companions with the Sophistic profession 
in a general condemnation was surely enough to stir him to a measure 
of compunction as against a common persecution. Certainly, it was a 
sympathy without approval-a kind of ironic rapprochement as it is made 
to appear in the Apology and the Meno, 9lc-92c; for the conjunctiofli was 
at best too artificial to bear examination, as Plato's analysis showed when 
it came time to draw the distinction which was destined to make of the 
Socratic group, mainly through his own agency and in his own person, 
the saving remnant of humane culture and civilization. 
At the time of Socrates' death in 399, however, it cannot be said that 
such a distinction had been satisfactorily drawn or even discerned, in 
spite of a generation of effort on the part of him who was undoubtedly 
its originator. Unquestionably' the character of Socrates was exemplary of 
the humanistic idea at its best. But about his thought there was evidently 
something incomplete, a failure to follow through, such as is illustrated 
in the earlier dialogues of Plato, and about his expression there must have 
been something indecisive and equivocal, that his spiritual heirs and assigns 
should have come to speak in his name to such various effect, and, up-
setting the balance of elements which had been harmoniously blended in 
his nature, should have become so widely estranged in their own persons. 
It may be that the fault, if his lack of didacticism was a fault, lay with 
his method, his dialectic-with his preference for stimulation over instruc-
tion. Or possibly his curiosity was to blame, which, willing to discuss 
every question under the sun, was unwilling to trancher any. His pro-
fession of ignorance and skepticism gave to his philosophy the appearance 
of a bare form-a blank cheque which his followers were free to fill in at 
88 
THE SoPHISTS 89 
their own discretion - if indeed that were not just what he himself 
contemplated. 
At all events he had hardly drunk his cup of hemlock in the prison, 
when his companions began to disperse in their several directions, each 
bearing with him his portion, as much as he was capable of carrying, 
large or small, of the Socratic inheritance, leaving Antisthenes and Plato 
to divide between them the bulk of their master's estate; for relatively 
insignificant as the former may now appear and actually was, to give 
him credit for all that can possibly be claimed for him, it is true that the 
two great systems of philosophy as a guide to life have ever since remained 
the Stoic and the Academic. 
Of the principal survivors of the little band the story goes that fearful 
of the Athenian <k!mos they sought a temporary asylum with Euclides 
at his home in Megara-Aristippus to betake himself in the fullness of 
time to the court of Syracuse; others to return sooner or later to Athens, 
where 1Eschines cut for a while something of a figure as a composer of 
"Socratic" dialogues, much admired in their day, and· Antisthenes set 
about the not ungrateful task of indoctrinating pupils of his own with 
the seeds of cynicism. As for Xenophon, he had already departed on that 
course of adventure which in spite of its precariousness yielded him an 
interval of repose and recollection on his farm at Scillus in the plain of 
Elis. Of the remainder of the original company the greater part appear 
to have settled like Phredo into what is for posterity a decorous if inglor-
ious philosophic twilight-o ;cavrrov d.Q1ta%-rfii;;. 
That Plato was ever so far forgetful of propriety, to say nothing of 
his own dignity, as to embroil himself overtly with these old associates 
of his, who had shared his intimacy with their revered and martyred 
leader, is a notion too discordant in itself to be seriously considered in 
the absence of conclusive evidence. And yet it was quite the fashion for 
a while, and may be still for aught I know, to set him and his former 
companions by the ears on the flimsiest of pretexts or indeed, on no pretext 
at all. In particular there has been a disposition to sprawl Antisthenes all 
over the Platonic record and to use the names of Sophists, like Protagoras 
and even Euthydemus, as "masks" for the author of Sathon. But no 
matter what the provocation on the part of Antisthenes-and provocation 
was his metier-such a contention, in default of anything like proof, is 
enough to strain the elastic limits of credulity to the breaking point. 
Under the circumstances, then, the matter may be left, with this brief 
mention, to the good sense of the general reader, who, whatever his disa-
bilities in the eyes of scholarship, has at all events no thesis to grind. 
Nevertheless it is hardly conceivable that Plato should have found in their 
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individual careers either anything like a complete way of life or a thoroughly 
satisfactory expression of human nature. Upon Xenophon he must have 
looked as pretty much of an outsider, if not an actual deserter or renegade. 
Notwithstanding his personal regard for Euclides he has shown again 
and again his impatience with the arid eristic which his friend under the 
influence of Zeno and the later Eleatics was grafting upon the Socratic 
tree of knowledge. Nor would the authorship of .i'Eschines have been 
likely to impress him as much more considerable dialectically than the 
belletrie of Isocrates; not impossibly he had good grounds for deprecating 
still another Socratic travesty. While Aristippus' complaisant accommo-
dation of Socrates' eudaemonism with the sort of hedonism for which 
Sicily was notorious would only have confirmed such suspicions as he 
may not unreasonably have formed already of the man's mind and char-
acter. As for Antisthenes, whatever respect he may have felt for the 
moral seriousness of him who alone can be regarded as in any sense a 
rival, it would have taken a stronger digestion than Plato's to stomach 
the crudeness and acerbity of "the strong man" of Cynicism. His in-
temperance, his narrow-mindedness and impatience of learning, his inso-
lence, his un-Attic unmannerliness and rudeness and vulgarity-in a word, 
his thorough-going dogmatism-if I may allow myself the parody of a 
pun in his own mannerl2-was quite enough to revolt an Athenian of 
the old stock, a patrician and aristocrat, albeit a philosopher, a man of 
taste and refinement to boot. To Plato he must have appeared, for all his 
sincerity, as little better than the Sophists with whom he had formerly 
foregathered and to whom he was indebted for his "exhibitionism," as 
well as for the didactic and hortatory style which was not without its 
admirers among the ancients. No, as illustrations of a liberal discipline 
none of these personages-Socratics still less than Sophists-was capable 
of satisfying the sense of moral reality which Plato had acquired as a 
result of his initiation into the counsels of his leader. At most, if we 
must make a merit of their influence, they were capable of provoking 
him by the spectacle of their shortcomings, had such an incentive been 
necessary, to that precision and completion of the Socratic idea upon 
which he was to spend the most vigorous and fruitful years of his life. 
The fact is that the strength as well as the weakness of the Socratic 
dialectic resides in its skeptical, its essentially critical character. It is not 
by chance that the dialogues wherein Plato for the most part follows his 
master's method turn out to be so uniformly dubitative or inconclusive. 
They are models of inquiry and research, exercises in the eradication of 
error and the assaying of residues. In this respect they suffer, as criticism 
32 See Diogenes Laertius, VI, 3: "f3tf}A.LIXQLOU %IXL vou," etc. 
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always must, from the defect of their qualities. Nor is it insignificant 
either that controversial as they necessarily are under the circumstances, 
they should be so heavily shotted against the Sophists and so uniformly 
indifferent to the Socratics. Aside from any consideration of delicacy-
for is it too much to assume that Plato was sufficiently ingenious in a 
pinch to have founJ some way of attacking their principles while sparing 
their persons, as he seems to have done in the case of the l\frgarians?-
aside from any such scruple, if he has neglected the one party for the 
other, it is for the perfectly intelligible reason that he found the latter 
of little or no importance in comparison with the former.:l:l 
At all events in dismembering Socrates they had lost whatever claim 
they might otherwise have had to his consideration. And in spite of the 
tremendous influence of Stoicism, that supposititious child of Antisthenes, 
Plato w.i.s right; for the student of humanism the Socratic sectaries are 
virtually negligible. For him it was the spirit of Sophistry that was the 
startling and significant apparition of the age-that spirit which has risen 
again and again, as often as laid, to distract the minds of successive gener-
ations. Talk of the legacy of Greek science as much as we please, it had 
in sober truth few positive assets to bequeath. As a matter of fact it is 
not improbable that the Greeks would have had difficulty in understand-
ing what we now mean by the term. It is perhaps an open question 
whether our physics is not to dissolve into a kind of mathematics; but if 
so, we may be sure that it is not Greek mathematics that will liquefy it. 
Nor have I overlooked the fact that our "philosophy of nature" appears 
to be backsliding into a pre-Aristotelian, even a pre-Tim:ean stage, in 
which matter is rapidly dematerializing into a sort of spectral ectoplasm 
composed of space and time and ingredience or something even more tenu-
ous and wraithlike, comparable with the "more and less" and the "inde-
terminate dyad." How apt the instance it hardly becomes me to say; but 
it serves to emphasize the sanity of Socrates in discounting current science 
and of Plato too, for as long as he remained under Socrates' influence. 
But Sophistry, on the contrary, is perennial, as, I venture to think, Plato 
once foresaw, in contrast with the transience of science and the vagary 
of the Socratics. It has its roots in the human breast where it was planted, 
and draws its virtues and vices from that very soil. Nor is there need of 
further explanation why Plato, in his great moral dialogues, having once 
turned his back upon the "science" of nature after the example of his 
master, and ignoring the heresiarchs of Socraticism, addressed himself to 
3:1 Not improbably he felt that they were all more or less tainted with sophistfy 
and was satisfied that in attacking the Sophists directly he was cutting at the toot 
of the evil, and might leave the branches to fall of themselves. 
91 
92 PLATO 
the criticism of "the new morality" as instituted by the elder Sophists-
its ideas on man, on nature, and on human life. 
It is not unusual to speak as though there were an abrupt break 
between the older physical philosophy, which had reached its term for the 
time being with Democritus, and this newer ethical speculation with which 
the names of Protagoras and his fe1lows are inseparably connected. And it 
is true enough, I suppose, that the former movement had apparently suf-
fered one of those suspensions or dubitations which we have recently been 
celebrating under tl1e commercial figure of a bankruptcy. ln reality, how-
ever, it was not so much an interruption as a transformation. What Demo-
critus had done was virtually to deny objective validity to the "secondary" 
properties o~ matter,34 and in so doing to call in question a phenomenal 
explanation of the outer and extended world, in the interest, as he believed, 
of a more profound and intelligible conception of reality. Now, whether the 
Sophists were fully conscious of the significance of their procedure or were 
ridden by the kind of fatality that attaches to an idea as to a curse or a 
blessing, it was upon these rejections, the discards of the Democritean 
system, that they pounced and out of which, after reshuflling them, they 
undertook to construct their theory of human nature, its proper ends and 
activities. 
Unpalatable though the atomic theory as such may have been at the 
start to Democritus' countrymen-in the picturesque phrase of a historian 
of their philosophy, they found it too "gritty" for their taste;35 still its 
secondary and indirect effects were of tremendous importance and justify 
to a great extent the respect we have been wont to pay it, notwithstanding 
the confusions to which our desire to assimilate it to our own' conceptions 
has given rise. Or after all was it less Democritus' hypothesis itseif that 
was responsible for men's gradual change of attitude, than the general 
charge upon contemporary thought which induced concurrently the Demo-
critean physics and the Sophistic ethics? But this is, no doubt, to dis-
dinguish too curiously; as the fir8t to formulate the idea Democritus de-
serves whatever credit belongs to it. At all events its point consisted, not 
in anatomizing matter, or yet in reconciling, according to the prevailing 
interpretation, the Parmenidean one with the Heraclitean many, but in 
pointing to i the eventual quantification of nature. To be sure, Democritus 
had not the mathematics for the task; but he did make, by hook or crook, 
what has turned out to be the correct forecast. It remained only to develop 
the calculus and to add a few further quantitive hypostaseF, like mass, 
inertia, and attraction, in order to complete the metaphysics of ~cience. 
34 'VOIJ,(p XQOdl .•• h'eii ll'a-ioJJ,a. xa.l. Xll'VO'V: Diels, £rag. 125. 
35 A. W. Benn: The Greek Philosophers. ' 
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But meanwhile the knell of the qualitative interpretation of nature had 
already tolled. If substantial reality is indeed reducible in the last resort 
to differences of shape, size, and position solely, then all those objective 
conceptions of truth which have occupied so prominent a part in the 
history of thought are suspect and questionable. Quality and value, agree-
ably with the view of Democritus and the Sophists, became wholly sub-
jective and illusory, mere counters of opinion, one as good as another. 
"As things seem to you," in Protagoras, "so they are to you, and as things 
seem to me so they are to me; and what appears to no man is not."36 
Granted if you like that the Sophists themselves were no great phil-
osophers in the strict sense of the term.37 None the less they had seen 
the writing on the wall, whose-ever the hand; and in laying claim to 
an ethics they ,vere obliged to pretend as well to some sort of consistent 
epistemology in accordance and an ontology consistent with it, however rudi-
mentary and inchoate its character. Not only had they a "real" or practical 
W eltanschauung, determined in part by their own interests as well as the 
exigencies of the "enlightenment;" but they had been, many of them, 
pupils or students of such systematic thinkers as Anaxagoras and Hera-
clitus, to say nothing of Democritus himself. In short, it is impossible to 
deny them the same sort of scholastic rating as we accord the majority 
members of our universiti~s at the present time. Writing occasionally on 
physical and even mathematical subjects, they devoted themselves assidu-
ously to the cultivation of linguistics, philology, anthropology, ethnology, 
archa:ology, and folklore, to say nothing of civics and political and social 
science, and of literary interpretation and appreciation. In fact, the so-
called "moral sciences" revert to them. On the whole, their conception 
of learning is, if anything, much nearer our own popular ideas than is 
Plato's. While as for the normal and methodological phase of science 
which we are more likely to associate with metaphysics-and this is the 
point after all-they were quite capable, as the titles and remains of their 
writings show, of giving such an account of knowledge and experience in 
general as sufficed not merely to justify their own conceit of wisdom and 
to impress their contemporaries but also to leave its mark upon posterity. 
As sensationalists, then, whose creed centered in the relativity of knowl-
edge and the indetermination of reality, so far were they from breaking 
or interrupting the continuity of philosophic thought-which was after 
all as alien as themselves and as antipathetic to the genuine Athenian 
genius-that they were merely extending the Ionian or Milesian succes-
36 Thetetetus, 167b, 15le. Cf. H. Gomperz: Sophistik und Rhetorik, s. 228. 
117 For a rather minimizing estimate of their endowments in this particular, sec 
H. Gbmperz: Sophistik und Rhetorik. 
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sion-if I may call it for convenience by the name of its originators-
iato the province occupied to-day by thei moral and social sciences,-thc 
Gei.steswissenschaft!-a movement not without its counterpart in modern 
times. Their psychology, dependent as it was upon bodily structure and 
organization~ was in proper terms a derivative of physiology; their ethics 
reduces to a species of i11stinctivism as it might be determined in one 
way or another by custom or expediency-a sort of social tropism. Their 
man, though the cock of creation, was but a featherless biped with a 
hypertrophied brain. Indeed, they were but a step short of behaviorism 
and may have missed it only by the breadth of a name. In sum, their 
originality consisted, not in any revolutionary discovery or invention, but 
in the explication of a transmitted principle. Such in brief was their prac-
tical or "real" philosophy, whether worthy of the cachet of metaphysics or 
not. And it was this W eltanschauung, quite as much as their specialized 
instruction, which recommended them to those eager and unsettled young 
spirits who had been so recently bilked of their confidence in the de-
moded science of their predecessors. 
In itself all this generalization was enough to arouse Plato's disapproval, 
but particularly so when considered as what it not improbably was, an 
apology for character and conduct. Not only was there something in-
herently false and hypocritical in the pretension of men with such ideas 
to the possession of any wisdom at all, let alone that wisdom whose func-
tion it was to secure the well-being of society-the royal or kingly science 
as Plato called it; not only was their private practice open to suspicion-
"Is it not disgraceful," Socrates exclaims, "that men in such case should 
bear themselves so presumptuously!"-but their official code was no less 
corrupt and vicious, as exemplified in their identification of pleasure with 
happiness and of the public with the good life. It is on the former counJ 
that Plato attacks Polus' glorification of doing as one likes, anticipatory 
of the Emersonian "whim," contending against that promising young 
pupil of Gorgias' that it is; better to suffer wrong than to do it and that 
the offender's sole chance of salvation is to pay the penalty and purge his 
soul of his guilt. On the latter count he takes issqe with Callicles, the 
precursor of Nietzscheism, preferring the lot of the philosopher before 
that of the politician, the theoretic before the demagogic life, in an argu-
ment whose studied urbanity as usual rather adds to its acerbity than 
detracts from it. 
And yet defective as the Sophists' humanism might appear in other 
respects, the gravamen of offense was to be found in its upper register. 
What actually moved Plato to indignation, we may believe, was their 
contempt of the higher notes of human nature. In the same breath with 
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which they avowed the relativism incidental to their theory of knowledge, 
they proclaimed the adequacy of an organ so constituted, of an atomic 
and phenomenal consciousness, to all the needs and requirements, to the 
aspirations as well as the appetites, of man. It was of such a creature, 
confessedly so feeble and imperfect, that they had the impudence to make 
not only arbiter but the autocrat of creation, sov,ereign of good as of 
evil. "I am far from saying that no man is wise," so runs Protagoras' 
Apology, "but I call him wise who, changing things about, makes good 
to seem and be in lieu of evil."38 
For all their astuteness, clever as they were in the main, they failed 
to notice--or it troubled them not at all-that their rationalism, in assert-
ing the self-sufficiency of the natural man at the same time that it recog-
nized the infirmity of his faculty and confined him within the narrow 
partitions of a pragmatic truth, had left of human nature nothing but a 
mutilated and misshappen trunk. In their partiality in making man de-
pendent for the source of his inferior being upon the promptings and 
insinuations of a nature no different in kind from that of the batrachian, 
Plato seems inclined to indulge them-such a view was not irreconcilable 
with his own belief in the duality of human nature; at least he reconsiders 
his sneer at the tadpole as man's rival in the art of mensuration. What 
he could not forgive or overlook, the unpardonable sin in his eyes, was 
the futility that would c11t off humanity altogether from participation in 
a higher and nobler reality, from that spiritual endowment or portion, 
{}Elar; 'ttvor; ?tal a.'tv<pou µoi.Qar;,39 which he himself believed to be man's 
birthright, affiliating human nature in its upper reaches with the divine 
through communication with the ideas of beauty, truth, and goodness. 
It is a great pity that the word supernatural has lost what would seem 
to be its native English connotation, particularly nowadays when we are 
in such dire need of a specific against the seductions of the subconscious. 
Were it otherwise, were it possible to redeem its character and restore its 
credit, we then might without impropriety contrast the Platonic with the 
Sophistic man as a supernatural creature-not wholly natural, not alto-
gether of the earth, but in some part, however small, of a superior order 
-a being not wholly earthly, if not wholly spiritual. It is in this sense at 
all events that Plato, without denying his mortality, has no hesitation in 
calling him divine ( {}Ei:or;) as he succeeds in transcending his lowlier 
station. Such is the force of the similitude which informs the Phcxdrus, 
Plato's most eloquent profession of faith in the spirituality, as well as the 
duality, of human nature. There the spirit of man is likened to a chari-
oteer endeavoring to guide a span of winged horses to his celestial goal. 
38 Thea:tetus, 166d. 
39 Pha:drus, 230a. 
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Of these the one is noble and of a noble breed, well trained and amenable 
to the rein; the other is quite the reverse, a rebellious, unruly brute, in-
clining to earth and struggling, often successfully, to thwart the efforts 
of its mate to lift the chariot of the soul. 
In effect then, as illustrated in the figure, Plato's achievement, taken 
up and perpetuated by the Platonic tradition, was to spiritualize the 
naturalistic humanism, which was, to give them their due, original with 
the Sophists and for which, partial as it was, posterity and Platonism 
too is so far forth in their debt.40 But instead of leaving man with his 
harassed conscience alone in the universe with the lower animals, the 
beast and the brute for his best allies, the humanism of Plato promoted 
him to a companionship, a real though humble friendship with divinity 
and made him a sharer in its ends, an ally of the gods. 
The procedure, if I may so speak of it, by which Plato succeeds in 
transforming in this manner the imperfect humanism of the Sophists and 
in reclaiming for man's usufruct, his spiritual heritage, consists with the 
distinction which he draws in the Republic between the two minds-the 
one lower, and the one higher-the reason and the nous. The reason 
is clearly enough the agent of rational discourse, the instrument of abstrac-
tion and comparison and inference as exemplified in the process of ratioci-
nation. The nous however is difficult of definition. On some accounts I 
should like to translate it soul. In the respect that I am now considering, 
in respect of man's spirituality, soul is perhaps the nearest English equiva-
lent; it has the proper poetic and imaginative associations. But it is, if 
anything, too sentimental. In accord with the Hellenic genius, which was 
never obsessed by the fantastic delusion characteristic of heretical roman-
ticism that it is possible to know with the emotions, there is about the 
Platonic nous, even in late tradition, more than a trace of intellect, of 
which English soul has been pretty well stripped by precedent, in great 
part, of false-Platonizing poets like Shelley and Wordsworth.41 I might, 
then, if I were confined to a single expression, compromise the matter 
by calling nous, in despite of paradox, the intellectual spirit. In any case 
it is the organ of spiritual divination or intuition, the faculty apprehensive 
of ultimate truth or reality.42 
40 I still speak, it will be noticed, of Plato's dualism in spite of the tripartite analysis 
of the soul in the Repubhc. But this partition notwithstanding, human nature is even 
there viewed as in division between the vou~ and the 'to ba.tuµf)'tLXov, the luµo!; 
taking sides with one or the other according to circumstances. 
41 While Dean Inge, for instance, in his Philosophy of Plotinus renders nous by 
spirit, Professor Brehier in his edition and translation of the same author calls it 
fintelligence and Mr. McKenna in his translation of the Enneads employs intellectual 
principle. 
42Jt is the means by which we apperceive-if I may try to bring another term to its 
right scnscs--the ideal forms, which become in this way spiritual presentations. 
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So Plato refers to it as an O'ljJL~ or {}fo, a vision or insight; though-
again we must guard against the ambiguities of our English vocabulary-
so far from being visionary in the sense of deceptive or passive, it is the 
power which enables us to communicate with the great impersonal ideas, 
significantly that of beauty as well as of truth and justice: and which ( to 
adopt a later and Stoic phrase) presides over the hegemony of man, main-
taining the order and balance of his members-an activity that while in-
tellectual and moral is no less spiritual-for we have to remember that 
Plato's beauty is but the lowest rung of the ladder, and that his virtue is 
a wisdom, not an emotion, however much they, as truth also, may be 
irradiated by love.43 
Doubtless, it is and always has been the problem of humanism to 
find some way of living satisfactorily in this world. It is difficult, if not 
impossible, to look upon a life of unhappiness otherwise than in some 
sort a failure. Nor with Plato is happiness less than a prime considera-
tion. But then satisfaction and happiness are conditioned, to say the 
least, fully aSI much by the nature of man as by the nature of the world. 
How little they depend, in Plato's opinion, on worldly circumstance alone, 
is made clear at the beginning of the Republic, when he accepts, the chal-
lenge of Glaucus and Adeimantus to show that the good man in utter 
destitution is in better case than the wicked in prosperity and repute. 
"Ein guter Mensch in seinem dunkeln Drange 
1st sich des rechten Weges wohl bewusst." 
In the course of this dialogue undertaken with such a purpose he pro-
ceeds to develop realistically what he considers the genuine humanism 
together with the kind of society in which alone the genuine humanism 
after his kind can flourish and short of which it must remain a private 
accomplishment of the individual. That there is a great deal in the 
Republic to shock and offend modern sensibilities-and those of the Greeks 
too for that matter-it would be idle to deny. Even Plato seems finally to 
have despaired of the socialization of humanism and resigned himself 
to its isolation in natures of distinction.44 
Nor is man's destiny without bearing upon the problem of satisfactory 
living either. And that man has a future no less than a past Plato firmly 
believes. About the exact character of that future he is not certain; in 
speaking about it he invariably had recourse to myth. But certain he is 
that it depends upon the manner in/ which man lives his present life and 
on the degree to which he has cultivated what I have ventured to call 
his intellectual soul. 
43 To discuss Platonic love at this point would take me too far afield. Suffice it to 
say that it was a passion largely intellectual and spiritual even in its concrete manifestll• 
tions, as Alcibiades' tribute at the close of the Symposium amply attests. 
44 Cf. T M~tetus, l 72'd- l 77 c. 
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So much he takes as assured. And those who speak otherwise speak 
after the mannei; of the Sophists. No man can be happy in defiance of 
his higher nature or save in conformity with the peculiar virtue of human 
kind. And that nature, that virtue is discovered, not by the tlickering 
reflections of sense or the capricious suggestions of impulse and instinct, 
not even by the tentative gropings of reason-but by the immediate reve-
lation of the great immutable ideas to the soul. 
45 T he,ztetus, 17 6e. Cf. the whole passage. I cannot translate the quotation. P,rofessor 
Fowler translates for the Loeb Library as follows:-"Two patterns, my friend, are set up 
in the world, the divine, which is most blessed, and the godless, Which is most 
wretched." This is very well; only we must bethink ourselves that divine and godly 
and blessed have not the same connotations in Plato as they have for u.s. There hi1$ 
been so much Platonism assimilated by Christiani~y that in reading Plato we are 
disposed to view him inversely in the mirror of our own religion. Perhaps godlike will 
come nearer his meaning than divine, which is in many instances nearly synonymous 
with spiritual, while blessed should be freed of its peculiar theological suggestion. 
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If we seek a raliying point, to begin with, for Plato's political concep-
tions, we shall find that they all centre about a single idea-the idea of 
justice. No other problem has given rise to more discussion, I suppose, 
than just this problem of the relation of justice to society and the indi-
viduals composing it; and in no age, perhaps, has it given rise to more 
discussion than it did in the age of Plato. The difficulty has to do partly 
with the nature of justice itself and partly with the discovery of a practical 
working definition. Abstractly it is easy enough to explain that justice 
consists in giving everyone exactly what he deserves. But who in any 
co.Q.ceivable state. of society is able to determine exactly what any one de-
serves-least of all he himself; and how is it possible to make sure that 
he gets it, neither more nor less? It is bad enough to ad:minister the 
approximate, the rough and ready justice of the courts of law without 
undertaking to settle such questions as these with the fallible judgment 
at our disposal. And in default of the competence and method necessary 
to such an adjustment society has been obliged to muddlei along as best 
it might, allowing the individual, within certain limits, to take what he 
can get, mider the dubious pretence of legality, without considering too 
closely whether he deserves it or not, in accordance with the good old plan, 
"That they should take who have the power 
And they should keep who can." 
Under these circumstances there has gradually grown up a kind of 
discrepancy between men's professions and their practices, between the 
sort of thing that they talk in public and the sort of thing that they confess 
only to themselves or acknowledge only by their actions. On the one hand 
they pretend to be animated, both as individuals and as citizens, by a 
single and unique preoccupation with justice, upon which they assert 
their community and government are founded. On the other hand they 
seek their own advantage by any means in their power, regardless of their 
neighbours or of any particular standard of right and wrong. Eulogising 
virtue and honesty with their lips, they recognize in their hearts that 
nine times out of ten such scruples are merely side-issues, that the main 
aim is success, and that success is not to the good, the virtuous, and the 
honest, but to the strong, the audacious, and the adroit. It is the latter 
sort of man who gets on in the world; he is honored, flattered, respected 
without concern fon his merits. He enjoys the esteem of the public, he 
unites their votes, he holds their offices, he rewards his friends and pun-
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ishes his enemies. And what is more, he carries his point, he controls the 
administration of what he and every one else calls justice, he influences 
legislation and law in his own sense. In short, right becomes merely his 
conveniency, the conveniency of the powerful. And in the meanwhile we 
go on, in our fatuity, calling the conveniency of the unjust justice and 
speaking as though justice were the foundation of our polity, when in 
reality its foundation is force or fraud in one form or another. Why not 
come out with it, then, flat-footed? Is anybody the dupe of our hypocrisy? 
Why not say that it is the smooth appearance, the plausible pretence that 
we have in mind when we educate our children in the shams of honesty 
and virtue? Why not acknowledge that it is a mask for their actions with 
which we are providing them? that we are teaching them a vocabulary 
with which to impose upon the simple and credulous who accept phrases, 
like specie, at their face value? Why not confess among ourselves that 
our little speeches about justice are for business and politics, a mere 
diplomacy of language; but that for the practical affairs of life our in-
centives are success and self-advancement? In other words, why not define 
justice as the advantage of the reigning interests whatever they may happen 
to be at the time? 
Modern as all these notions seem, though cloaked as a general thing 
with a decent reticence, they are all, as a matter of fact, to be found in 
Plato. They are to be found in the mouth of Thrasymachus in the 
Republic; they are to be found in the mouths of the Sophists, of Callicles 
and Protagoras and Gorgias, the rationalists and utilitarians of the time, 
with whom: they were as favourite doctrines as with Nietzsche. Indeed, 
the young men of Plato are full of the futility of virtue and honesty and 
justice, of the expediency of wickedness and the high hand, of the natural 
rights of the strong and the dexterous over the weak and the simple, of the 
excellence of success and the legitimacy of any means by which it may be 
attained. 
It is against these thinkers that Plato undertakes to vindicate the de-
sirability of a genuine and absolute justice, and it is in opposition to their 
notions of government that he attempts to rear an ideal republic upon 
the corner stone which they have rejected as unfit for the purpose. And 
what concerns him most, to begin with, is less justice as a founadtion of 
government than justice as a foundation of character. At the outset it is 
the individual to whom his gaze is directed and not the community. In 
one sense his Republic is less interesting as a plan of society than as a 
kind of symbol of the human spirit. It is the inner city, the city of the 
soul, the spiritual city, upon which he has his mind's eye; and he con-
structs his ideal polity for the sake of comparison. The justice which it 
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is so difficult to study in the small letters of the individual, he hopes to 
read to better advantage in the capital letters of the city. For after all 
the just man and the just city are counterparts one of the other, and what 
is justice in the individual is justice also in the community, or contrariwise. 
With this idea in mind, then, his first care is to re-establish the cause 
of justice and virtue as the basis of human character. And to do so he 
proceeds to argue that man is happy just because he is virtuous. To de-
clare that virtue insures success and that honesty is the best policy is 
absurd and mischievous. The upright man may be successful or not-it 
makes no difference; in any case he can dispense with success, his satis-
faction is in his own merit. Strip him of the goods of existence; refuse 
him the respect due to his qualities; worse than that, let him have the 
reputation of an evil doer; and last of all, let his righteousness escape the 
approval of the gods themselves-even then, as compared with the wicked 
flourishing in prosperity, surrounded with admiring followers and Batterers, 
and blest in spite of reality with the name and character of virtue; even 
then, says Plato, will the just man be happy and the unjust wretched. 
Yes, it is better to suffer injustice than to commit it. And if the wicked 
understood his own best interest, he ought to desire nothing so much 
as to be brought to justice, to expiate his misdeeds, and by so doing 
regain his innocency. 
But this justice which forms the basis of character and which, properly 
understood, insures the only genuine happiness, what is it? Who is the just 
man? It must be confessed that Plato's definition strikes the modern as 
rather peculiar, mainly, I think, because it lays no particular stress upon 
the rewards accruing. At the same time it seems to me that it has one 
advantage over other definitions in being the only one which furnishes 
in any sense a working formula for the regulation and adjustment of 
human affairs. And it does so by indicating the conditions under which 
alone justice can work itself out. It indicates as nearly as can be done, 
I fancy, the manner in which some sort of relative justice can be attained. 
It has its difficulties too, but as a definition it has this advantage. 
Justice, then, in the individual consists in a kind of balance or equilib-
rium among the faculties by virtue of which each is enabled to do its 
proper work and to contribute in its proper degree to the welfare of. the 
entire being. In other words, justice is defined by its obligations rather 
than by its privileges, one reason evidently why the definition is bound 
to be distasteful to us nowadays. In Plato's mind there existed a sort of 
hierarchy among the faculties. At the top stood the mind, the vou~, 
perhaps what the Germans call Vernunft; at the bottom lay the appetities 
and passions; and midway between was situated the courage or mettle, the 
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kind of thing we think of when we speak of a man of spirit, the nearest 
thing in Plato's psychology to the will. In the just man the mind or 
reason should rule. And by mind or reason Plato understood not merely 
the discursive or syllogistic reason or ratiocination but something akin 
as well to divination, intuition, or insight. Of the perception of higher 
truth he always speaks as an o,jni; or {Ma, a seeing or vision. To this prin-
ciple the passions and appetites are to be kept in subordination by means 
of the animation or courage, which in a correct balance of the faculties 
allies itself with the mind or voiii;. Such is the just man; he is the man 
who has harmoni7ed and ordered his spirit in this wise. 
In this respect, it will be noticed, Plato stands at the antipodes from 
the Bergsonians, who seem in some obscure manner to divorce the intui-
tion as an organ of truth from the reason and to associate it with the 
instincts, so making of it a servant or confederate of the third estate. In 
this interpretation the mind is left in isolation with no direct and instant 
perception of reality, while the sole reality immediately appreciable be-
comes that of the desires and impulses-a sense of eternal mobility and 
flux, in which the foundations of character are submerged and finally 
swept away, and truth itself loses all stability and degenerates into an 
exclusive regard for the many as the sole reliable data of consciousness. 
Now it is in just the contrary sense, for the sake of making his idea 
of the hegemony of reason clearer, that Plato undertakes to construct an 
ideal polity, where it will be easier to recognize the qualities of justice 
in accordance with his conception of the parallelism between individual 
and state. To take this structure of Plato's quite literally, as has been 
done so often, would be to make a grave mistake and to prove oneself 
more of a Platonist than Plato himself. As a matter of fact Plato is not 
wholly serious about his republic. He is led to introduce the subject in 
the first place as, an illustration of his general theory of justice. Such, he 
says, would be the perfect state, where justice may be studied to the best 
advantage. Once embarked, however, he becomes interested in the under-
taking for its own sake and dwells complacently upon its details; occa-
sionally he is quite carried away by it. But on the whole, the plan itself 
remains a ;eu d'esprit, a play of the imagination, which he never expects 
or hopes to see realised in anything like the shape in which he proposes 
it, as is evident from a comparison with his Laws. It is, then, a species of 
allegory or parable--ot better, perhaps, a metaphor; it is seriously meant, 
not as a practical project, but as an illustration of Plato's general ideas of 
government, and it is full of penetrating aperfUS with regard to human 
nature and society. 
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Ideally, then, such a city as he proposes as a paradigm of the just man, 
is composed of three definite and distinct classes or orders analogous to 
the three faculties of the individual. At the bottom there are the workers 
of all kinds-tillers of the soil, labourers, handicraftsmen, merchants-all 
who contribute to the support of the community. Just above are the war-
riors, the protectors and guardians of the commonwealth, answering to 
the courageous or spirited principle in man. From the latter are chosen 
the rulers, who in the perfect city are philosophers prepared for their work 
by a long and arduous discipline and selected by successive eliminations from 
the mass of the warriors. As philosophers they are naturally unwilling to 
undertake the task of government and are moved to do so only by a sense 
of their responsibilities as the sole members of the city competent for the 
business. They descend into politics as a man who had been used to the 
light of day would descend into a den or cavern. But then, no man who 
wishes to rule is fit, in Plato's opinion, to do so. 
In a state so constituted justice will consist, as before, in a balance or 
equilibrium of forces under the direction of these philosopher-rulers, who 
make up the vov~ or mind of the community. They will be assisted in 
their labours by the class of warriors or guardians, who, like the cour-
ageous part of the individual, are intrusted with the preservation of order 
as well from sedition within as from hostility without. Of the workmen 
Plato has little to say; they fail to interest him particularly as long as they 
do their work in subservience to their superiors and provide for the sub-
sistence of themselves and others. At the same time it would be a mistake 
to suppose that he contemplates their condition as one of serfdom or 
slavery, though to such a condition he has no great objection in the abstract. 
In this instance, however, his city exists as a whole for the benefit of its 
inhabitants-or rather, it would express his meaning better to say that the 
inhabitants exist for the benefit of the city. It is not for the sake of the 
well-being of such and such a person, he declares, that the state exists, but 
for the well-being of the whole. In this way the working class has its share 
of the advantages resulting from the organization-a share proportionate 
to its abilities and importance. As in the case of the purely physical prin-
ciple in the individual, however, its predominance over the other orders 
would mean confusion and disaster. It has neither the wisdom of the 
lawgiver nor the mettle of the warrior. It is, therefore, as though Plato 
took it for granted or assumed it rather than despised it. As its functions 
arc perfectly familiar already, he sees no need to dwell upon them. 
Of the warriors, on the contrary, he has much to say that is curious 
and interesting. In this connection it must be remembered that the rulers 
are originally members of this class, being selected from it in accordance 
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with certain standards so that up to a given point the conditions of both 
are alike. It is evident that these two classes taken together form an aris-
tocracy; there is no doubt about it, they are the superiors of the third 
estate in every respect. Distinction of classes is a postulate of the system; 
it is a part of the conception of justice, for without distinction justice be-
comes unthinkable and the acme of injustice resides in the socialistic con-
ception of an equal participation by unequal participants. And this dis-
tinction he purposes further to strengthen by means of a gross convention 
such as necessarily underlies every government, whether it happens to be 
that of the divine right of kings or that of the divinity of the people's 
voice and the sacredness of the will of the majority. Pure convention in 
either case and equally preposterous on examination. But so it is and 
so it is indispensable. And in like manner Plato proposes the necessary 
convention at the root of his polity. We will teach the people, he advises, 
that while they are all of the earth and brothers, yet they are made of 
different materials-some of gold and some of silver and some of bronze; 
and the nobler the metal, the nobler the creature. This is pretty gross, to 
be sure-pretty nearly as gross as) the infallibility of majorities; not quite, 
perhaps, but still gross enough in all conscience-and yet admirably adapted 
to the purpose-to safeguard the distinction and hierarchy of the several 
classes and orders. At the same time its crudity was tempered in practice 
by the circumstance that Plato provided for a rectification of the errors of 
birth. If a gold or silver child should be born in the brazen class, he was 
promptly to be promoted as soon as he manifested his quality; on the 
other hand, if a bronze child should be born of gold or silver parents, he 
was liable to degradation in like manner. 
Though an aristocracy, then, in the most distinctive sense, the two 
upper classes were an aristocracy of merit. As a result they were not simply 
an aristocracy of privilege but an aristocracy of responsibility. They were 
carefully educated, and trained; their life was a severe and strenuous drill 
in the form of a rigid communism. They had no right to property of any 
kind save their clothes and their arms. They were without homes; the 
houses in which they lived, when they lived in houses rather than in 
camp, were not their own. They received their support from the com-
munity. They ate in messes. They had their wives and their children 
in common. Their marriages were temporary; and the offspring of their 
transient unions were taken possession of by the state and cared for in 
public nurseries. No man was supposed to be able to recognise his own 
child or identify it. Woman, as having the same faculties as man only 
weaker, was to bear her part in the same affairs and occupations. Like 
him she was to exercise in the pala:stra; like him she was to bear arms 
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and fight the battles of her country; like him she was to eat in her mess 
and live homeless and free of permanent ties save her duty to the state 
and society. 
By such ways and by such means did Plato dream of founding and 
preserving an efficient and uncorrupted aristocracy. Shocking as some of 
these notions are to the modern consciousness, there is still something to 
be said for them in theory if not in practice. It was in some such manner 
that the monastic orders were managed; and no more powerful and effec-
tive organizations ever existed. But then they were pledged to chastity 
as well as to poverty; and there are but two ways to be chaste-either to 
have no wife or to have only one, of which the former is doubtless the 
better if it were not for the difficulty of perpetuating the caste. At the 
same time it must be acknowledged that Plato has recognized one im-
portant truth: that an aristocracy, to be worthy of the name, must be 
free from individual self-seeking and from the distracting influence of 
feminine frivolity. Let the order be as wealthy as you please-the wealth-
ier, the better as an order; but see that its members remain unmoved by 
hopes of personal enrichment, if they are to devote themselves heart and 
soul to the furtherance of the object for which their body as a whole exists. 
And see too that they are removed from the insinuations 06 the sex with 
its vanities and caprices and irrelevances, if they are to amount to any-
thing as public officials. Even as it is, there is nothing more egotistic 
than the father of a family, who is obliged to prefer the welfare of his 
wife and children before that of his neighbors; there is nothing more dis-
heartening in the pursuit of a disinterested aim than the reproaches of a 
family which imagines its; own interests to be neglected and is piqued at 
the prosperity of acquaintances and associates. Even at the present day 
there is nothing more exigent than the claims of a family. How much 
greater must have been its distractions at the time of Plato, when wives 
were ignorant as well as idle and luxurious! Consider the confusion intro-
duced into Socrates' final interview with his friends by the irruption of 
Xanthippe. All this Plato saw; he had probably some knowledge of 
Xanthippe himself and the kind of home she made for her husband. And 
against this sort of thing he tried to provide by breaking up the home in 
the interests of disinterestedness and by abrogating the importunities of 
wife and children at the same time that he removed the children from the 
timid and selfish instruction of their parents. And for his day, too, he 
would have accomplished not a little in giving woman something to do, 
in supplying her with a mission, or to employ the modern cant, in making 
her an instrument of social service. But after all, he reckoned without 
his host; he failed to count with human nature, and he proposes as a 
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remedy for human weakness what is bound to seem to the average man 
something little short of a monstrosity. 
But after all, in this vision of things as they might be one must not 
take Plato too seriously. Nobody was ever more conscious of the diffi-
culties and paradoxes of his plan than he himself. Even in his own eyes 
it is hardly more than a castle in the air, to which he attaches only a 
relative importance save in as far as it helps him to realize his idea and 
principle of justice. Evidently in such a city as this, where everything is 
properly disposed and where every man is in the right place, justice will 
consist in every one's minding his own business. The well-being of the 
community will depend upon every individual's and every class's doing 
its own work and fulfilling its own function in its proper station in life. 
In other words, justice in the large as in the small is simply order. This 
is the reason why it seems to me that Plato's definition has a certain 
experimental-I hesitate to say practical-value which is wanting to most 
definitions of justice. It specifies the actual conditions under which justice 
is possible; there are no nice appraisements and delicate assessments of 
awards and emoluments to be made ... Provided every member of the 
community does the work for which he is fitted in the scale of his relative 
ability, he will ·automatically· re<;~~e his fdeserts. And here is, of course, 
the crux of the .system-the accu.r:ag: direction of the citizens' proclivities; 
and though 1.iYis· probabiy ~sief to determine what a man is fit for than 
what he is worth, still the former task is hard enough. And it is com-
plicated by the not infrequent occurrence of the exceptional case, who 
would have fared worse under Plato's authority than he does in the present 
scheme of things. Such persons are not seldom of great value to society, 
although that value may not be capable of exact computation. Of these 
exceptions the hardships are often extreme; they are suited for none of 
the usual employments, their services to the public are seldom recognized 
by their contemporaries, they seem hardly to belong to the world into 
which they have been brought-their livelihood is as problematic as their 
utility. Such a character was Blake or Coleridge, to mention only poets. 
And yet the development of moral types of the sort is as important for 
civilization as the production of Rothschilds or Bismarcks. In human 
society, as it is actually constituted by a free play of more or less spontan-
eous forces working elastically to approximate results, such characters are 
able, as a rule, to find some kind of place and existence, even though with 
difficulty. But in Plato's republic with its strict suppression of individualism 
they would have had no footing; contributing in no wise to the support or 
the protection of the government of the city, falling properly into none of 
his classes, they could expect no other fate than repudiation and banish-
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ment. Such, as a matter of fact, is the sentence to which he condemns 
the poets; much as he loves them personally, his polity has no room for 
Homer or Hesiod or Sophocles. They are but fabulists and makers of 
falsehood. At most they can be tolerated only as they will consent to 
teach useful and salutary truths; that is, as far as they cease to be variations 
and conform to the normal type of society. 
But however this may be, whatever the difficulties and inconsistencies 
even of an ideal constitution, one thing· is clear-Plato's conception of 
justice as an order or balance of forces in an individual and a community. 
Such has been his objective from the first, much as he may have loitered 
by the way attracted by the scenery along the roadside. Once he has 
reached this conclusion, however, he proceeds, with his conception as a 
criterion, to the more practical part of his work-the criticism of actual 
forms and types of government and the search for the best and most 
advantageous one possible. 
Since justice consists in a delicate equilibrium of powers, in the for-
mation of a perfect harmony out of a number of divers elements, it is 
evident that the task of insuring it is an exceedingly difficult and prob-
lematic one, requiring the highest kind of ability on the part of the 
ruler or justiciar. In fact, government is an art or a science demanding 
both natural aptitude and acquired skill. As such it is entirely out of the 
power of the crowd, which is bungling and foolish-the government of 
the many is a contradiction in terms; it is not a government at all but 
an anarchy. It boasts that it is a government of the people, by the people, 
for the people; and· so it may be. But none the less is it a government of 
the masses, of quantity, not of quality. As such it means the suppression 
of the minority by the majority. And since merit is always in the minority, 
it is the government of the better by the worse. Further, as it knows 
itself to be inferior and to have usurped a position which does not belong 
to it, it rapidly develops a distrust and a hatred for any sort of distinction 
whatever. 
Under these circumstances there are only two careers open to men 
of ability, who in happier conditions might become philosophers or lovers 
of wisdom. On the one hand they grow into demagogues; for being de-
barred by their talents from ruling, they can only learn to truckle to the 
multitude and to echo its whims and caprices, falsely pretending that these 
opinions constitute a system or philosophy of government-or, as we 
should say, a platform. In Plato's words such persons might be com-
pared to "a man who should study the tempers and desires of a big beast 
. . . he would learn how to approach and handk it and at what times 
and from what causes it is dangerous or the reverse, and what is the 
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meaning of its various cries, and by what sounds it is soothed or infuriated; 
and . . . when by constantly waiting upon it, he has become perfect in 
all his lore, he calls what he has learned by the name of wisdom and 
makes a method or art of it ... calling this honorable and that dishonor-
able, good and evil, just and unjust, all in accordance with the tastes and 
moods of the big beast." Or on the other hand, the man of ability who 
has no other opening for his activities and who is revolted by the role 
of demagogue, may engage in thei single pursuit which the mob are cap-
able of respecting; namely, the making of money. Hence the growth of 
a plutocracy along with every democracy. At the same time, as the accum-
ulation of great wealth in the. hands of a few tends to recruit the ranks 
of the needy, the rise of a plutocracy serves to reinforce the democracy 
which breeds it. In this way the proper balance of powers is broken up 
and destroyed; intelligence and courage cease to rule and the passions 
and appetites assume the ascendency; intuition is degraded from the reason 
to the desires. In a word, justice is not the controlling principle of such a 
community, but license, or, as the people delight to call it, liberty. 
"Is not this, indeed, a delightful state of affairs!" exclaims Plato with 
sardonic enthusiasm, "where a man may say and do just what he likes" 
and "where the individual is able to order his own life for himself just 
as he pleases," "where there is no necessity for you to govern . . . or to 
be governed, unless you like" and "where, because some law forbids you 
to hold office, there is no necessity ... that you should not hold ofli.ce"-
"a charming form of government indeed, full of variety and disorder, and 
dispensing a sort of equality to equals and unequals alike." And finally, 
"when a <lemocracy which is thirsting for freedom . . . has drunk too 
deeply of the wine of liberty, then, unless her rulers are very amenable 
... she calls them to account and punishes them"-is Plato prognosticat-
ing the recall? What she wants are "subjects who are like rulers and 
rulers who are like subjects; these are men after her own heart, whom 
she praises and honors both in private, and public," until "the anarchy 
finds by degrees a way into private houses and ends by getting among the 
lower animals and infecting them." "The father grows accustomed to 
descending to the level of his sons and to fearing them, and the son is 
on a level with his father-for neither of his parents has he any respect 
or reverence." "The teacher fears and wheedles his pupils, and the pupils 
despise their masters and tutors; young and old are all alike-the young 
man is on an equality with the old and is ready to compete with him in 
word and deed; and the old men condescend to the young and are full 
of jocularity and pleasantry; they are loath to be thought morose and 
authoritative and therefore they adopt the manners of the youth." "Even 
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the she-dogs are as good as their mistresses; and the horses and the asses 
have a way of marching along with all the rights and dignities of citizens; 
they will jostle a body if he does not get out of their way-and all things 
are full to bursting with liberty." "Above all, see how touchy the\ citizens 
themselves become; they chafe impatiently at the least hint of authority, 
and at last,, as you know, they cease to care even for the laws; they will 
have no one over them." 
Such is Plato's diagnosis of democracy; and though relieved by touches 
of humor, it is serious enough. Whatever we may think of it, it is 
necessary to remember one thing. Plato is not now theorizing; he is 
speaking from experience; he had seen democracy distinctly and close at 
hand. He had never run for office, I believe; but he had relatives who 
had stood within its danger and he had followed the trial and condem-
nation of his friend and master, Socrates. 
But his objections to democracy went even deeper. It was not only 
opposed to his principles by its disorderliness or essential injustice, its 
pretension to distribute a kind of equality among equals and unequals 
alike, its tacit denial of the fundamental facts of nature in the creation 
of better and worse, its confusion of higher and lower; but what was 
worse, it was antipathetic to his own character and disposition, which 
we.re finely aristocratic and distinguished. To such a person democracy has 
a way, it must be acknowledged, of making itself peculiarly detestable. 
Where the blame lies, I do not pretend to say-on both sides, I fancy. 
On the one side democracy itself has a hatred of distinction, which it 
makes no effort to conceal. As a matter of fact distinction is inimical to 
its existence. For that reason it likes to see pretenders to its favors on 
all fours at its feet. But at, the same time it can not be denied that the 
man of distinction frequently displays a superciliousness with respect to 
the masses which is as galling as it is in one sense undeserved. Every 
man is respectable as a human being whatever he may be as a constituent 
of the mob. It is worth noticing that Shakespeare, who speaks so slight-
ingly of the populace as such, modulates his voice when he addresses its 
individual members and treats even his fools with a kind of human sym-
pathy. But, at all events, that Plato detested his democracy as well as 
disapproved of it, seems pretty certain. He detested its vulgarity, its cant, 
its rough and ready judgment, its self-complacency; and he held himself 
aloof from it by prejudice, perhaps, as much as by principle. Nor were 
the conditions of demoralization under which he beheld it such as to 
elicit a favorable criticism even from a more unprejudiced observer. 
Nevertheless, with all allowance made for the circumstances, there is 
still something in what he says to make the thoughtful pause before 
pushing to an extreme a form of government which is so particularly 
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liable to extremity and whose virtue consists so largely in moderation. 
Other governments are likely to fall by deficiency of their own principle, 
democracy alone by its excess. 
At the opposite pole from the democratic type of government is the 
monarchical. With Plato's sympathies and ideas it is not surprising that 
he should more incline to the latter than the former terminal, although 
he can not approve of it unreservedly. Nevertheless, in the actual state 
of things, of all systems that seem to be possible he appears to believe that 
the best chance of securing something like justice is by the instrumentality 
of a benevolent despot-a single arbitrary ruler of good parts and dispo-
sition, neither weak nor violent, uniting in his own person the three 
attributes of the perfect governor-wisdom, courage, and steadiness. Such 
a character would appear to be the best equipped for weaving a harmon-
ious design from the diverse elements of society; above all he would seem 
to have the best opportunity of carrying out a consistent policy. In this 
characterization may possibly be detected a regret for Dionysius of Syra-
cuse, of whom he had hoped so much · and in whom he had been so 
bitterly disappointed. At all events, as he acknowledges, the happy con-
junction of circumstances necessary to unite these qualities in a single 
individual and to bring this individual into power is so rare as to be 
wdlnigh miraculous. And in default of such a ruler he declares for a 
kind of limited or constitutional monarchy, whose master is restrained and 
controlled by law. As for the other forms of government by the few 
as opposed to the many-namely, oligarchy and tyranny-he has for them 
no toleration of any kind whatever. 
In following Plato's discussion, as I have tried to do, with an eye 
to what seems most pertinent to our particular occasions, I have implicitly 
taken account of the most important tenets of his political creed as far 
as they have any modern interest or significance. It remains to indicate 
what is positive rather than negative in his conception. In the first place, 
that his theory of government is aristocratic., is perfectly clear. The two 
systems that he reprobates the most severely are democracy and plutocracy. 
The symbolic or metaphoric republic that he constructs for the purpose 
of illustrating the city of the soul, is ruled over by an aristocracy and an 
aristocracy pretty much unhampered by laws except of its own making. 
The will of the aristocracy is the law. And not only is it a government 
by an aristocracy which is the desideratum but a government for the 
aristocracy. The purpose and raison d' !tre of a state is to be sought not 
in mediocrity but in excellence. It is not by its average that a nation 
is justified but by its genius. And to the production and_ preservation of 
genius should its efforts be directed. Not that the remainder of society 
110 
PLATO'S POLITICAL IDEAS 111 
is non-essential and negligible, but it takes its value from above; and the 
cultivation of an industrial community merely for its own sake would h~ve 
struck him as absurd as the attempt to develop a stomach independent 
of the body. 
As far as these conclusions are a matter of terms, an affair of logic 
pure and simple, it is difficult to see that Plato is very far wrong in them. 
That the best are alone the natural rulers of a state and that the ruling 
should be done in the interests of the best is so obvious on statement that 
it has taken any amount of sophistication and any number of centuries 
to make it appear otherwise. Even then the contrary opinion has suc-
ceeded in gaining a footing only by means of an indoctrinated convention 
as gross as Plato's parable of the gold, the silver, and the bronze men-
a convention so at odds with the facts that its falsity is patent to the 
most superficial. That convention consist~ in the denial of the aristocratic 
principle-in the denial, that is, of any such natural distinction as better 
and worse. Or positively, it consists in the assertion of the romantic 
doctrine of equality-a doctrine that we are obliged to deny in deed a 
dozen or more times a day. In fact, so contrary is it to our actual convic-
tions that even the candidate for office is revolted when he is compelled 
to act consistently in accord with it and to abase himself to the level of 
those whom for the occasion he delicately designates as his equals. Nor 
is such a distinction between better and worse a practical impossibility. 
For the rough and ready purposes of government it is easy enough to 
make a partition of the kind. Education, property, nativity, even sex con-
stitute tests sufficient for practical politics. 
And yet, as usual in human affairs, there is in reality one obstacle in 
the way of applying the theory. The world is full of people who have 
come into it more or less accidentally and unintentionally. As they are 
here by no fault of their own and in fact would gladly be almost anywhere 
else if they could, and as in the gaiety of their hearts they will in all 
probability proceed to bring others like them into a place to which they 
find themselves so admirably adapted; the theoretical legislator like Plato 
finds himself at any given time with a collection of odds and ends on his 
hands, which it is extremely difficult to dispose of. To be sure, there may 
be no great harm in this folk. To adapt Plato's own figure, they are 
like the amiable but incapable owner of a vessel, who is a little hard of 
hearing and short of sight, and is indifferently acquainted with naviga-
tion, and who is coaxed and bullied by various members of the crew who 
hope to get the job of pilot. At the same time it is just this sort of 
gentry that complicates the legislator's problem. Theoretically Plato begins 
by making a clean sweep of them. He dumps the rubbish somewhere 
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outside of his boundaries and retains only such material as suits his own 
designs. But the solution seems hardly practicable at present, particularly 
since we in America have been pursuing the opposite policy. And under 
the circumstances it is this matter which destroys the regularity and 
symmetry of many a very pretty social theory. It is itself one of the forces 
or factors which go to shape the final result as it exists in fact and nature. 
It is a part of the destiny of nations. In short, if you have a population 
of a certain type, what else can you make of it than the kind of thing 
it lends itself to? At the same time,, to rescue as much of Plato's aris-
tocracy as is feasible, it is worth while trying to make the best of your 
materials. 
In the second place, innovator as Plato seems at first sight, it is clear, 
on second thought, that he is all for conservatism, as for aristocracy. Per-
haps the two ideas are in reality correlatives. At all events, once his ideal 
republic established, he would preserve it, if possible, in much the same 
shape forever. Indeed, rigidity is of its very essence. As its partitions are 
inflexible and inelastic, allowing only for a few sorts of vocation; so in 
itself it forms a more or less motionless and inalterable structure, incapable 
of any great modification: or adaptation. For the cultivation of that wide 
variety of individual character which we esteem one of the merits of 
civilization, it had no care. In its essence it was thoroughly socialistic-
a kind of higher organism in which the citizen had pretty well lost his 
personality. Like modern socialism it guaranteed his existence at the 
cost of his liberty. Further, as the best state conceivable, there naturally 
remained nothing more. to do for it except to conserve it in accordance 
with the principles laid down for its institution. 
On the whole, this seems to me one of the instances in which Plato 
is carried away by his project; and, as so often happens in such cases, 
it is necessary to go a little deeper to get the steady bearing of his thought. 
Obviously enough the motive that moves him in this particular instance 
is a care for the permanency of political institutions. And in this respect 
he agrees with Burke. He recognizes as true what is too patent to be 
insisted upon-that the life of a nation is a slow development, that its 
present rests upon its past, and that any change should be made slowly 
and carefully in the direction, of its growth. He sees that a state which 
breaks with its tradition is adrift and that innovation is especially dan-
gerous in a matter of government, whose adjustments are so delicate and 
complicated as frequently to escape the scrutiny of a single lawgiver or 
even of an entire generation. 
"All other errors but disturb a state, 
But innovation is the blow of fate." 
112 
PLATo's PoLITICAL IDEAS 113 
Not that he denies the value of a legislator who is thoroughly advised; 
such a person with the adaptability to meet any emergency with intelli-
gence, is better than any set of mechanical laws or provisions that can be 
devised in advance. But with the difficulty of obtaining such a director 
at any given time before his eyes-a difficulty that amounts to a virtual 
impossibility-he recommends a prudential respect for antiquity and 
tradition. 
In the third place and finally, Plato's ideas are as moral as they are 
aristocratic and conservative. The model of the just city is the just man. 
And as the just man exists for virtue, as he finds his happiness and good 
in virtue alone, so the just community exists for the same end and prospers 
accordingly. That Plato overworks the similitude between the two cases, 
must be granted. The main purpose, the higher justification of the 
Republic resides in demonstrating that the happiness of the just is the 
sole real and permanent good. The institution of the state is in one 
sense a side issue, undertaken for that purpose. Hence Plato is con-
tinually forcing the analogy. But in any case his constant insistence upon 
the necessity of virtue as a part of the very being of government, may 
at least lead us to ask whether the modern divorce between morality and 
public policy is altogether justified, whether it is not in some sense parallel 
with the attempt to separate morality from literature and art. That our 
civil government might be a little healthier for an infiltration of morality, 
I suppose, no one will dispute. And that international affairs should be 
conducted with some eye to moral considerations, would not be entirely 
out of the way either. And yet this is not just the point. By considering 
government from this point of view, Plato, like Burke at a much later 
day, was saved from .making of politics a mere technology removed from 
other concerns and artificially isolated as a wholly independent and self-
sufficient study like physics or dynamics. On the contrary, he was able 
by this means to keep in constant touch with human nature. In conse-
quence he succeeded in reducing some of the eternal principles of the 
subject to their very root in the moral consciousness. Arrd as a result, 
while many of his shifts and expedients seem little better than ridiculous, 
his general discussion has always commanded the attention and respect 
of statesmen of all nationalities and all ages. 
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